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              This study examines the phenomenon of doublethink as a core feature of the 
“mental software” that continues to define the character of post-Soviet societies. It is 
revealed in patterns of prevarication and equivocation that characterize the thinking 
and behavior of both the elites and the masses. Doublethink is also manifested in 
incongruous values and duplicitous rules that prevail in society. It accounts for the 
perpetuation of simulative and fake institutions of “façade democracy.” Political 
parties in post-Soviet Ukraine are analyzed as a major example of simulative and 
imitative institutions. Here, traditional ideology-based party taxonomies prove 
misleading. Political parties are quasi-virtual entities with the character of “post-
Orwellian political machines”: they operate in a topsy-turvy world of imitated supply 
and deluded demand. The study employs three levels of analysis: macro (surveys data 
and “Tocquevillean” observations); meso (biographical data and political discourse 
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                         The starting point of this research project is an intellectual inquiry into 
the reasons for the failure of the “transition paradigm” in post-Soviet polities. The 
meanings of the ambiguous post-Soviet “transition” and the factors that caused this 
ambiguity present a puzzle that is not fully resolved in political science literature, as 
shown by the review presented in Chapter 1.  Further, this study addresses what is 
deemed to be the “missing link” of the “transition paradigm” – namely, the problem 
of metanoia, or the mental change. For more than two decades after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, “Soviet legacies” are still a significant factor in post-Soviet politics 
and societies. Although that factor is frequently mentioned, it is rarely specified. This 
work attempts to define the mental legacies of the Soviet past – conspicuously called 
“Soviet mental software” – and examine how they influence the formation and 
functioning of new political institutions.                   
                       As discussed in Chapter 2, the Soviet civilization was a project that 
imitated modernity Therefore, the challenges of post-Soviet transition are discussed 
here as challenges of realignment with modernity.  The deficient modernity of Soviet 
communism perpetuated the historical Russian trait of “potemkinism.” It produced 
complex patterns of prevaricative and equivocative thinking and behavior. Their 
essence was insightfully captured by George Orwell in his conceptual frame of 
“doublethink.”  
                   Doublethink was the key element of the “Soviet mental software” -- a 
product of a number of factors that played together in the formation of the “New 
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Soviet Man,” as argued in Chapter 3. By the same token, the trait of doublethink 
became a major cultural legacy of the post-Soviet societies. It accounts for confused 
and ambiguous orientations, attitudes, and political behavior of both the elites and the 
masses.  
                  While doublethink is shown to be a generic feature inherent to all post-
Soviet societies, this study discusses post-Soviet Ukraine as a prime example and a 
showcase of that phenomenon – the society where the ambiguity of ideological values 
overlaps with the duality of collective identity and memory: “creole” Russophile and 
“post-colonial” anti-Russian. The impact of those dual orientations is briefly 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 4.  
                 The overall argument presented in Part One of this work is that 
doublethink – the trait of post-Soviet collective mind – breeds not only ambiguous 
and confused orientations, but also deluded political behavior, as well as virtuality 
and fakeness in political institutions.   
                 As a feature of mass consciousness, doublethink is manifested in political 
practices and thus inhibits the development of modern political institutions. Part Two 
of this work examines one specific example of such negative impact: the stalled 
development of political parties in post-communist Ukraine. The central question 
asked here is as follows: is the legacy of doublethink compatible with democratic 
consolidation?  This study also addresses a related normative question: is there a cure 




                         The primary method of this study is interpretive research focused on 
analysis of human self-reflection and meaning-making. 
1
  The body of data embraced 
by the study includes media news, commentary, interviews, published sociological 
surveys, as well as field observations and interviews performed by the author over a 














                                                          
1
 Primary methodological guidance was taken from: Peregrin Schwartz-Shea and 











THE CHALLENGE OF POST-SOVIET 




      CHAPTER 1.   POST-SOVIET EXPERIENCE: 








            Grand theories of political science have not fared well in the world of post-
Soviet politics. In the opinion of some leading scholars, many comparativists have 
chosen to “simply ignore the post-Soviet cases altogether as a way to protect the 
validity of their findings derived from other regional studies.” 
2
  
               Reality disproved the “triumphalist” notion that the end of the USSR was 
synonymous with a victory of the liberal democratic order.  Instead of an orderly and 
“paradigm-consistent” transition to democracy, we observe “a confused process with 
no clear direction.”
3
   
                The early post-communist discourse of “transitology” and “consolidology” 
– subsequently characterized as ‘imperial and messianic’
4
, as well as ‘intellectually 
neocolonialist’
5
 – was based on a set of unstated assumptions. The most erroneous 
among them, as it transpired later, was the idea that post-communist transitions were 
                                                          
2
 After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition. Michael 
McFaul and Katheyn Stoner Weiss (eds.), 2004,  p. 3. 
3
 Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. Revolutions Reconsidered. Journal of Democracy 18.1 
(2007) 42-57, p. 51. 
4
 Michael McFaul and Katheyn Stoner Weiss The Evolving Social Science of 
Postcommunism. After the Collapse of Communism…,  p 2. 
5




consensual efforts of respective societies towards instauration of liberal democracy,
 6
 
and that neo-liberal reformers played a central role in making that change happen.
7
 
               Such triumphalist and euphoric notions were countered by early voices 
cautioning that in many post-communist transitions, a goal is only “something that 
pretends to be a democracy”.
8
  From a “non-euphoric” view, transition was seen as a 
difficult road “between liberation and freedom,”
9
 where democratic elections could 
bring to power illiberal demagogues and populists that would become a headache for 
Western democracy promoters.
10
   Years later, Fareed Zakaria elaborated this concern 
by highlighting a spreading phenomenon of “illiberal democracy”: the emergence of 
democratically elected regimes that disregard the rule of law and basic liberties.
11
  
Thomas Carothers followed with a comprehensive criticism of transitology 
                                                          
6
 The flaws of such “hidden ideological bias” are addressed in detail by Rudoplh 
Tökés (ibid., pp. 2-3).  
7
 Venelin Ganev indicates how mistaken that assumption is by emphasizing that 
“during most of the 1990s, the role of pro-market politicians and neoliberal ideas was 
minimal”. In: Venelin Ganev. Preying on the State. Cornell Univ. Press, 2007.  
8
 Ghia Nodia. How Different Are Post-Communist Transitions? Journal of 
Democracy 7(4), 1996, p. 17. 
9
 Vladimir Tismaneanu. Between Liberation and Freedom. Uprooting Leninism, 
Cultivating Liberty. V. Tismaneanu and P. Clawson (eds.). University Press of 
America, 1992.  
10
 At the peak of post-communist ‘triumphalism’, and years before the NATO 
military operation in Yugoslavia, Vladimir Tismaneanu was pointing out: ”What is 
Washington to do with Slobodan Milosevic? On the one hand, he is an extremely 
dangerous nationalist and neo-communist; on the other hand, he was unquestionably 
the electoral choice of the Serbian people. This problem of dealing with […] 
demagogic democrats bodes to be as thorny in the postcommunist era as the problem 
of “friendly tyrants” was during the cold war” (ibid., pp. 41-42).  Since then, there has 
been a long list of such ‘thorny’ post-Soviet leaders,  including Lukashenka, Kuchma, 
and Putin, to name a few.   
11
 Fareed Zakaria – Rise of Illiberal Democracy Foreign Affairs, Nov. 1997.   
10 
 
assumptions in his seminal article
12
 that came to be seen as “the intellectual epitaph of 
the transition paradigm”.
13
   
                 A separate line of transitology criticism concerned the falseness of 
analogies between post-communist transitions and the fall of nationalist dictatorships 
in South European and Latin American countries (often referred to as “the second 
wave of global democratization”).  Critics argued that ‘second wave’ fundamentally 
differed from post-communist transitions both in the character of the old order and 
the tasks of democratization. In ‘second wave’ cases, key government institutions 
were in place, as well as a system of private ownership, banking and commerce; there 
were pluralist groups within the elites and politically aware public. Therefore, 
democratization could proceed by means of incremental law making and incremental 
social change. Post-communist transitions required not only a new architecture of 
state institutions, but also creating a market economy ‘from scratch’ of state-owned 
assets and shadow private sector. They also required a complete reinvention of civil 
society in place of atomized citizenry.
14
   
                Although the expectations reflected in the transition paradigm have 
generally come true in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, they essentially 
failed in the “core” Soviet republics. It is interesting to note, for instance, how 
Zbigniew Brezinski’s predictions accurately materialized for those former communist 
                                                          
12
 Thomas Carothers. The End of Transition Paradigm JoD 13:1 (2002). 
13
 Fairbanks 2007, ibid.. 
14
 Tokes, ibid.  
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states that gained accession to NATO  and EU, but failed for such countries as Russia 
or Ukraine whose prospects looked rather hopeful back in 1993.
15
    
                 Scholars’ focus on “change” in the post-Soviet space may have been 
misplaced. Long after the fall of the communist rule, there is a ‘most striking’ 
discovery that post-Soviet societies are ‘a surprising mix of change and continuity.’
 16
  
Attentive observers point out that today’s Russia is still defined by its Soviet legacies: 
“while the ideology has gone, the mechanism for sustaining political power 
remains.”
17
  That ‘mechanism’ is described as the manner of functioning of the 
country’s key institutions – from the presidential administration and the court system 
to television and education, all based on “the Soviet mental software” – something 
that “has proved much more durable than the ideology itself.”
18
  Reflecting on that 
discouraging continuity, a major Russian journalist bitterly remarks:  “We still have a 




                                                          
15
 Zbigniew Brzezinski.  The Great Transformation. The National Interest, Fall 1993, 
pp. 3-13.  
At that time,  Brzezinski predicted democratic consolidation and accession to NATO 
and EU for “successfully” transforming countries within 5-15 years, and he estimated 
success chances of Russia, Ukraine, or Kyrgyzstan higher than those of Romania or 
Macedonia.  
16
 McFaul and Stoner-Weiss. The Evolving Social Science of Postcommunism. Aftter 
the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition. Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2004,  p. 2. 
17
 The Long Life of Homo Sovieticus. The Economist, December 10, 2011, p. 27. 
18
 Ibid.  
19




                   There is a remarkable lack of consensus in political science literature as to 
defining post-Soviet political regimes. Whereas the term “hybrid” is now broadly 
accepted, its analytical value is limited because of its implicitly broad meaning. 
Efforts to define more specific subtypes of hybrid regimes resulted in a wave of new 
terms known as ‘democracy with adjectives’
20
, later followed by a similar wave of 
‘authoritarianism with adjectives.’
21
  Both waves admittedly added to the conceptual 
confusion in regard to understanding post-communist hybrid regimes.
22
   
                     Many scholars now admit that attention to formal institutions – e.g. 
nuances of constitutional design -- does not reveal important features of hybrid post-
Soviet regimes. Levitsky and Way convincingly argue that hybrid regimes are 
characterized by “the centrality of informal institutions.”
23
  A good illustration to this 
argument was offered by Ukraine’s political leader Yulia Tymoshenko when she 
remarked:  
“The presidential forms of government in Ukraine and the US bear the 
same name, but they differ like a crude forgery differs from a genuine 
masterpiece. By the same token, if we compare the US presidential 
form of government with the parliamentary models in Germany or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
transformation.  Arguably, the most meaningful outcome of the two decades of post-
Soviet development is the fact that it continues to be defined as “post-Soviet.”    
20
 Collier and Levitsky 1997. 
21
 Levitsky and Way discuss how important shades of meaning distinguish 
‘competitive authoritarianism’ from ‘electoral authoritarianism’,  ‘semi-
authoritarinism’,  ‘democratic authoritarianism’ and other related terms. In: Stephen 
Levistky and Lucan Way. Competitive Authoritarianism. Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2010, pp. 5-16.  
22
 Ibid., p. 14. 
23
 Ibid.,    p.27 
13 
 





Levitsky and Way characterize the majority of post-Soviet political regimes as 
competitive authoritarian – where electoral competition is real, but unfairly skewed 
by authoritarian practices of the government. They analyze post-Soviet regimes as 
fundamentally similar to hybrid regimes of the third world. This analysis is focused 
on two features of hybrid regimes: (a) impact of international environment (expressed 
in their proposed variables of “linkage” and “leverage”); (b) “organizational power of 
incumbents.” 
25
   
                  From an inside perspective, post-Soviet ‘competitive authoritarian’ 
regimes are more often described as “imitation democracies” where formal 
democratic features are a decorative façade, while practical power is in the hands of a 
narrow oligarchy.
26
 Such understanding is consistent with Larry Diamond’s view that 
“all hybrid regimes in the world today are deliberately pseudodemocratic” because 
“formally democratic political institutions mask the reality of authoritarian 
domination.”
27
  Imitation democracies in countries like Russia, Ukraine or Azerbaijan 
are deemed to differ from outright dictatorships by the presence of informal checks 
                                                          
24
 Interview to Zerkalo Nedeli,  April 19, 2012. (In Russian). 
25
 L&W, ibid., pp. 37-86. 
26
  Yaroslav Shimov. “Shards of Broken Pieces. Democratization Wave Crashed on 
the Borders of the Former Soviet Union”. Gazeta.Ru, August 18, 2011. (In Russian). 
27
 Larry Diamond.  Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. JoD, 13.2 (2002), p. 24. 
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and balances within the oligarchic “elites”, wherefore a degree of pluralism and 
political competition is maintained.
28
 
                   Thus, a dichotomous frame of democracy vs. authoritarianism continues 
to dominate in scholarly interpretations of post-Soviet political regimes. Even though 
hybrid regimes demonstrate no clear transition of any kind – as emphasized by 
Thomas Carothers – the dichotomous frame is argued to be indispensable because 
those regimes “can only be understood in terms of how near or how far they are from 
democracy.”
29
   
                  From a contrary view, such dichotomous interpretations lead to conceptual 
stretching and erroneous search for “good” and “bad” players in post-Soviet 
politics,
30
 but this does not help to understand the true nature of political struggle, nor 
the trends of regime change in post-Soviet societies. 
31
   
                        Another approach that attempts to bring analysis of hybrid regimes 
beyond formal institutions is known as “neopatrimonial interpretation.”
32
   It focuses 
on the character of power relations within the elites (rational-legal vs. clientelistic-
                                                          
28
 Shimov, ibid. 
29
 Nodia. The Democratic Path, JoD, 13.3 (2002), p. 16. 
30
 As illustrated by this comment from Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr: “A Russian friend 
remarked that reading the American press on Russia was like reading the old Pravda: 
certain nouns never appeared without a certain adjective. He was right. We rarely saw 
the names Yeltsin, Gaidar, or Chubais without the Homeric epithet “democratic 
reformer”, or the name Zyuganov without the word “hardliner”. This describes 
journalism and foreign policy, but we scholars did not correct it. We omitted all the 
complexities, shadings, and paradoxes; our presentation of the Russian struggle was 
uncomfortably close to the cliché “all black and white.”  JoD, 10.2 (1999), p. 52. 
31
 Fisun, Oleksandr. Towards Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics: a neopatrimonial 
interpretation. Politicheskaia Kontseptologia, No. 4, 2010 (in Russian).  
32
 E.g. Fisun 2007;  van Zon 2005 (Uk), van Zon 2009 (?) =Rus.  
15 
 
neopatrimonial). From this perspective, post-Soviet states are compared to an iceberg 
in which modern political institutions and constitutional rules comprise the visible 
part, while the bigger and more important underwater segment is made up by the 
“patrimonial systems of domination.”
33
   
                          Some scholars use the distinction between the two models of power 
relations to explain the divergence of transition paths between East Central Europe 
and the post-Soviet space. For instance, Ivan Szelenyi speaks about the two families 
of post-communist societies – “neoliberal” and “neo-patrimonial.”
34
  In a similar way, 
Oleksandr Fisun contrasts the two types of post-communist elites’ pacts: in East 
Central Europe, those pacts were addressing a democratization agenda, whereas in the 
post-Soviet space, their agenda was “cartel agreements on state capture.”  According 
to Fisun, the peculiar path of post-Soviet states was caused by their ‘inverse 
developmental sequence’ – when democratization had not been preceded by the 
development of a modern nation-state. 
                        From a conventional view, the starting point of post-communist 
transition was an omnipotent Leviathan state that needed to be modernized by 
adopting the concept of limited government. In reality, however, the communist 
Leviathan had been a party-state conglomerate. When the separation of party and 
state took place at the starting point of all transitions, the resulting post-communist 
state revealed syndromes of weakness -- that appeared conceptually surprising.  In 
                                                          
33
 Fisun 2003, p. 2. 
34
 Ivan Szelenyi. “Poverty under post-communist capitalism - the effects of class and 
ethnicity in a cross-national comparison.” Paper presented at the conference “Unity 
and Diversity”, Bruges, 2001. For Szelenyi, the decisive indicator of each variation 
was the chosen mode of state assets privatization (auctions vs. vouchers).  
16 
 
countries where the former ruling party bosses maintained their hegemonic position 
as the informal “party of power”, the outcome was described as “preying on the 
state.”  In that environment, “the most important form of entrepreneurship was the 
large-scale effort by state officials to re-deploy and appropriate resources hoarded 
into the immense public sphere previously guarded by the party/state.”
35
  Moreover, 
such predatory elites were interested in perpetuating the weakness of state institutions 
because that was a necessary condition for their successful extraction of resources 
from the state. Thus, declared goals of strengthening the state would come in 
contradiction with bureaucrats’ shadow interests, informal rules and practices (or, 
more aptly put, there was an incongruous duality of every government official’s 
“impersonal bureaucratic role and a personal profitmaking role”
36
).  Duplicity would 
be the order of the day in that predatory behavior.  
                      There is recognition that the weakness of post-communist -- particularly 
post-Soviet – states is a problem deserving special attention in political theory, 
because all previous transitions from authoritarian rule had never weakened the state. 
Therefore, “eminent Western experts on democratic transition did not anticipate the 
emergence of weak states after communism”.
37
  In a “fumbling attempt to find some 
label” for post-Soviet state weakness, many commentators – especially domestic -- 
resort to analogies with feudal states in medieval Europe. Clientelistic relations within 
the post-Soviet “party of power” resemble the feudal tenure of fiefdoms: “in the 
                                                          
35
 Ganev,, p. 3. 
36
 Charles F. Fairbanks. Feudaization of the State JoD,10.2 (1999), p. 49. 
37
  Charles F. Fairbanks, Jr.  The Feudal Analogy, JoD 11.3 (2000), p. 35. 
17 
 
regime inherited by Putin, as in West European feaudalism, rulers pay for the 
performance of a public duty by transferring a resource to be exploited. This practice, 
the core mechanism of feudalism, blurs the distinction between public and private, 
and squanders the power of the state.”
38
  The feudal analogy becomes even more 
meaningful for post-Soviet states if we take into account that earlier it was also 
applied to characterizing the late phase of the Soviet system.
39
 
                   And so, the post-Soviet phenomenon is still waiting for “a shared 
definition of what we have witnessed in the region.”
40
   Consensus is lacking about 
the meanings of the events of 1991, about the nature of the core post-Soviet political 
systems, and about the character of their transformation.  Arguably, the most 
meaningful outcome of the two decades of post-Soviet development is the fact that it 





                                                          
38
 Fairbanks ibid. p. 36. 
39
 E.g. Charles King points out that ‘was overlooked’…..   Post-postcommunism… 
World Politics, 53.1. (2000), p. 158-159. Mikhail Voslensky’s Nomenklatura (1991) 
provides a detailed description of late Soviet system via the feudalism frame.    
 
40
 McFaul and Stoner-Weiss (ibid.), p. 7.   This point remains valid two decades after 
the Soviet collapse: a conference panel dedicated to that anniversary featured five 
presentations with five different interpretative frames (as noted by Timothy Colton in 
his remarks at George Washington University on December 8, 2011).   
 
41
 Some scholars maintain that while countries of CEE have already moved beyond 
the phase of post-communism,  former Soviet states continue to remain in that 
analytical category, and it will be a challenge for political science to explain  when 
“post-Soviet post-communism” is going to come to an end and how that “threshold” 
should be established (e.g. Timothy Colton, ibid.). 
18 
 
1.2.     Frustrations of Departure from Soviet Civilization 
 
                  The ‘paradigmatic’ perspective considered post-communist transformation 
as a reform process with three main components: political (establishment of basic 
freedoms, elections, parties), economic (privatization and marketization), and 
regulatory (developing a new structure of governance). 
42
    
                  An important missing element in this paradigm was a reform of earlier 
mentioned “mental software”, i.e. the frames of collective mind, or the collective 
consciousness – beliefs and attitudes embedded in a social order.  Ghia Nodia 
proposed to name this transformational task with Carl Jung’s term “metanoia”  
(change of thinking).   Nodia reasoned that post-communist transformation should be 
seen as the reversal of the communist revolution, whose project was the cultivation of 
‘the new socialist man.”  Therefore, a challenge of post-communism would be “to 
cure post-communist man of the traumatic communist experience.”
 43
   
                      The Soviet system was arguably “the most comprehensive form of 
closed society ever invented by man.”
44
 In East Central Europe, the communist 
project was not as lengthy as in the Soviet Union, especially – and very importantly – 
it its totalitarian phase. It became only a limited replication of the comprehensive 
construct known as “the Soviet civilization” whose fundamental features were shaped 
                                                          
42
 Brzezinski, ibid. 
43
 Ghia Nodia, How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions? JoD, 7.4 (1996). 
44





  Yet, the collapse of communist regimes in East Central Europe 
was followed by a “post-partum depression from communism” with a “growing 
chasm between premodern anxieties and postmodern expectations.”
46
   Post-
communist transition in those countries was accompanied by spiritual reactions that 
included nostalgia, “moral disarray of the times of historical fracture,” and also 
“malaise, widespread exasperation, fatigue, and a general sense of exhaustion.”
47
    
                      Post-Soviet societies revealed an even stronger presence of such 
pathologies. They were deemed to be engaged in “self-diagnosis of psychiatric 
insanity”
48
 as political leaders, journalists and even scholars would commonly resort 
to psychiatric terms in political discourse.  Michail Gorbachev was one of the first to 
speak about post-communist “political schizophrenia.”
49
    Others have spoken of a 
“virus of madness, social and spiritual masochism”,
50
  “delirium and ecstatic 
idiocy”
51
, “mass insanity and psychosis”,
52
  etc.  
                      As argued by prominent post-Soviet sociologists,  
“The issue in question is the existence in society of a specific form of pathology 
which is entirely different both from mental disease as a subject of psychiatry and 
                                                          
45
 E.g.  Stephen Kotkin. Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization.   Siniavsky. 
The Soviet Civilization.  
46
 Vladimir Tismaneanu. Reinventing Politics, p. 294.  
47
 Vladimir Tismaneanu.  Fantasies of Salvation, p. 14. 
48
 Holovaha and Panina, 1994, p. 7. 
49
  Ibid., p. 8.  The phrase “post-Soviet schysophrenia” has been widely used since 
then. As a concept, it was elaborated in detail in the writings of Mykola Riabchuk 
(Two Ukraines; ……).   
50
 Ibid, p.7; quoted from an article by Aleksandr Yakovlev. 
51
 Ibid.,  quoted from a TV address by Russia’s Vice-President Rutskoi. 
52
 Ibid., quoted from an interview by Russian philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko. 
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deviation from social norms of behavior as a traditional subject of sociology and 
political science. This form of pathology has been defined as social insanity. It is […] 
a mass phenomenon associated with the destruction of a system of values and norms 




                       From this perspective, psychiatric terminology is of limited help in 
political analysis – it only provides allegoric labels that are inaccurate and 
misleading.  
                       Holovakha and Panina proposed to distinguish between general social 
pathologies, or sociopathies (which are found in different ‘times of historic fracture,’ 
or disruptive cultural change) and those specific to post-totalitarian environment.   
                         One kind of general sociopathy that is notably manifested in post-
communist societies is anomie,
54
 or ‘normlessness’ and social disharmony, (as 
opposed to eunomia -- a harmony of law and order).  Anomie is known to facilitate 
social disintegration, demoralization, uncertainty of orientations and attitudes, social 
tension and conflicts.
55
   In post-totalitarian societies, it is accompanied by perceived 
lack of social demand for one’s expertise and capacity, which translates into 
increased anxiety.
56
  Another related manifestation of general sociopathy is a growth 
of xenophobic sentiments, ethnic and religious intolerance,
57
 of “vindictive 
mythologies and scapegoating fantasies.”
58
 
                                                          
53
 Yevhen Holovakha, 1995, p. 233.  
54
 The concept was elaborated by Émile Durkheim in his book  Suicide (1897).  
55
 Holovakha and Panina, 1991, p. 89.  
56
 Ibid, p. 96-103. 
57
 Ibid., p. 105-118. 
58
 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation…, pp. 65-110. 
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                         Robert Merton discussed anomie as discontinuity between socially 
desired goals and socially acceptable means for reaching them.
59
  Post-communist 
societies are abundant with situations when social groups are trying to achieve new 
goals by old means (e.g. the so called “market bolshevism”) or old goals by new 
means (e.g. communists appealing to democratic rules in order to legalize their 
party).
60
   
                       Holovakha and Panina have argued that previously developed theories 
of social change cannot fully explain the sociopathies of post-communist societies. 
Neither the Industrial Revolution of the 19
th
 century, nor democratic transitions after 
World War II inflicted such an overwhelming change in people’s lives -- that would 
encompass abrupt changes in politics, ideology, social structure, and economic 
conditions of everyday living.   They observed that  
“The unpredictability of the social situation and the uncertainty of  norms and values 
shape a mode of living characterized by dramatic contradiction between actions and 
feelings, when one’s own quite rational actions of adaptation to the new conditions of 




Those authors identified several sociopathic features specific to post-Soviet societies, 
which can be summarized as follows
62
.  
             Post-totalitarian ambivalence:  mutually incompatible ideas and values 
coexist in collective mind without internal conflict, unified in one mode of conscience 
                                                          
59
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and emotional attitudes to social reality. It is linked to inability for critical thinking 
and a habit to thoughtless conformism. One of its forms is “mosaic conscience” 
where old pieces get easily replaced by their opposites.  
            Acquired social helplessness, or paternalistic mindset: a frame of thinking 
that would shift responsibility for public matters and even for one’s own fate to an 
external agency, such as domestic government, international donors, etc. Post-Soviet 
societies maintained a “system of social relations” that continued to reproduce the 
phenomenon of acquired social helplessness after the fall of the Soviet state. 
                   Sociopathic communicative culture:  it emphasizes confrontation and 
search for “enemies,” but lacks interest in understanding other people’s views and 
search for consensus and compromise.   This feature is a legacy of the totalitarian cult 
of “struggle” and the tradition of top-down communication codified in the so called 
“principle of democratic centralism.” 
                  Normative, or standard reactions to sociopathic anomie after communism 
are the ‘traditionalist” and “authoritarian” temptations: one is based on the sense of 
nostalgia for “good old times”, and the other is driven by desire for a strong-arm 
leader to restore “justice and order”
63
 (or “waiting for Peron”
64
). 
                  However, sociologists have also observed a bigger than expected ‘non-
standard’ reaction to anomie in later post-Soviet years:  growth of social cynicism, 
distrust, and rejection of ‘old’ moral standards.   Their findings revealed the 
formation of a post-Soviet “immoral majority” -- when the majority of the nation 
                                                          
63
 Holovakha and Panina, 2008. 
64
 Vladimir Tismaneanu, ibid., pp. 49-54. 
23 
 
appeared to think that honest behavior and responsiveness to others were qualities of 
“losers”, whereas bribes and fraud were more important for success than professional 
merit.
65
   
                 To conclude, the sociopathic factor is a component of the “mental 
software” of post-Soviet societies.  A product of “historical and cultural experiences, 
existential orientations, collective unspoken political volitions, and resolve of rallying 
crowds,” this mental software cannot be reduced to “clear qualities of order, norm, 
and rationality.” 
66
 On the contrary, it conspicuously includes “new delusions, 
political day-dreaming, primitive slogans, and notions that bear no real sense.” The 
latter, according to a prominent philosopher, “serve the post-communist individual as 
substitutes for stable forms of life and belief systems” and turn into “countless 





1.3.  Western Capitalism and Democracy Not Fitting for Post-Soviet Societies? 
 
            One reason for deeply traumatic perceptions of the post-communist 
experience in the former Soviet space was a sense of economic loss. Economic 
hardships of transition in former Soviet countries were more profound, painful, and 
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lengthy than in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
68
  Some have argued that 
“the Soviet society was not ready for capitalism,” that it lacked “the cultural baggage 
required by free market capitalism,”
 69
 and therefore the market economy became “a 
worse enemy for the Russian people than even the Communists said it would be.” 
70
    
                        The blame for a failure of post-Soviet reforms, according to a widely 
spread belief, lies on orthodox recipes of Western capitalism wrongly applied. As 
eloquently stated by Stephen Cohen, 
“Mainstays of what was known as the “Washington Consensus” […] professed to 
know the cure for [Russia’s aliments], gave regular assurances about the ongoing 
treatment, and predicted a full recovery. In reality, their prescriptions, reports, and 
prognoses were fundamentally wrong.”
71
   
 
                 Contrary to positive expectations, post-Soviet reforms produced a system 
known as “bandit capitalism”
72
 or “capitalism for the few.”
73
  Academically, it is 
defined as “oligarchic capitalism” – a system in which “government policies are 
designed predominantly or exclusively to promote the interests of a very narrow (and 
very wealthy) portion of the population.”
74
   In that system, government is not 
focused on the country’s development and economic growth but rather on 
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“maintaining and enhancing the economic position of the oligarchic few (including 
government leaders themselves) who own most of the country’s resources.”
75
   
Oligarchs are engaged in predatory “state capture” and rent-seeking
76
. 
                   Theorists of post-communist “capitalism building” emphasize that the 
oligarchic model of capitalism emerged as the result of insufficient (delayed, partial, 
unfinished) reform that opened extraordinary rent-seeking opportunities.
77
 Such 
opportunities are deemed to be temporary and reducing towards the end of the 
transition period.
78
  From that perspective, post-communist oligarchs are viewed as 
similar to “robber barons” of the Gilded Age in the U.S., who “rationally responded 
to a peculiar set of economic, legal, and political conditions” as they built their 
industrial empires.
79
 According to this argument, oligarchs will inevitably ‘get 
civilized’: they will seek to secure their property rights and thus favor the 
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                   On the other hand, the development of post-Soviet rentier oligarchs is 
also likened to the historic transition of Early Middle Ages in Europe when “roving 
bandits” engaged in looting eventually became “stationary bandits”  (princes, kings, 
governments) collecting taxes.
81
 But post-communist oligarchs emerged with much 
greater speed and influence, which makes them unique in history.
82
  
                   In this line of argument, delayed reform and oligarchic development form 
a vicious circle: as oligarchs capture state policy for self-interest, they continue to 
secure rents and privileges gained from non-transparent lobbying.
83
  Such state-
capturing power of oligarchs includes their capacity to determine election results and 
broad policy lines. The immense scope of political influence is what differentiates 
post-Soviet oligarchs from rent-seeking capitalist tycoons elsewhere.  
                  From an optimistic viewpoint, political influence of oligarchs will be 
reduced with the development of modern institutions, such as parliamentary systems 
with proportional elections, as well as by the growth of media freedom.
84
    But there 
are many pessimistic voices saying that borrowed Western institutions do not become 
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viable in post-Soviet societies. A leading post-Soviet media market entrepreneur 
bitterly remarks: 
 “I have lost many of the convictions and apparent truisms that developed during the 
collapse of the USSR and what seemed to be a victory of the Western model of 
democracy… With time, I realized that much of what works well in the US and, in a 
very different way, also works in European countries – is not fitting for Russia or 




                Likewise, another Ukrainian publicist observes that “attempts to borrow 
fundamental institutions from Western countries deliver only fake external forms, 
whereas the internal foundation of Ukraine’s society remains unchanged.” 
86
   Both of 
those commentaries emphasize the weakness of civil society due to ”pre-civic” 
identities, values and ethical norms: “People who tell lies on a daily basis, and for 
whom corruption is an inseparable part of their living, cannot seriously put forward 
civic demands.”
87
      
                 One example of “fake” post-Soviet institutions is “elections with 
predictable outcomes” that increasingly become a “ceremonial accessory of regime 
legitimation”.
88
   A Russian scholar and liberal activist suggested that his country’s 
political system should be defined as “electoral clanism” because its elections “are 
merely the means of settling disputes among post-totalitarian clans that generally 
operate outside the law or in a situation of legal confusion.” 
                                                          
85
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                  From that perspective, “hasty introduction of free elections” after the fall 
of Soviet communism was dangerous and harmful because it had not been preceded 
by the development of a new “legal system and a legal way of thinking” that would 
include such features as independent courts, the rule of law, separation of powers, 
independence of the media, and religious and ideological freedoms.
89
   
                  This point is consistent with Fareed Zacharia’s thesis about the “rise of 
illiberal democracy,” as well as with Karen Dawisha’s reminder that early Western 
democracies, including American, developed for a long time without universal 
suffrage.
90
   
 
1.4. Ukraine as a Showcase of Post-Soviet Ambiguity 
 
                    The ambiguities, puzzles, and paradoxes of post-Soviet politics and 
societies are brightly demonstrated in the example of Ukraine – the country that is 
sometimes called a “bellwether” of the post-Soviet space.
91
   Its path has been 
described as “the muddle way”
92
, “sovereignty with uncertainty”
93
,  “movement 
without change, and change without movement”
94
, and “a study in ambiguity”
95
.   
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                      From the standpoint of democratization paradigm, Ukraine appears to 
be a perpetual “swing state”.  Its post-Soviet history is rendered in consecutive cycles 
of “democratic breakthroughs” alternated with “authoritarian reversals”.  Every 
declared “breakthrough” would raise high expectations, but then yield bitter 
disenchantments.   
                        In 1991, Ukraine was seen as a hopeful of democracy and market 
reforms: its chances for success were estimated as “the most promising” among the 
former Soviet republics. Yet by the end of Leonid Kravchuk’s presidency in 1994, the 
country resembled a “failed state” and was described as “a case study in how to 
wreck the economy.”
96
   
                        A peaceful transfer of presidency to Leonid Kuchma and his 
announcement of comprehensive reforms, along with relatively orderly and 
competitive parliamentary elections in 1994 and 1998 were praised as advances of 
democracy and placed Ukraine in the frontrunner position of post-Soviet 
democratization. At that time, many observers began to consider Ukraine a fully 
consolidated democracy. 
97
 However, Kuchma’s second term in office (1999-2004) 
was characterized as “creeping authoritarianism”
98
  and “rising super-
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 whereas Ukraine’s political system got to be defined as “hybrid 
ambiguous”
100
 and “electoral authoritarian”.
101
   
                      Prior to the Orange Revolution of 2004, it appeared that Ukraine’s civil 
society and political opposition were even weaker than in Russia.
102
  The Orange 
Revolution was hailed as a breakthrough towards a long-term durable democracy.
103
 
But five years later, when Viktor Yanukovych succeeded Viktor Yushchenko in 
winning the presidential election, this development was interpreted as “the death of 
the Orange Revolution”
104
  which thus apparently had been “for naught”.
105
 Under 
Yanukovych presidency, as shown by the Freedom House’s recent analysis and 
rankings, the country is moving to authoritarian rule again.
106
   
                      This confusing sequence of ups and downs eventually created a 
perception of “Ukraine fatigue” in many Western capitals. After the failure of the 
Orange Revolution, Ukraine fatigue “returned with a vengeance.” 
107
  Looking back, 
Western diplomats and EU officials admit with bitterness that important aspects of 
Ukraine’s politics evaded their understanding.  Dietmar Studemann, who was among 
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the EU mediators of the international “round table” in the Orange Revolution, 
subsequently recalled:  
“For the European diplomats who were present at the negotiations table, this looked 
like a civilized compromise, a “European” way of the political system’s development. 
They did not take into account that ‘political balance’ in a developed European 
democracy and in Ukraine are very different things. […] We in Western Europe 
believe that members of parliament elected by the people represent the people. 
However, the parties in the Supreme Rada were groups that only pursued political and 
economic interests of their leaders. They did not represent the people’s interests. That 




                Javier Solana – a long-time chief foreign policy official of the European 
Union – subsequently called Ukraine “one of the biggest frustrations of his life” and 
said he later realized that Ukraine’s political class was immature and “below average” 
quality. 
109
  A prominent member of the European Parliament, while commenting on 
Ukraine’s prospects of accession to the EU, outspokenly remarked: “Many in the 
European Union believe that Ukraine cannot be joined with the EU because it is a 




                          Ukraine has been discussed as a success story of the post-Soviet 
world – a country that was able to become a market economy and a democracy.
111
  
But a democracy of a peculiar flavor: as Timothy Garton Ash aptly observed, it is “a 
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world closer to The Sopranos than to The West Wing.” 
112
 The same point was made 
by a celebrated Russian newsmaker when he remarked: “The difference between 




                             Despite the advances to democracy, Ukraine continues to be ‘a 
nation at the crossroads’.
114
  For a long time, it has looked “perpetually unsure 
whether it truly wants to plump for a western way or to keep at least one foot in the 
Soviet past.”
115
  Presently, Western observers continue to ask: “Will Ukraine 
ultimately be "Western" or "Eastern"? Will its political culture come to resemble 
Europe's or Russia's? Will Ukraine eventually join European and transatlantic 
institutions?” 
116
 The country continues to face those “big questions” without definite 
answers.    
                           Academic literature addresses the ambiguities of Ukraine’s transition 
in several different ways. Notable emphasis was made on the challenge of “multiple 
transitions”.  That argument reminds that there is an inherent tension between the 
agenda of democratization and the agenda of economic market reforms. In Ukraine’s 
case, the challenge is even more complicated because there is a “quadruple transition” 
                                                          
112
 Timothy Garton Ash in The Guardian, 10 Feb. 2010.    
113 Clifford J. Levy. “TV Refugees From Moscow.” New York Times, January 23, 2010.  
114
 Cf. Adrian Karatnycky. Ukraine at the Crossroads. Journal of Democracy, 
Volume 6, Number 1, January 1995. 
115
 The Economist, October 17, 2002. 
116
 Anne Applebaum. Ukraine's democratic evolution on hold, for now. Washington 
Post, Feb. 9, 2010. 
33 
 
agenda: in addition to developing the institutions of democracy and free market, it 
also includes the tasks of state-building and nation-building.
117
   
                           From this perspective, nation-building is seen as the critically 
important part of the “quadruple package” because a strong national identity is 
deemed to be a prerequisite for a sense of national solidarity and successful 
mobilization, hence for robust civil society and democratic consolidation.  Thus, 
Ukraine’s divided identity – an obstacle for national integration – is what impedes the 
country’s civil society growth. By the same token, weak national identity is likely to 
strengthen the sense of nostalgia for the former communist regime.
118
 
                         Ukraine’s modern identity is often pictured as a set of dichotomous 
divisions between “East” and “West”: Russian vs. Ukrainian speakers, Orthodox vs. 
Catholic parishes, communities with European cultural orientations vs. those oriented 
towards Moscow, supporters of accession to NATO vs. those who vehemently 
protested against such plans. To illustrate this dichotomy, journalists often juxtapose 
the images of two Ukrainian cities, Lviv (formerly the Polish Lwow and the Austria-
Hungary’s Lemberg) and Donetsk (formerly Russian Hughesovka and the Soviet 
Stalino).  The two cities live, speak, and vote as differently as they look. In both of 
them, residents have talked about “the opposite side” with as much animosity as there 
has been between the Serbs and the Chroats.
119
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                        However, a deeper look into Ukraine’s identity becomes “a study in 
ambiguity” rather than dichotomy. 
120
    Ukraine has inherited an ambiguous national 
identity due to a mix of cultural influences from two powerful neighbors – Poland and 
Russia – over the centuries of its own stateless history.   Mykola Riabchuk, the 
Ukrainian political essayist who thoroughly explored the “two Ukraines” theme, has 
observed, paradoxically, that “nobody can say where one half ends and the other 
begins.” 
121
   The two opposing influences, each with its own distinct set of myths, 
narratives, and visions of the past and the future, are clearly present today, but seldom 
in pure and antagonistic manifestations.  For the most part, they have produced an 
ambiguous intermixture that is found all through the country, albeit in different 
proportions. Moreover, even individual Ukrainians, according to Riabchuk, tend to be 
“ambivalent, vague and nebulous” in their identities and ideological orientations.  
               Riabchuk concludes that, whereas there are “two clearly defined and visible 
Ukraines,” there is also the immense space between them that can be defined as “the 
third Ukraine” which for the most part is “invisible, mute, uncertain, undecided, 
ideologically ambivalent and ambiguous.”  It serves as “the major battlefield and the 
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Western journalist (The Unruly  Child. A Survey of Ukraine. The Economist, May 7, 
1994, p. 16).  Two decades later, a Ukrainian commentator remarks that a westerner 
who identifies himself as Ukrainian in the census and an Easterner with the same self-
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major prize in the protracted contest between the two vociferating but minor 
Ukraines, the ‘Soviet’ and the ‘European.” 
122
  
                Thus, Riabchuk’s exploration of “ambivalent identity” modifies Kuzio’s 
argument about Ukraine’s “divided identity.” His approach, however, does not 
question the priority of nation-building agenda.   
                  Another viewpoint stands in more resolute disagreement with postulated 
primacy of nation-building. It is brightly articulated in Steven Kotkin’s essay 
“Trashcanistan” where he argues that nation-building projects in former Soviet 
republics were essentially hijacked by the ruling bureaucracies (former communist 
Nomenklatura) and have often served as a shield for the rulers’ private interests. 
123
  
As the result, we see “parasitic states” with “government-led extortion rackets, gangs 
in power, and shadow economies.” From observing post-Soviet developments in 
“nation-building”, Kotkin concludes: 
 “ ‘National’ self-determination is too often a recipe for Trashcanistan – for systemic 
malfeasance and economic involution, with convenient cover for the worst political 
scoundrels and their legions of apologists. […] Wrapping an executive branch 
syndicate in the “legitimacy” of the nation may be the essence of Trashcanistan, but 





             Kotkin shows that his conclusion is fully applicable to Ukraine where 
President Kuchma’s machinery of political manipulation, intimidation, extortion, 
embezzlement and money laundering exceeded “a mafia don’s wildest dreams.” At 
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the same time, Ukrainian intellectuals’ “tormented search for a “national” identity” 
has distracted and impeded demands for responsive and accountable governance.  
              Kotkin’s insight is corroborated by thoughtful analysis from Ukraine’s 
leading political theorists of liberal orientation.
125
  Volodymyr Polokhalo and 
Oleksandr Dergachov point out that since 1991 Ukraine’s higher party-and-state 
bureaucracy “appropriated the idea of sovereignty”, “established their monopoly on 
patriotism”, and concentrated on “state-building to fit themselves”. This was a neo-
statist project that “cemented” the country’s political system. It also substituted the 
more urgent task of reviving the Ukrainian society. At the same time, those who 
proclaimed the goal “to strengthen the state” as the nation’s priority, pragmatically 
sought personal profit from such efforts. 
126
  
                          Polokhalo and Deragchov were among the first to draw attention to 
systemic incongruency and duplicity of Ukraine’s post-communist development. 
They mentioned that Ukraine’s problems reflected abnormal co-existence of 
incompatible traits. One such incongruent pair was the intrinsic parochialism of the 
old leaders (who had risen to power as provincial bureaucrats dependent on guidance 
from Moscow) and the new demands of independent statehood. Another example was 
the combination of “economic, political and mental bolshevism debris” with the 
requirements of liberal reforms (the writers aptly remarked that universal and 
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unconditional acceptance of unspecified “reforms” was one of the biggest and the 
most stunning myths in post-communist Ukraine).   
                              About the same time, Sherman Garnett observed that Ukraine’s 
apparent westernization was inconsistent with its stagnant internal development: 
those two features were incompatible “like oil and water” unable to mix.
127
  
                          Altogether, such observations combine into a picture of ambivalent 
and amorphous society with likewise double-minded but pragmatic and self-centered 
leadership. That double-mindedness was strikingly exposed in the “Kuchmagate”
128
 
scandal: it brought to the world’s attention “a glaring gap between public 
verisimilitude and private cynicism” in the culture of Ukraine’s political class. 
129
 The 
“secret tapes” revealed that President Kuchma’s system of governance was largely 
built on informal tools of power and coercion -- not unlike an organized crime 
syndicate, as pointed out by Stephen Kotkin.  Keith Darden famously characterized 
this system as “the blackmail state.”
130
 
                     The revelations of “Kuchmagate” prompted Andrew Wilson to propose 
an explanatory model of “virtual democracy” for the “strange post-Soviet world.” He 
                                                          
127
 Sherman W. Garnett. Like Oil and Water: Ukraine’s External Westernization and 
Internal Stagnation. State and Institution Building in Ukraine. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. 
Kravchuk and Paul D’Anieri (eds.). Palgrave McMillan, 1999. 
128
 Also known as “Tapegate” or “the Cassette Scandal”. It broke out on November 
28, 2000 when audio recordings of President Kuchma’s confidential conversations 
were made public and implicated him in numerous crimes including abduction and 
killing of the journalist Georgiy Gongadze. The scandal ignited mass protests 
motivated by moral outrage against the regime; those events became a precursor to 
the Orange Revolution four years later.   
129
 Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s New Virtual Politics. EECR,  2001 . 
130
 Keith A. Darden. Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under 
Kuchma. East European Constitutional Review, 10 (2/3), 2001.  
38 
 
argued that the “virtual politics” model provided a better way of understanding 
modern Russia or Ukraine than “standard academic unilinear transition models.”
131
  
According to Wilson, the key element of that model was “the culture of virtual 
politics – where a public world of gesture and image-making masks an alternative 
reality of private intrigues and complicity.”  He emphasized that this model would 
apply to certain hybrid regimes where there was “a gap between rhetoric and reality, 
between performance and underperformance.” 
132
  Wilson characterized those post-
Soviet polities as “the looking-glass world of ‘clones’ and ‘doubles,’ of 
‘administrative resources’ and ‘kompromat,’” and “a paradise for the most brazen 
liars and guileful con artists.”
133
 
                   Ukraine, in Wilson’s estimate, was “one of the most virtual” of all post-
communist states – in part, because the Ukrainian state was, paradoxically, too weak 
and too strong at the same time: “too weak to resist falling prey to special interests” 
and yet “too powerful in other people’s lives.”
134
  For that state, the model of virtual 
politics was “a short-cut means of retaining power” and “an edifice of illusion:” its 
goal was, in lieu of a strong repressive machine, to create a perception that the people 
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                Wilson noted virtuality  in many aspects of Ukrainian politics,  such as “the 
masked identity” of key political players; the inability of voters to challenge or even 
verify what politicians publicly proclaimed; high incidence of fake political parties 
(categorized, in part, as  “broadcast parties” and “convenience parties”); prevalence 
of all kinds of myths in the political discourse; “ephemerality” of divisions between 
opposing political groups; and, last but not least, “lack of congruity between political 
principles and political behavior.” 
136
 
                        Andrew Wilson’s model of “virtual politics” is not (nor is intended to 
be) a fully comprehensive explanation of Ukraine’s political realities, but its 
plausibility cannot be doubted. The best proof of this model’s value was Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolution of 2004.  Wilson’s narrative of its causes and course serves a 
good example that  illustrates the model.
137
  Whereas the model provides a sound  
interpretation of the underlying motive of the Orange Revolution. Essentially, that 
motive was the moral outrage against suffocating hopelessness of the rotten system of 
virtual politics. Wilson’s model provides the “detail” that brings sense into otherwise 
vague and abstract explanatory variable of “regime’s organizational power” proposed 
by other researchers.
138
 It shows that state’s coercive power is decapacitated not by 
mere numbers of protesters, but by a perceived consensus of the protest legitimacy.  
In Wilson’s words, there was one simple common denominator in the motley mix of 
the Orange Revolution’s actors and voices: 
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“Students wanted a change in political culture, the poor wanted a change in political 





             Wilson argues that Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was “the first revolution 
within and against the system of virtual politics” (and it therefore cannot be easily 
placed in one analytical category with other events labeled as “colored” or “electoral” 
revolutions).
140
   
              But the system of virtual politics did not end with the Orange Revolution. 
Ukraine’s “post-Orange” political history is an exciting tale of society’s efforts to 
emancipate from the culture of “looking-glass world.”   
              Some see this story as an ongoing fight between the society and the state.  
“Society demands political rights and civil liberties, but the Soviet-styled and 
repression-oriented state is not prepared to play by new democratic rules,” remarks a 
columnist in Ukraine’s most influential analytical newspaper. 
141
  
              Others feel that the hardest struggle for the Ukrainian society is the struggle 
with its own Soviet past that remains hauntingly present in many aspects: “We have 
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               The Ukrainian state continues to get characterized as “a post-Soviet 
Leviathan” that lacks broad social support. In its absence, the regime is based on “a 
contract of the political class and the oligarchy,” but that system can only stay afloat 
by means of its “strategy of uncertainties.” Thus, the regime intentionally maintains 
uncertainties, both within the elites and the society at large, by “playing with the 
rules” (instead of playing by the rules).
143
  Such “strategy of uncertainties” becomes a 
sequel to early post-Soviet trend of “ambivalence to ambiguity.”
144
  Like ten years 
earlier, Steven Kotkin’s words seem very much to the point again: “Ukraine has 
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 Mykola Riabchuk emphasized in his study of “the ambivalent Ukraine” that post-
Soviet oligarchy had a vested interest in keeping the society “atomized, confused, and 
alienated.” Thus “ambivalence turns into ambiguity, breeds cynicism and 
indifference, and people become easy targets for brainwashing and manipulation.” 
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CHAPTER 2. PSEUDO-MODERNITY: 





2.1.  “Deficient modernity” of Soviet communism 
  
             
                            If modern institutions in post-Soviet polities appear ambiguous and 
virtual, then, in order to understand their true character, it is appropriate to examine 
post-Soviet developmental legacies in their broad relationship with modernity.  
                              For those who considered the Soviet system a genuinely New 
Civilization with a promise of a “quick leap into a superior kind of modernity,”
146
  its 
failure signified a crisis of modernity.
147
  
                               From an opposing perspective, it is deemed fundamentally wrong 
to view the Soviet system as “another path to a common, universal modernity.”  
148
 
Those who make this argument emphasize the fallacy of accepting the Soviet Union 
as a coherent and rationally functioning system.
149
 That fallacy was made by 
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Sovietologists who fundamentally misunderstood the nature of their subject” and 
assumed a universalist meaning of such concepts as “society” or “modernization.”
150
    
                       Indeed, it needs to be reminded that “all institutions in the Soviet 
society with names like labor union, church, newspaper, university” and so on could 
not be taken at their face value because they “bore very little resemblance to their 
counterparts in the non-communist world.”
151
   Martin Malia takes this argument 
further and points out that it was wrong to discuss the Soviet project of “building 
socialism” in terms of “modernization” and “development” – because those 
categories “do nothing to explain the startling outcome of the Soviet adventure.”
152
 
                   The Soviet project was driven by a utopian aspiration and could only be 
pursued “through a mixture of ideological illusion and raw coercion.”
153
  Its 
fundamental contradiction was between the goal of a rationally ordered society and 
the reliance on utopian faith.  This latter component of the Soviet system is rightly 
seen as pre-modern.
154
  Contemporary Russian scholars speak about the rejection of 
“market anarchy” as a “medieval” trait in Marxism.
155
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                        In the prevailing contemporary view, the Soviet project represented a 







 modernity).  Apart from the regime’s ideocratic nature, another factor 
that is deemed to have had a distorting effect on the Soviet modernity was the 
country’s historical path of a late modernizer (what Yegor Gaidar called the “catch-up 
civilization” path). 
159
 In S.N. Eisenstadt’s formulation,   the Soviet society in its 




                        Anatolii Vishnevskii describes this modernization as “one-sided” – it 
emphasized economic industrialization, and measured its achievement in the millions 
of tons of steel and coal production.  At the same, its model of social mobilization 
was based on a conservative and “archaic” type of social conscience which, in 
Weberian terms, was “value-rational.”  The Soviet society was gradually evolving 
towards the “goal-rational” type of behavior – that is more consistent with liberal 
modernity – but the Soviet system was trying to eradicate such behavior and was 
labeling it as “vestiges of the capitalist past.”   As Francis Fukuyama remarked, “the 
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Soviet society was evolving independently of the Soviet state.”  In his view, the 
“modernizing imperative” resulted in socio-economic change and the emergence of 
“proto-civil society” in the USSR, and that made the Soviet system obsolete. 
161
  A 
similar point is made by Johann Arnason who described Communism as a “self-
destructive form of modernity.”
162
 
                         What the Soviet order failed to achieve was a legal-rational system of 
“impersonal trust.” Larry Ray describes impersonal trust as a key factor of the 
modern organization: he defines it as “relations of trust among anonymous and 
functionally different actors.”  Impersonal trust is ensured by internal controls such as 
audit, surveillance, regulation, and other forms of governance; in other words, by “a 
balance between institutionalized trust and distrust.” 
163
     
                        But the Soviet state could not develop embedded legal-rational 
institutions:  its principle was the “rule of men” (party chiefs)
164
 – that is antithetical 
to the “rule of law.”  Under Stalin, the Soviet order cultivated high institutional 
distrust combined with repressive coercion. Eventually, as repression weakened, 
impersonal distrust remained, but was complimented by a system of “trust based on 
personal commitments and client networks.”  That system nourished “a culture of 
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                        Piotr Sztompka discusses that deficiency of communist modernity 
more comprehensively -- as a paradoxical contrast between the advances of “tangible       
modernity” (such as industrialization, urbanization, technological and educational 
progress, etc.) and the destruction of the “intangible tissue” of cultural modernity.  He 
describes the outcome as “the syndrome of civilizational incompetence” inherent in 
post-communist societies. Its features, in Stompka’s opinion, include: a habit of blind 
obedience, reluctance to take decisions, avoidance of personal responsibility, lack of 
respect for law, institutionalized evasion of rules, distrust of authorities, and double 
standards of talk and conduct.
166
 
                       In a concise formula, the “grand idea” of cultural modernity can be 
defined as the “greater depth of human design.”  Karol Soltan explains this concept as 
follows:  
“Modernity lifts the chains of inevitability that bind all pre-modern, traditional 
societies, dramatically expanding the scale and depth of human design as opposed to 
organic growth or evolution. The world increasingly does not impose itself on us. We 
make it ourselves […] Legislation (made law) replaces found law, and our lives are 
increasingly governed by formal, special-purpose organizations. In the human sphere 
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From this perspective, the project of post-communist transformation can be 
understood as an effort of realignment with modernity: a rebirth of post-communist 
societies in a new civilizational character based on the principle of “human design.”   
                          The validity of such interpretive frame is supported by a regression 
analysis of “success scores” of post-communist transformation in 28 countries in 
relation to indicators of their societal values from the World Values Survey. 
168
 That 
study showed that some value indicators -- generally considered to be important 
prerequisites for success of democratization -- were not very meaningful statistically. 
For instance, the value of participation in government or the approval and disapproval 
of competition, taken as the independent variables, had little impact on the dependent 
variable of country success scores. However, the indicator that was shown to have the 
biggest impact on country success scores was the amount of support for the survey 
statement: “I feel that I have no control over changing my life; what I do has no real 
effect on what happens to my life.”   What that statement reflects is an “organic” type 
of conscience – a mindset of being locked in the “chains of inevitability.” Nations 
where this perception was the strongest fared the most poorly as post-communist 
reformers (e.g. Belarus, Azerbaijan, Bosnia).  The leaders of the “successful 
reformers” list were those countries where the mindset of “inevitability” was the 
weakest (Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia).    
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                   2.2 . Potemkinism: a Perpetual Trait of  Russian and Soviet History 
 
 
                
                   Guy Sorman, a celebrated Western philosopher, provocatively observed: 
“Potemkin is of greater help than Marx and Lenin for understanding the USSR.”   
Upon visiting the Soviet Union in 1989, he described it as “a land of scenery, 
speeches, theatricality, and duplicity,” and noted that “Potemkinism was and still 
remains a life principle of all Russian regimes.”
169
  
                     For Sorman, even Gorbachev’s perestroika was “the highest degree of 
the Potemkinist thought.”
170
  He perceived that perestroika declarations were 
inconsistent and often meaningless; that Gorbachev was making a futile attempt to be 
the Pope and Luther at the same time; and that the ultimate goal of all those efforts 
was “to rescue the Communist Party.”  
                     Sorman noted that the causes of Russia’s “eternal duplicity” and its 
tradition of “converting the idea into the mise en scene” should be searched in the 
country’s history:  
Perhaps, [the reason is that] since the 18
th
 century, Russia has been trying to look 
European but remained deeply Asiatic?  Perhaps, its pseudo-European capital, St. 
Petersburg – Leningrad, is only a set of stage props in a theater of the still barbaric 
people? […]  The scenery and speeches make up for the backwardness – or rather, 
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Before Sorman, other Western travelers to Russia were making similar observations. 
Perhaps the most famous account was made in the 19
th
 century by Marquis de Custine 
who remarked, “I came here to see a country, but what I find is a theater.”  Explaining 
his negative perception, he wrote: 
“I don't reproach the Russians for being what they are; what I blame them for is their 
desire to appear to be what we [Europeans] are.... They are much less interested in 




                        In his study of Russia’s historical path as ‘a catch-up civilization,” 
Yegor Gaidar points out that the three states which historically shielded Europe from 
adversary invasions – Spain, Austria, and Russia – exhibited similar historical traits: 
“fortification of the state as a bulwark against the East, bureaucratization, and delayed 
development.”
173
  But Russia had to pay a much higher price than the others: “the cult 
of the state warped the mind of the nation” and created complexes that do not allow 
Russia to look at itself and the world “with a clear and rational eye.” 
174
  
                            That was vividly demonstrated in Peter the Great’s modernization 
project at the turn of the 18
th
 century. Russia’s modernization was based on state 
coercion and mobilization – unlike in Western Europe where industrial development 
was a product of private initiative and capital. Emperor Peter’s reforms were an 
incongruous mix of enlightenment and terror. A contemporary Russian publicist 
emphasizes this contrast with bitterness:  
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“The young Tsar Peter was fascinated and charmed by the atmosphere of Europe 
when he came to Amsterdam.  He liked everything, from magnificent shipyards to 
clean pavements and cozy coffee houses, and he immediately wanted to transfer all 
that to Russia. But he also wanted to continue decapitating his enemies in propria 
persona. And, after drinking coffee with foreign guests, he would go down into a 





In Gaidar’s assessment, Russia’s tormenting struggle in between the two paths of 
development -- European modernity and Asiatic despotism , without being able to 
permanently choose either one of them – has been the definitive controversy of its 
history for more than three centuries. That controversy remains topical in Putin’s 
Russia, as Andrey Piontkovsky points out:  
“Something in the nature of the West -- that escapes the understanding of our 
modernizers – allows it again and again to overtake Russia with all her stockpiles of 
cast iron and steel, and rusty missiles, and submarines […] Our barbaric rulers are 
charmed with products of the West and are eager to possess them; but they 
disdainfully reject the roots of the Western civilization, its atmosphere of Freedom 




                       Gaidar describes the product of such controversial development as “a 
permanent crisis of an ‘east-western’ social structure.”  Russia copied the European 
experience “in form,” especially in its cultural aspects, but failed to establish a 
tradition of private property relations “unfettered by state or bureaucratic dictates.” 
177
 
He adds that the bureaucracy of the Russian Empire combined the worst features of 
both worlds: it borrowed the mechanistic and alienated style of the Prussian 
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bureaucracy -- but without the traditional German accuracy; and, consistent with the 
“eastern” tradition, it cultivated petty tyranny, lazy sloppiness, and corruption.  
Russia’s social structure, according to Gaidar, became “pathologically ill and 
permanently out of balance”:  it lacked a middle class that would provide social 
stability.  The upper aristocracy and the lower social strata “seemed to live in two 
different countries” and even spoke and thought in different languages – the peasants 
used Russian, the nobles used French. 
178
 
                         Ronald Hingley’s famous study of the enigmatic “Russian mind” 
portrays Russians as a nation of role-players who continuously “display postures” and 
keep “eye and ear constantly cocked for audience reaction.”
179
 The celebrated scholar 
brings up many examples of this trait, both in every-day life observations and in the 
character of Russian leaders, from Emperor Nickolas I to Nikita Khrushchev.  In 
Hingley’s view, Stalinist show trials of 1936-1938 were a spectacular example of 
how the rulers of the nation would use theatrical devices “to bolster their authority 
.“
180
  Hingley notes the presence of the “show trial” principle in Soviet life, on a 
humbler level, in such features as “boards of shame” or “self-criticism sessions.” 
181
 
                                                          
178
 Ibid., p. 33 
179
 Ronald Hingley. The Russian Mind. New York, 1977.  The book’s emphasis on 
“the histrionic aspect” of the Russian character was noted as its most significant 
insight (“The Economist” book review, May 27, 1978).  
180
 Ibid., p. 86.  
181
 It may be worth noting that the tradition of “boards of shame” did not disappear in 
the 21
st
 century: for example, utility fees collectors in Russia or Ukraine still publicly 
post lists of debtors near entrances to apartment buildings.   
52 
 
                     Ronald Hingley also devotes his attention to the stereotypic notion that 
“all Russians lie all the time," as was testified by a British ambassador to Moscow 
back in the 16
th
 century: 
‘From the great to the small  […] the Russ neither believeth anything that another 




                    Hingley quotes numerous other such testimonies, including a 16
th
 century 
traveler account that, when selling captured Russians at Crimean Tatar slave auctions, 
a seller would always try to pass off his stock as Polish, “for the Muscovite race, 
being crafty and deceitful, does not bring a good price.” 
183
  
                      Exaggerations apart, Hingley analyzes the causes of that stereotype. 
Among them, he points out to the earlier discussed Russian “histrionic character trait” 
and civilizational duality.  Another important factor, in his opinion, is the impact of 
living under despotism, which cultivates the survival art of “camouflage behavior” 
and “deception tactics.”  
                      Hingley’s analysis highlights a stock of Russian vocabulary denoting 
many shades and gradations of untruthfulness, such as  ochkovtiratelstvo 
(“eyewash”), pokazukha (“bull”),   lukavstvo (subtle and cunning pretense), and 
dvulichie (two-facedness, duplicity).    
                     The “Potemkin villages” of Catherine the Great were a prime example of 
the bull and eyewash, and became an emblem of false imitation and pretense.  That 
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phrase itself is now international, along with other famous internationalized Russian 
words like vodka, sputnik, and perestroika.    
                    Ronald Hingley draws an important distinction between the practices of 
vranyo (fantasy-mongering; tall tales) and lozh (sinister untruth).  A textbook 
example of vranyo is the character of Khlestakov in Gogol’s Inspector General. 
According to Hingley, public vranyo developed by Russia’s statesmen and officials is 
akin to “political bombast in general”; but Russian rulers, from Empress Catherine to 
Khrushchev, perfected its art to the virtuoso level. He notes that vranyo became a 
professionalized skill in Soviet times, as demonstrated by “officially licensed 
greeters” for foreign visitors, such as the Intourist guides.  
                      In that sense, Hingley suggests that Lenin’s period of the Soviet history 
might be called “the age of truth” – because the official spokesmen who promised the 
people a glorious future “on the whole believed that their promises were well 
founded.”  But the age of Stalin, in Hingley’s terms, was the era of deliberate and 
militant lozh, when propaganda lost its sincerity, and “a sincere belief in anything 
could becomer a passport to disgrace and arrest.” 
184
  
                   “Institutionalized mendacity” is traced through the ages of Russian 
history. Michael Speransky, a reformist-minded Russian statesman complained at the 
turn of the 19
th
 century:  “In no other State do political words stand in such contrast to 
reality as in Russia.” 
185
 A century and a half later, George F. Kennan observed that 
there were “two images of Russian reality – the country as it actually was and as the 
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authorities wished it to appear.” 
186
 In Stalin’s times, notes Hingley, there was a 
likewise “array of political fictions and myths” – and, while the subjects were not 
necessarily expected to believe them, they were required “to affirm their acceptance 
as a form of ritual obeisance.” 
187
 
                  This helps to explain why the ordinary people would also become “experts 
in fabrication of falsehoods.”  Ronald Hingley quotes Donald Mackenzie Wallace (a 
diplomatic correspondent who worked in Russia in late 19
th
 century) who reflected:  
“For ages the peasantry were exposed to the arbitrary power and ruthless exactions of 
those who were placed over them; and as the law gave them no means of legally 
protecting themselves, their only means of self-defense lay in cunning and deceit.” 
188
 
   
                   Hingley found it notable that “Russians themselves most expertly deride 





 century satirist, Saltykov-Shchedrin, is well known for these quotes:  
“The severity of Russian laws is alleviated by the lack of obligation to fulfill them.”  
Another of his famous quotes -- “Our governance principle is very simple: never 
explicitly permit anything, and never explicitly forbid anything” -- stands in 
remarkable accord with a line from Mikhail Zhvanetsky that refers to Russia today:  
“Our freedom is like a traffic signal with all three lights on.” 
                     Two centuries after the invention of “Potemkin villages,” Russia 
remains entangled in a mix of truth and vranyo.  From the earliest days of his 
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presidency, Vladimir Putin was described as “trying to erect the Potemkin village [of 
fake democracy] before the complacent West.”
190
  Ten years later, a prominent 
Russian columnist speaks about the ongoing “restoration of the USSR Potemkin 
village”. 
191
 After years of work in Russia, a Western journalist feels that “Russia is 
an assembly line of Potemkin villages – they used to be made of cardboard, then they 
were wooden, and now they are virtual.”  She concludes that “the Russian society 
seems deeply ill; nobody understands how to distinguish truth and lies, and help from 









                      Martin Malia, who was insightfully skeptical about the attempts to 
reform the Soviet Union, explained that such efforts were futile because the Soviet 
system was an “applied utopia:”  
 “applied utopias do not simply fail and fade away. The effort to realize them leads 
rather, through a perverse cunning of reason, to the creation of a monstrous 
antireality, or an inverted world.”
193
.   
 
                      Post-Soviet societies demonstrate evidence supporting this view. 
Richard Rose interprets post-Soviet Russia as an “antimodern society” – because its 
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apparently modern organizations perform in a non-modern fashion. It is a system that 
rejects modernity, maintains pre-modern ways of doing “everyday things,” and even 
shows a de-modernizing effect. 
194
    
                           Richard Rose characterizes modern society as knowledge-based, rich 
in information, transparent, and with predictable causal relations. It operates on the 
basis of laws and “continuing feedback between governors and governed.” Its formal 
organizations perform their functions in the fashion of a vending machine, so people 
do not need a “repertoire of tactics” for obtaining a needed result from them. 
                         In contrast, the anti-modern society can be described as “translucent, 
opaque, uncertain, and irregular,” where feedback messages are repressed or ignored. 
Survey data reported by Richard Rose reveal that Russians, when confronted with 
formal organizations failures – such as unpaid wages, lack of police protection, low 
quality medical care, etc. – resort to repertoires of alternative tactics for getting things 
done. They rely on private networks of family and friends, home-made products, 
bribes, and informal connections in the “economy of favors.”   
                        Relations in the “economy of favors” are based on “informal codes” 
that are enforced more thoroughly than written rules.
195
  Alena Ledeneva quotes the 
popular wisdom saying that “Russia is a country of unread laws and unwritten 
rules.”
196
  The culture of unwritten rules is based on a common knowledge about the 
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gap between “official discourse” and “the ways in which things are done in practice.”   
This culture, according to Ledeneva, has the nature of an “open secret” – an 
oxymoron that adds to other paradoxical formulas describing communist societies 
(such as “the art of reading between the lines”).   Her definition reflects the intended 
ambiguity and duality of unwritten rules; it underscores “a tacit acceptance that what 
is known should remain unarticulated.”  This principle nurtures “ambivalence about 
the idea of being honest” and dedicated to declared values and goals.  Hence, such 




                      The social practices of “beating the system” undermined the Soviet 
communism, but they also “worked as a boomerang” when the old system collapsed. 
198
  In Hans van Zon’s viewpoint, the fall of communism became a Pandora’s box for 
the spread of those anti-modern practices “from population to polity.” That deepened 
the legitimacy crisis of the post-Soviet regimes, which developed into “a hidden war 
between citizenry and state” – in the form of failed services and unpaid taxes. 
199
 
                       Hans van Zon notes that post-Soviet societies demonstrate a growing 
division between “inside and outside morals” that is typical of pre-modern societies. 
Social divide and disintegration – which had started in the late phase of the Soviet 
system – became astonishingly strong and created “a Hobbesian nightmare.”  The 
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new social structure strengthens the ascriptive tendencies of late socialism thus 
indicating a return to the traditionalist society – except that such structure is not 
sanctioned by religious beliefs or traditional values.
200
  
                        The overall trend of post-Soviet social change, according to van Zon, 
is “from a pseudo-modern to an antimodern society.” This change strengthens the 
pre-modern elements: for instance, social network capital in Ukraine is deemed to 




                          Hans van Zon summarizes his observations of post-Soviet societies in 
a hypothesis about “the post-Soviet socio-psychological syndrome.” 
202
 He posits it as 
a persistent and self-reproducing set of values, norms, and behavioral patterns. One of 
them is a cult of power – which is understood as personalist, absolutist, and arbitrary 
in nature. Such understanding appears to be shared both by the rulers and the ruled.  
But is is complemented by a perceived alienation between “the people” and “the 
state,” wherefore the skill of “beating the system” is viewed as a virtue. Another part 
of that syndrome is an attitude of “learned helplessness” which implies that “the 
world cannot be changed” and cultivates dependence on the authorities. Compliance 
with those in power also means that all other abilities are deemed less important; as a 
consequence, meritocracy is alien to this society, and “intellect is marginalized.”  Last 
but not least, the described syndrome includes “a problematic relationship to truth.” 
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This includes widely spread economic cheating, as well as a general lack of trust in 
society.  
                     An international policy advisor himself, Van Zon admits that state 
policies cannot immediately influence the social practices stemming from those 
beliefs and norms. Although development alternatives are not ruled out, a vicious 






CHAPTER 3.   




3.1. Orwell Still Matters 
 
 
                          From a positivist perspective, George Orwell’s texts have little 
relevance to the scientific inquiry about the Soviet system and its legacies: Orwell 
performed no field research in the Soviet Union. For some, Orwell’s concept of 
“doublethink” is only an abstract “literary metaphor.”
203
 
                         But his readers in the Soviet Union
204
 were astonished: how could this 
foreigner, living in a far-away “normal country”, describe their life with so much 
accuracy? How did Orwell know it so well? 
205
   “Soviet readers admired Orwell; 
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they were able to feel the metaphor of ‘a boot stamping on a human face – forever’ in 
its vivid entirety,” recalls a Russian essayist. 
206
   
                        Victoria Chalikova, Russia’s leading scholar of Orwell, believed that 
his biggest discovery as an artist concerned the changing character of power in the 
20
th
 century. This was the first time when the rulers came “from the masses,” when 
they attempted to protect their power collectively, like a mafia or a clique, and when 
they resorted to a calculated algorithm in order to control society – by controlling the 
people’s thoughts, memory, and speech.
207
  A central question for Orwell is “whether 
there is any such thing as ‘truth’” – because truth in the 20
th
 century becomes 
“mobile,” it is proven “by the consensus of the millions,” and there is “no longer any 
awareness of the discrepancy between truth and falsehood.”
208
   
                       Orwell’s characters discuss the “mutability of the past.”  They explain 
that “past events have no objective existence […] Since the Party is in full control of 
all records and in equally full control of the minds of its members, it follows that the 
past is whatever the Party chooses it to be.”
209
  
                      That narrative accurately reflected the Soviet reality -- suffice it to 
compare the above quote with the following passage from George Kennan’s famous 
article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct:”  
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“Truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the 
Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. It is 
nothing absolute and immutable -- nothing which flows from objective reality. It is 
only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate 




              Orwell’s text further explains that, in order to accept the Party’s “mutable 
truth,” a person would need, most of all, “the training of memory” with the help of a 
“mental technique” named doublethink:  
 
“Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind 
simultaneously, and accepting both of them […]  To tell deliberate lies while 
genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient […]   
To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling 
carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, 
knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them […] and above all, to 
apply the same process to the process itself – that was the ultimate subtlety; 
consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious 
of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word 




                Erich Fromm notes that as the result of such manipulation of the mind, “the 
person is no longer saying the opposite of what he thinks, but he thinks the opposite 
of what is true.”
212
  We are also reminded that doublethink importantly differs from 
cognitive dissonance. The latter term denotes “the perception of incompatibility 
between two cognitions”, or “the uncomfortable tension that comes from holding two 
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conflicting thoughts at the same time,” whereas doublethink describes the act of 
“simultaneously accepting two mutually contradictory beliefs as correct.”
213
   As 
Robert Conquest remarked, doublethink was “the condition of life” in the Soviet 
state.
214
   
                 Ronald Hingley’s analysis indicates that the concept of doublethink is 
relevant for understanding the Soviet trait of “camouflage and deception.”  Hingley 
raises the question whether “the vranyo artist” can simultaneously “believe and not 
believe the creative fictions that he disseminates.”   For Hingley, the likely answer 
was in Dostoyevsky’s description of “the take-off moment” – when “one begins to 
believe in oneself halfway through a story.”  In Hingley’s view, a fantasy-monger 
“oscillates” between wholeheartedly believing in what he is saying at one moment, 
and not believing at another moment.
215
  
                 Hingley also pointed out that the nature of belief was “a particularly 
elusive general problem,” and that too little was known about “what happens to a 
man’s brain when he is compelled year in and year out to repeat statements which he 
may know or suspect to be untrue.”  He assumed that a lifelong addiction to vranyo 
may produce a significant “dislocation in the brain,” perhaps in the form of 
“controlled schizophrenia whereby private thoughts and official mendacity are, so to 
                                                          
213
 Tom McArthur (ed.). The Oxford Companion to the English Language. Oxford 
University Press, 1992, p. 321.  
That point is also developed by Gail Sheehy in her biographic study of Mikhail 
Gorbachev (The Man Who Changed the World,1991).  
214
 Robert Conquest. Foreword to: Luba Brezhneva. The World I Left Behind.Pieces 
of a Past. Random House, 1995.  
215
 Ronald Hingley, ibid., p. 97-98. 
64 
 
speak, confined in separate compartments of the brain.” 
216
  As another important 
point, he noted that vranyo was a “two-way process” in which “the relations between 
purveyor and recipient are of the essence.”
217
 
                         The concept of doublethink is directly linked to Hanna Arendt’s claim 
that totalitarian ideologies were focused on the transformation of human nature rather 
than the outside world.  Alena Ledeneva further extends that link to the writings of 
Alexander Zinoviev who portrayed the Homo Sovieticus as a product of such 
transformation, and to the empirical evidence from Yuri Levada about the traits of 
Homo Post-Sovieticus where doublethink remains a perpetuating legacy.
218
  
                        Levada described the Soviet Man as “Deceptive Man” -- an 
incarnation of “doublethink, Russian style,” a person “in constant need of self-
deception.” While praising George Orwell for introducing the “fruitful term” of 
doublethink into the language of science and politics, Levada also maintained that 
Orwell’s frame was “deliberately oversimplified for the sake of ‘purity’ of the 
thought experiment.”  It assumed that the “bosses” were cynically rational in 
manipulating the submissive “lower orders” -- but in reality such distinction did not 
exist. Levada argues that “the ‘upper classes’ inevitably live by the same rules of 
deceptive doublethink that are typical of their inferiors,” and that they self-
deceptively “confuse desire with reality” in the same manner.  He concludes that 
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post-Soviet Russia reveals “even more profound examples of doublethink,” and so far 
“neither society, nor its leaders have succeeded in breaking out of the circle.”
219
   
            Thus, it should not be surprising that references to Orwell remain abundant in 
the post-Soviet political discourse. In one notable example, an activist of Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolution was recalling: 
”In early 2004, I and my like-minded friends were driven by personal hatred for the 
[President Leonid] Kuchma regime. We were reading Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, 




                        Likewise, anti-Putin protesters in Moscow came out for the rally on 12 
June 2012 with mocking quotes from Orwell on their posters: “War is Peace. 
Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength.”
221
  
                A Russian political essayist, Kim Satarin, suggests that the phenomenon of 
doublethink is not necessarily a product of the totalitarian suppression of dissent, 
which is why it can also be found in a democratic environment. Such form of 
doublethink can be nourished by contradictions between people’s private attitudes 
and habits, on the one hand, and the expectations of their public roles, on the other. 
                      In post-Soviet Russia, according to Satarin, a major source of 
doublethink is the country’s “catch-up civilization path” – because it produced a mix 
of mindsets and behavior models, some predominantly archaic, others more inherent 
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to the modern industrial society.   They are based on different worldviews, different 
patterns of rationality and identity, and  different understanding of such concepts as 
power, law, privacy, and individual rights. Therefore, “a person with a mixed 
structure of consciousness and surrounded by likewise ‘mottled’ individuals will 
inevitably demonstrate doublethink.” 
222
  
                     A similar point is made by a contemporary philosopher who interprets 
the phenomenon of Russian doublethink as “a historical and cultural derivative of the 
destabilizing duality of the Russian society.”  He quotes Nikolai Berdyaev explaining 
those roots of doublethink:  
“The conservatism and stagnancy of our base character became connected with our 
inclination towards novelties and the latest European trends, which, however, were 
never truly internalized.”
223
   
 
                 Kim Satarin further reflects that the archaic type of conscience -- which 
was cultivated under totalitarianism – tends to deify the supreme ruler as a “magic” 
protecting force. For this type of conscience, free elections create a sense of 
psychological absence of the supreme power – which that conscience rejects as 
uncomfortable and unacceptable. Hence, a big part of Russian voters do not take the 
democratic procedure seriously – they perceive it as a toy, rather than a tool. This 
determines an imitative character of politics: there are civic procedures in absence of 
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citizens.  And conscientious imitation results in doublethink again – only this time, it 
is not imposed from above, but rather is prompted “by one’s own invalidity.”  
                       In Satarin’s estimate, that type of voters is prevalent in contemporary 
Russia, although there is a civic-minded minority as well. It is still an open question 
whether that minority will be enough to realign Russia’s development with the path 
of political modernity.  
                     In Ukraine, observers note similarly irrational trends of voting behavior.  
“Our post-Soviet society remains locked in stereotypes that are harder to break than 
chains and shackles,” remarks a Ukrainian political commentator.  He finds that mass 
consciousness is dominated by “resilient myths” where  “interpretations are more 
important than facts”.  As he further points out: 
“Without changing the myths, we cannot change the reality. [Thus,] lies are the truth, 




                 Like many others, this expert feels that elections cannot change the quality 
of Ukraine’s politics because strong protest attitudes do not get reflected in election 
outcomes: “when people decide to vote, they are guided by irrational motivations.”  
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3.2. Doublethink: the Mental Software of the “Soviet Mind” 
 
The “Dual consciousness” of  communist ideocracy 
 
 
                   The Soviet system was based on ideocratic rule; its two most distinctive 
and permeating characteristics were discipline and ideological control.   The latter 
was rooted in the exercise of doublethink as a “positive” way of domination – 
teaching the Soviet people to “love the Big Brother.” 
 225
 
                      Andrzej Walicki discusses two notable features of the collective mind 
of Soviet functionaries. One is known as “the party mystique” -- the belief in the 
party’s “collective infallibility” and, consequently, a functionary’s absolute loyalty to 
its pronouncements. Leon Trotsky was one of the first to formulate this principle by 
saying, “The party in the last analysis is always right because the party is the only 
historical instrument given to the proletariat to resolve its fundamental tasks… it is 
impossible to be right against the party, one can be right only with the party and 
through the party.” 
226
  Perhaps, the most famous articulation of this principle belongs 
to Yuri Piatakov, a prominent figure in the Communist Party leadership of the 1920s, 
who was reported saying that if the party called something black that actually was 
white, he would then consider it black, too – “since outside the party, outside accord 
with it, there is no life for me.”
227
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                        The faith in the infallibility of the Party was grounded morally and 
logically. It assumed that the Party’s aims were sanctified by the “Dialectic of 
History” since it claimed to be the “vanguard of the proletariat” – the embodiment of 
“the active principle in History.”  For those who devoutly believed in that, communist 
party membership equated to “being one of the select.”
228
 
                        Related to the perception of “the party mystique” was the psychic 
mechanism that Andrzej Walicki calls “dual consciousness.”  A vivid example of it 
was revealed during the “show trials” of the 1930s when famous Bolshevik leaders 
were falsely confessing to be guilty of “heinous crimes” against the country. Walicki 
resorts to Arthur Koestler’s analysis of their “mental captivity” showing how an old 
Bolshevik uses “Marxist dialectic” to persuade himself that he was “objectively 
guilty” despite his “subjective” innocence on the specific charges.
229
 
                           The historical prototype of that character, Nikolai Bukharin, made a 
“remarkably self-conscious” attempt to explain such conduct in his confession at the 
trial.
230
 He spoke of the “dual psychology” of opposition-minded Bolsheviks that was 
akin to the Hegelian inwardly split “unhappy consciousness” (unglückliche 
Bewußtsein).  They were torn between their factional differences with Stalin and the 
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realization that by fighting against him, they were siding with class enemies of the 
communist revolution. In Andrzej Walicki’s terms, people like Bukharin “were 
seeing Stalin as a monster, on the one hand, and yet regarding him as the legitimate 
incarnation of the party and its socialist cause.”
231
 He describes this state of mind as 
“paradigmatic” of the totalitarian communist mentality.  
                          It may be argued that “unhappy consciousness” was a kind of 
“secular theodicy” under heavy ideocratic pressure, whereas Orwellian doublethink 
was a “voluntary accommodation to the mendacity of a secular theocracy.”
232
 Andrzej 
Walicki makes that distinction to show that “Communist true believers” suffered a 
different tragedy that “victims of ideological oppression” such as Soviet intellectuals.  
But Walicki also admits that the difference is rather blurred. Indeed, Winston Smith’s 
love of the Big Brother cannot be called a truly voluntary act. It will further be argued 
that “true believers” and “victims” in the Soviet historical experience often blended 
together.  
                         A Soviet Samizdat writer and human rights activist, Valentin Turchin, 
argued that the supreme form of totalitarian enslavement was not by means of terror, 
but by making individuals “accept the system as an alleged necessity that cannot 
possibly be changed.” He described it as “subjecting people’s minds to an ideological 
operation that changes their identity and paralyzes their will to resist.”
233
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                           That definition, written in the early 1970s, resonates with remarkable 
admissions now made by former Soviet retirees as they look back into those times.  A 
descendant of enthusiastic Jewish settlers that came to the Siberian Birobidzhan in the 
1930s
234
 recalls that his parents had always perceived Stalin’s repression as “a force 
of nature that takes its inevitable toll.”  For them, arrests and disappearance of 
neighbors were “a part of life, like weddings and funerals… They lived in fear, but 
they did not resist; they did not understand why [this was done], but they took it with 
hardly any complaint.” 
235
 
                          Turchin described the late Soviet phase (USSR under Brezhnev) as 
“stationary totalitarianism” when the system was perceived as “the only game in 
town,” and attitudes of “social adaptation” developed into a comprehensive culture of 
doublethink. Another dissident intellectual of that time defined the Soviet doublethink 
as “submission to the ‘socio-ideological mannequin’ installed in everybody’s mind” 
which required “repudiating one’s genuine identity.” 
236
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                          Importantly, this separation with “one’s genuine self” existed in 
different degrees and varied from one individual to another.  The minimum degree 
was characterized as “ideological infantilism.” Its opposite was cynicism – the 
maximum degree of inner separation from externally accepted rules. Cynics were 
noted to serve the official ideology even more effectively than “infantile” believers. 
But even cynics – despite their sense of having “inner freedom” -- were “correcting 




                           It is worth noting that the younger generation of Communist Party 
functionaries – especially the apparatchiks of the Young Communist League (the 
Comsomol) – consistently exhibited that trait. That should not be surprising because, 
in comparison with any other social group, they were better informed and less 
constrained by illusions or moral scruple.
238
  By the same token, their particular 
“more separated” version of adaptation made this group better prepared to excel in 
post-Soviet realities: they were perfectly trained to follow “the trend.”
239
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                            Another peculiar mental technique of adaption to totalitarian 
ideocracy was described by Czeslaw Milosz as Ketman.
240
  Andrzej Walicki 
interpreted Milosz’s famous novel as emphasizing creative defense and passive 
resistance, rather than surrender to ideocratic mental captivity. 
241
  In his opinion, 
“national Ketman” as a form of “conscious mass play” ultimately helped to 
deligitimize Marxism in the Polish society sooner and more completely than in Russia 
where communist indoctrination had been deeper and longer.  
                         In Walicki’s conclusion, different forms of accommodating  “dual 
consciousness” developed by the Soviet people in response to ideocratic tyranny 
defeated the ultimate goal of communist indoctrination: “the New Man of the 
communist utopia did not appear.”
242
  But the efforts to create the New Man 
undoubtedly left their mutilating effects. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn once remarked, 
in the Soviet society “doublethink had been worked to perfection and became a 
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Forging of the New Soviet Man 
 
                        In Lenin’s view, the best proof of Marxism’s difference from old 
socialist utopias was the understanding that the communist society would not be built 
out of abstract “virtuous people specially cultivated in greenhouses.”  On the 
contrary, as he put it, communism could only be built with “the mass human material 
raised in bourgeois environment” and inevitably poisoned by “bloody, dirty, 
rapacious, mercantile capitalism.”
244
  Hence, the program of the Russian Communist 
Party written by Nikolai Bukharin in 1918 prescribed that the new communist man 
should be “manufactured” by means of “proletarian coercion in all its forms, 
beginning with the firing squad.” 
245
 
                          The ultimate goal and challenge of such “manufacturing” was well 
explained in Evgeny Zamiatin’s famous formula when he wrote that the individual 
and the communist state were lke two weights on a pair of scales – a gram for “I” and 
a ton for “We.” Then “the natural path from nothingness to greatness is to forget that 
you are a gram and to feel instead that you are a millionth part of a ton” – but the 
“grams” themselves would have to wish to be merged into the “ton.”
 246
 No wonder 
then that the Soviet vocabulary of the 1930s referred to that process as the “forging” 
of the New Man.  
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                           As Mikhail Heller demonstrates in his thorough study, the main tools 
of this “forging” had been accurately described by Zamiatin and Orwell. They 
included fear, hatred of the designated enemy, affection for the supreme ruler, power 
over memory and personal life, controlled poverty, and “Newspeak.”
247
 Zamiatin’s 
inventory of those tools additionally includes literature and arts.  
                              Fear was inflicted not only by arrests and executions – those were 
only “the sharpest” out of many tools in the arsenal.  It was also produced by a 
coercive and tightening system of restrictions and bans that concerned all spheres of 
life, from housing and domestic travel to employment and marriage. 
248
 
                          A keen British journalist observed in 1930 that 90% of Soviet 
population were disillusioned, discontent, and driven by anxiety and fear. But the 
other 10% were “filled with an enthusiasm, unknown in any other group of people 
save perhaps the National Socialists of Germany, the Fascist and the Salvation Army. 
[…]   Most of the active minority are young in age and young in spirit.  Many of them 
[…] have no conception of life in a capitalist country.  Having passed through the 
Communist training grounds of the Pioneers (the Communist Boy Scouts) and the 
Komsomol (the League of Communist Youth), they have had Leninism stamped upon 
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The school, the media, literature and films – all of this together made up one integral 
system of propaganda  (a.k.a. “communist upbringing”) that was “penetrating into 
every house  and every mind.” 
250
 
                             More than anything else, that system of indoctrination cultivated 
duplicity in various forms – from dual consciousness and doublethink to prevarication 
and blunt hypocrisy. As an example,  during the collectivization famine of 1932, 
when every day one could see swollen bodies of starved and dying people on the 
streets, a teacher was telling a class of hungry kids about the advantages of socialism 
and kept saying: “Children, you are NOT hungry!”
251
   
 
                   Lev Kopelev -- subsequently a writer and a human rights activist -- was 
an ardent communist believer at that time, one of those youths with “Leninism 
stamped upon him”.  In 1932, he was assigned to enforce farm collectivization – 
which meant to confiscate food from starving villagers. Kopelev’s memoirs are a 
rarely honest self-study, a kind of retrospective autopsy of “a true believer.”  He 
recalls how his fanatic faith in the righteousness of the goal made him blind and deaf 
to the villagers’ despair; he was convincing himself that all was being done “for their 
own good” and better future: 
“We were fanatical novitiates of the omni-salvatory ideals of communism. So when 
we saw that our noble and kind ideas were used to justify ignominious and cruel 
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deeds, and when we had to take part in those deeds ourselves, we most of all feared to 





                     Contemporary historans explore the field of “Soviet subjectivity” in 
attempts to examine “the degree to which the interior life of the individual citizen was 
dominated by the regime’s ideology.” Their findings confirm Zamiatin’s metaphor 
about “grams” wanting to be merged into a “ton.”  For many, such immersion was a 
means of survival. They forced themselves “to silence their doubts and fears” and 
tried “not to think or feel outside the terms defined by the official  
public discourse.”
 253
 Such “Sovietization of the mind” was universal. As a Soviet 
writer remarked, “Stalinism entered into all of us.” 
254
 
                           Official censorship strictly controlled writers and artists, but their 
inner control – the so-called self-censorship – was even stricter. It worked like a 
spelled circle besetting a writer inside a chain of mandatory myths, permitted 
characters, and approved symbols. “No Soviet writer who wishes to be published in 
his own country can escape from that circle,” remarked Mikhail Heller.
255
  One 
aspiring writer explained that point to Sergei Dovlatov as an act of balancing: “A  
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“Grandpa Lenin” in a Soviet pre-school  dance class (top). 
Source: A Day in the Life of the Soviet Union, Collins 








An image of Lenin in his childhood (as Volodia Ulianov) 
accompanied elementary school students as the official 
emblem of the pre-pioneer upbringing – as in this Soviet 
poster (Source: Wikimedia Commons).  





litterateur must get published, but not to the detriment of his talent. There is a slot 
between clean conscience and ignobility. One must slip through that slot.” 
256
 
                          Valeria Novodvorskaia, an essayist who was a prisoner of conscience 
in Brezhnev’s times, summarizes: 
“The Soviet literature, stifled and dehydrated by the “red heat,” perfectly mastered the 
pentameters and trochees of doublethink. Everyone had to go through those 
grindstones – from Mikhail Bulgakov to Ilya Erenburg. Very few were able to stay 





                           Heller also emphasized that Soviet indoctrination had a strong 
irrational component; it was propped by belief in miracle and myth.  The teaching’s 
promises were impossible to achieve, in everyday small matters as well as in the 
grand dimension. Hence, faith in miraculous victories and achievements against all 
odds, due to the power of will, ingenuity and wisdom, was called to rescue. It is 
reflected in propaganda messages, in every Soviet leader’s statements, and in such 
developments as the Stakhanovite movement or the career success of Trofim 
Lysenko.  
                          The same was true about Soviet myths. “A collection of myths 
creates a magic ring around a Soviet person, blocking all the exits to the outside 
world,” observed Heller.
258
 That ring was made up by the grand myths such as “the 
unity of the party and the people,” the “all-people state,” the inevitability of 
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communism etc.  Heller emphatically agreed with Leszek Kolakowski who had noted 
that the Soviet state was combating religion not because of its atheistic principles, but 
because of its totalitarian nature: it did not tolerate competing mythologies.   
                          Soviet propaganda generated myths about its heroes and strongly 
relied on them. Myth was substituting and ousting true reality. Examples are 
abundant. The story of Pavlik Morozov, a Young Pioneer who allegedly exposed 
“class enemies” in his own family and was brutally killed by them in 1932, was a 
major heroic narrative of Soviet history textbooks for more than fifty years.  When 
the writer Yuri Druzhnikov investigated the facts on his own, he discovered that the 
majority of them were false. Most remarkably, the villagers he interviewed -- 
including even the dead hero’s own mother -- while recollecting facts that differed 
from the official version, would also add: “but the correct story is the one in books.” 
259
 
                          Another and no less striking example of myth replacing reality is 
rendered by Semion Gluzman, a psychatrist who was imprisoned in Brezhnev’s times 
for human rights activism.  While in prison, he learned the story of a man who had 
been serving a long sentence for collaborating with the Nazis during World War II in 
Krasnodon – the city made famous by the celebrated Soviet novel “Young Guard” 
which describes a heroic group of teenagers who took part in underground resistance 
movement. That old convict once wrote a letter to the USSR Prosecutor General 
asking to review and drop some of his charges because they had been based on false 
facts. Weeks later, a special investigation officer came from Moscow – and told that 
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man: “Your petition was rejected because we cannot question the validity of the great 
novel that serves to educate millions of our young people.” 
260
 
                         A tool of major importance in forging the New Soviet Man was 
language – as reflected in the Orwellian Newspeak. Heller notes that language was 
“the most important and the most powerful weapon in the hands of a state that 
decided to transform the human beings.”
261
  In the new “Soviet language” the word 
“loses its generally accepted meaning and becomes an empty shell which the supreme 
authority fills” as desired.  The word “conceals reality with an illusion” and also 
creates a “coded reality.” According to Heller, “the Soviet language is a code in 
which the signs are determined by the supreme authority,” and individuals are 
“admitted to the secrets of the code” in varying degrees, depending on their position 
in the social hierarchy. 
262
   
                         The linguist Grigory Vinokur attempted to propose improvements to 
the “revolutionary phraseology” of the 1920s by making it more rational and 
meaningful. He noted that communist slogans were turning into “verbal clichés” 
devoid of real content. He was warning about “the danger of the effect of empty 
phrases on people’s minds” -- because one can think in images or in words, but not in 
clichés. Thinking in clichés was bound to be “senseless.”
263
  Similar ideas and 
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 and Hannah 
Arendt.
266
 Czeslaw Milosz addressed the same issue in his concept of “logocracy.”
267
    
The Soviet system produced the most comprehensive historical experience of cliché-
based logocracy.  Among its other effects, this experience trained the Soviet people 
“to read between the lines” – which often meant to interpret the truth as the opposite 
to what is officially claimed. 
268
 
                           Heller, Sinyavsky, Krasin, Zinoviev and many other Soviet 
intellectuals agreed that the decades of molding the “New Soviet Man” did produce a 
new breed of people.  Alexander Zinoviev denoted it as the “Homo Sovieticus.”  He 
characterized that person as “ideologically enslaved”
269
 and “a self-satisfied slave” 
who considers himself “the freest man there is.”
270
  Victor Krasin recalls how 
dissidents like himself mistakenly believed that the “working masses” obediently 
followed Soviet rituals such as elections and parades “out of fear” – but they were 
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wrong. “The masses” showed little sympathy for the dissidents who took protest 
action in defense of human rights.  
                           Mikhail Heller compares the formation of the Soviet Man with the 
finale of Orwell’s famous novel: the machine of the state achieves complete victory, 
and the individual is turned into a cog in the machine. In the Soviet Union, he 
concludes, the process of turning human beings into cogs lasted for more than seventy 
years.   The most important outcome of that process, according to Heller, is expressed 
in Alexander Zinoviev’s words: “The Soviet society is passive and regimented. Our 
people became resigned. They are indifferent.” 
271
 Likewise, the writer Anatoly 
Pristavkin, when interviewed by the American scholar Gail Sheehy, described his 
compatriots saying: “Indifference is their chief characteristic.”
272
  
                      Gail Sheehy observed that Soviets did not think in the same way as 
Westerners. For a Western-educated thinker, perceived cognitive dissonance causes 
psychological discomfort and motivates an effort to resolve or reduce the 
contradiction. But Soviets are “trained to think on two levels,” notes Sheehy; “at the 
first level they believe they are sincere, but at the level of heart they realize they are 
lying.”
273
 She quotes Valentin Yumashev, a professional journalist who in post-Soviet 
times became a political and business tycoon, explaining that form of adaptation:  
“The first level is protective. You believe that you mean well and cast your actions in 
the name of romantic ideals. At a deeper level, the level of heart, you understand that 
it’s a trade-off or betrayal […] Truth is mixed with lies, trade-offs with attempts to 
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justify them. But you can’t let yourself think at that level, except in rare moments, or 




                        Thus, concludes Sheehy, the class of Soviet rulers has cultivated traits 
of chameleons “accustomed to acting many parts and drifting to change views in a 
matter of minutes,” while the class of the ruled are in a condition “of the walking 
dead”: they could never speak the truth, so they are not even able “to think the truth.”  
Therefore, “the masses have accumulated a perverse talent for not seeing what they 
see, for not believing their eyes, as though they had been rewired into a single, nerve-




The Philistine Within the Bolshevik 
 
                         Carl Marx wrongly assumed that “proletarian” was a stable social 
identification – because “proletarians, no matter whether they are victorious or 
oppressed, never want to remain proletarians.”
276
 In other words, they want to acquire 
property. The thoughtful Russian commentator making that point today feels that this 
was a fundamental mistake of Marxist theory and perhaps an underlying cause of the 
Soviet system failure.  
                       Soviet ideology waged a war against “petty-bourgeois acquisitive 
instincts.” In part, it used the Russian word “meshchanstvo” as a label to condemn 
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  The word is normatively translated into English as “philistinism,” 
although perhaps a more accurate equivalent in the American English would be 
“babbitry.”  
                        Leon Trotsky foresaw the dangerous consequences of “the Bolshevik 
finding the philistine within.” 
278
  He spoke about the “dual character” of the Soviet 
state, which was socialist because it abolished private property, but was still using, as 
Lenin himself had recognized, “the bourgeois state without the bourgeoisie.”  That 
meant using “the bourgeois norms of distribution” and “the capitalist measure of 
value” which had “to serve socialist aims.”   In this theoretical contradiction (that 
could “horrify the dogmatists and scholastics”) Trotsky saw the cause of “the 
fundamental contradiction between Bolshevik program and Soviet reality.”  He 
observed that the state was getting more despotic, while its bureaucracy was rising as 
the new privileged class. 
279
 
                         Yegor Gaidar reasonably points out that Trotsky’s “perceptive 
sociological analysis” anticipated the theory of the New Class which Milovan Djilas 
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elaborated decades later. Trotsky also predicted that increasing privileges would not 
satisfy the appetite of the bureaucracy (a.k.a. the nomenklatura).  There would come a 
day when the nomenklatura would want to turn from “directors” of state-owned assets 
into their “shareholders.”  As Gaidar noted, “unlike many of Trotsky’s other 
prophesies,” this one actually came true.
280
 
                            According to Gaidar, the collapse of the Soviet system inevitably 
followed from the “rigid framework of logic” expressed in the two Marxist formulas:  
1) communism abolishes private property; 2) the state, in essence, is owned by the 
bureaucracy. For Gaidar, those two premises shaped the logical, sociological, and 
psychological “frame of the grand but doomed house that Lenin built.”
281
  Its rise and 
fall, according to Gaidar, was a three-step process:  a) all private property was turned 
into state property; b) state property turned into the collective property of the 
bureaucracy; c) bureaucrats sought to become its private owners.
282
  In Gaidar’s apt 
metaphor, “the nomenklatura broke out of its socialist framework like a chick pecking 
out of its shell.” 
283
 
                           Initially, the anti-proprietorial component of the communist ideology 
efficiently restrained the bureaucrats’ acquisitive instincts. But that should not be 
credited to Stalin’s personality alone, notes Gaidar. Rather, the nomeklatura’s 
behavior in the 1920s and 1930s was driven by a comlpex mix of fear, faith, and self-
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preservation instinct. The latter was telling them that their power was not entirely 
secure. Massive social unrest could result in the restoration of the old regime. 
Communist officials had “nowhere to retreat,” so they firmly upheld the ideological 
tenets that solidified the regime by filling every crack of its edifice.    
                        In the late phase of Stalin’s rule, the ideology lost much of its impulse 
and appeal. The revolutionary spirit had been “exorcised” out of it; its tenets became 
fossilized and were reduced to ritual.  Apparatchiks of the new generation did not 
share romantic illusions and conformed to the standard rituals of the “Church of 
Marxism” without giving them much thought.  Hypocrisy and cynicism were filling 
the now empty shell of ideology to the brim.
284
     
                            Then came de-radicalization ushered in by Khrushchev. Loosened 
ideological restraints legalized acquisitiveness of moderate scale. As political rule 
became less tyrannical, economic centralization was weakened as well. Formally, the 
system of central planning and subordination remained without much change; but a 
parallel informal system of horizontal and vertical arrangements, agreements, and 
adjustments emerged and quickly developed. In experts’ opinion, the post-
Khrushchev Soviet economy was no longer managed as a “command system.”  
Instead, it became “an economy of understandings,” or a complex “bureaucratic 
market” which traded, in addition to goods and services, also in “power and rank, 
rules and exceptions, social position – basically in anything that had any value.”  As 
an example, the director of a plant would now be able to bargain before accepting an 
increased output assignment from the central planning authority, and in exchange for 
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his consent he would likely receive additional awards, an extra shipment of valued 




                            Gaidar calls this “parallel market” of bureaucratic arrangements and 
agreements a usual but subordinate part of normal market economies which operate 
with property and prices. There, relations of “understanding” go along with market 
relations per se -- like gestures go along with spoken words. The Soviet “bureaucratic 
market,” however, was the primary form of exchanges, like gestures and signs are 
primary for those who cannot speak.   
                         As the Soviet regime was de-radicalized, it brought to life a growing 
shadow economy.  That growth was nourished by increasing embezzlement of public 
resources (khishchenia) and a spread of inflated production records (pripiski). Both 
became possible due to spreading bribery that involved the highest level of the 
nomenklatura.  
                         For example, Uzbekistan’s cotton-growing industry was actually 
producing 5 million tons of cotton per year, but its shipments to fabric producers in 
Russia were reported at 6 million.  Recipients were bribed to accept half-empty 
containers as full, and to count low-grade cotton as high-grade.  Bribes were also 
given to “patrons” in Moscow for cover-up – all the way up to the Kremlin.
286
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                          Subsequently, some Uzbek officials who got prosecuted for those 
offenses (in Yuri Andropov’s time) blamed the culture of eye-washing encouraged by 
Moscow: “Brezhnev was the leader of the state, and he could not help knowing that 
our capacity was limited at 5 million tons. But in his address at the party conference 
in Tashkent, he called on Secretary Rashidov to surpass ourselves and produce six 
million instead of five – to which Rashidov was apparently forced to answer, ‘It will 




                      Bribes and misappropriation of growing scale soon accrued significant 
wealth in the hands of select members of the nomenklatura.
288
 But there were no 
ways to openly use or even reveal that wealth. 
289
   
                      The perverted nature of the Soviet economy based on artificial prices, 
anti-proprietorial constraints, and inapt management became vivid in the growth of 
underground entrepreneurs known as tsekhoviki (literally, “production shop 




 Telman Gdlian, the most famous investigator of high-profile corruption cases 
including the “cotton affair,” recalled afterwards: “I was astonished at the 
unbelievable amount of wealth that we were confiscating [from prosecuted regional 
party bosses and other high-ranking officials]: one regional party chief had 6 million 
rubles’ worth of gold, another had 5.4 million – it would have been even more in 
dollar equivalent then. In those times of relatively non-stratified society, this was like 
a nuclear bomb explosion.“ (Interview with Telman Gdlian. Versia, June 11, 2008).  
289
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Kalinichenko, ibid.).  
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managers”).  They “commercialized” the work of state-owned manufacturing 
facilities (usually, clothing factories) and were able to generate high profits, which 
they pocketed. Typically, such entrepreneurs would use government materials to 
produce more goods than reported, or more expensive goods than reported, or would 
produce unreported goods out of privately procured materials.  In any case, the 
produced consumer goods (that would typically be of better quality than average mass 
products) were easily sold for cash in retail stores “in disguise” of state-owned goods. 
The profits were shared within the chain of producers, sales operators, and the state 
officials assigned to control them all. Such operations were brilliantly conceived 
underground conspiracies. From the standpoint of Soviet law, they were severely 
persecuted and punished as organized crime (a.k.a. “the Soviet mafia”) -- although 




                        Thus, in Gaidar’s characterization of late Soviet system, “the monolith 
had begun to crack.”  The society emerging inside the post-totalitarian state was 
“ugly, shady, semi-criminal, and oligarchic,” but it “grew and matured within the 
greater System, pressurizing that system, demanding some kind of change, some kind 
of lawful outlet for the desire, the opportunity to manage property freely or event to 
own it free and clear.”
291
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                        When Guy Sorman visited the Soviet Union in 1989, he observed that 
the system of “parallel markets” was the epitome of the ideology-induced principle of 
doublethink.  He quoted a celebrated poet, Andrei Voznesensky, explaining to him: 
“We have learned since childhood to separate truth from words; to think is one thing; 
to speak is something different.” That duplicity, remarked Sorman, was present in the 
everyday life of the people, and it helped to understand how the people survived in 
that system. He noted that “under the semblance of socialist labor and socialist trade, 
black market and private labor were saving the economy from collapse.”  According 
to Soviet economists that he interviewed, over 80 percent of the population were 
regular consumers of products and services in the “parallel market.”  Virtually 
everybody, as far as he could see, had to produce something for the “parallel market” 
in order to be able to consume there.  Thus, concluded Sorman, “the whole Soviet 
society is drawn into double thinking, double acting, double speeches, and double 
morals.”
292
    
 
Society of “greengrocers”: the last Soviet generation 
 
                            Vaclav Havel created a striking symbol of compliance to post-
totalitarian ideocracy by describing a vegetable shop window with the slogan, 
“Workers of the world, unite!” 
293
 Havel’s “greengrocer” who posts that slogan 
symbolizes the ordinary citizen’s token compliance with the regime that is based on 
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falseness. That token compliance becomes complicity in the system’s lies. The 
symbolic greengrocer is “both a victim and a supporter of the system”: Havel shows 
that “the system” is not imposed by one group upon another, but it is “something that 
permeates the entire society and is a factor in shaping it, something that may seem 
impossible to grasp or define, for it is in the nature of a mere principle.”
294
    
                             That evasive phenomenon described by Havel might be called, in 
modern terms, “mental software” that guides individual and group conduct.  
“Individuals need not believe all those mystifications [of the regime], but they must 
behave as though they did,” remarked Havel.
295
   
                            The Russian writer Vladimir Voinovich made essentially the same 
conclusion about Soviet life: “The phenomenon of the Soviet system was in the fact 
that the lower classes lied to the upper classes, the upper classes lied to the lower 
classes and themselves demanded the lower classes to lie to them.” 
296
   
                        
Exhibit 1.3.2: “Greengrocers,” Soviet style 
 
These documentary photos from “One Day in the Life of the Soviet Union” published in 1987 
accurately match Vaclav Havel’s example of “a greengrocer with a poster” as a symbol of 
token compliance with the regime, and also the epitome of falseness and doublethink.  
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A Lenin poster sloppily pinned up in the office of a fishing coop 







In the office of a Soviet Army general, Lenin’s portrait mutely 
blends with the design of walls and furniture  – like a trademark 




    Elaborating on that formula, Voinovich explained:  “All or nearly all Soviet people 
know that what matters in the Soviet Union is not written laws, but the unwritten 
rules of behavior.”  Those rules prescribe that one should not stand out or take too 
much initiative, and should always vote unanimously with others. Orders  
 
from superiors, no matter how absurd they may seem, should be taken obediently, 
although it is not necessary to fulfill them. One should not show too much interest in  
politics or Soviet history; it is much better to be “moderately patriotic” and limit 
newspaper reading to the sports pages.
297
 
                            Voinovich pointed out that such shifty behavior of the “Soviet 
people” was not ethnically determined -- it was shaped by “the rules of conduct and 
conditions of life that influenced the entire lives of several generations.” 
298
  
                           The “greengrocer” phase of the Soviet life was characterized as “a 
rare combination of insanity and stupidity” in which “the parroting of a moribund 
orthodoxy seemed a normal and natural condition.”  In that world reminiscent of 
Kafka and Gogol “doublethink was the condition of life.”
299
 
                        Looking back, a Russian journalist recalls: 
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 “By the middle of Brezhnev’s rule, many of us were already accomplished “closet 
dissidents” or overt cryptographers: we relied on our own perceptions rather than on 
the rattle from newspapers and television. We could read between the lines of any 
newspaper article or government announcement. […] We could not help feeling 
irritated by meaningless slogans, such as “Economy must be economical!” and the 
signs “Glory to CPSU!” seen everywhere. Irritating was empty talk at official 
meetings, phony reports, and mandatory subscription to the party newspapers and 
journals. […]  That was an epoch of universal shortages alongside with piles of 
derelict goods and heaps of waste.  
And those who had access to scarce supplies controlled everything. Everybody sought 
their friendship and disposition. The whole country turned into “capitalist 
underground”, a total black market where money could buy any goods and services, 




                     Thus, Gaidar concludes, the anti-proprietorial component of the 
ideology – which used to make it “both coherent and unique” -- was the first to 
degenerate. Now the regime was “holding on out of sheer inertia, shielding itself from 
the blinding light of reason by hiding its head in the tattered old shawl of ritual.”  The 
nomenklatura itself was showing most vividly how senseless the ritual had become. 
“The reality of regional Party chairmen, Cabinet ministers, and millionaire kolkhoz 
directors singing revolutionary songs about their life as ‘hungry slaves’, of how ‘their 
outraged reason boils and leads them into battle to the death’ was far more surreal, 
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Exhibit 1.3.3: duplicity of senseless Soviet rituals. 
 
Documentary photos  from CPSU congresses of the 1970s .  
As Yegor Gaidar aptly observed,  “The reality of regional Party chairmen, Cabinet ministers, 
and millionaire kolkhoz directors singing revolutionary songs about their life as ‘hungry slaves’, 
of how ‘their outraged reason boils and leads them into battle to the death’ was far more 






    Some observers failed to grasp the dualistic and duplicitous character of the Soviet 
system – if they looked at it “through the prism of one’s own culture-bound standards 
and failing to understand that these standards might be totally inapplicable.” 
302
 For 
instance, misled by such cultural blindness, intellectuals like Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb sincerely believed that Stalinism was a new height of human civilization. They 
mistakenly took the Soviet constitution at its face value and ignored the “unwritten 
rules” of the system.  
                           In a similar manner, observers who took ritual at its face value in 
Brezhnev’s time misinterpreted its true meanings. One example of such 
misinterpretation was shown by George W. H. Bush when he attended the funeral of 
Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in 1982: a non-significant token gesture (the sign of the 
cross) from Brezhnev’s widow was described as a statement of civil disobedience – 
essentially, a rebellion -- against the communist system. 
303
 
                            But in reality, Brezhnev himself did not consider paying tribute to 
religious rituals as incongruous with his position of the Communist Party leader.  His 
niece recollects that religious rituals were a part of Leonid Brezhnev’s habit, 
“imbibed like mother’s milk” in his childhood. Every year, Leonid asked his brother  
                                                          
302
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303
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Exhibit 1.3.4: “Multicolority of Soviet grey” 
 
Late Soviet system was no longer as “black-and-white” as in the times of Stalin. But its de-
radicalization did not mean liberalization; it primarily meant increased duplicity and fakeness.  
 
This photo shows Leonid Brezhnev toasting with top Moscow clergy at a private reception –       
a scene that does not fit into a “stereotypical” notion about the relationship between the CPSU 
and the church in the Soviet Union.   
 






to light candles in church for the peace of their parents’ souls. He always marked 




                      
          This example is a case in point for the claim of modern historians that it was 
inaccurate and oversimplified to interpret the Soviet system “in black-and-white;” its 
actual picture consisted of “a variety and multicolority of grey.” 
305
 
                        A picture of Soviet life as “a variety of grey” is featured in the writings 
of Sergei Dovlatov, who is considered “the literary voice of the last Soviet 
generation.”
306
 While previous generations of Soviet writers promoted “correct ideas” 
as opposed to “wrong ideas,” Dovlatov, on behalf of his generation, was saying that 
ideas did not exist at all, so they could not induce the world to change: 
 
“The human brain has not changed since Aristotle’s times. All the more so, human 
conscience has not changed either. So, there is no progress.  There is only motion 




                        That negation of ideas and ideologies defeated the “moral rhetoric of 
both adherents and opponents of the Soviet power.” 
308
 It created an ethical paradigm 
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in which people existed beyond good and evil, “like cats,” as Aleksandr Genis put it.  
In Dovlatov’s own admission, 
 
“I realized that it was silly to divide people into good and bad, or into non-affiliated 




                          Dovlatov and his followers see no difference between “a Soviet type” 
and “an anti-Soviet type.” 
310
  For them, the antithesis to the Soviet regime is “life in 
all its complexity, depth, and unpredictability --  viewed without doctrinaire eye-
glasses of ideas and constructs.”
311
 
                           In his first big collection of stories, “The Zone,” Dovlatov described 
a Soviet prison camp through the eyes of a guard (which he had been while on 
military service duty).  Contrary to traditional dichotomies of prisoners vs. law 
enforcers – when one of the two sides is equated with “heroes” and the other with 
“monsters” – Dovlatov discovers with surprise that there is little difference between 
them:  
 
“special regime prisoners and camp overseers are absurdly similar in all sorts of 
things: speech, style of thinking, folklore, aesthetic canons, and moral judgments. 
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The last Soviet generation,  
as testified by Sergei Dovlatov, 
perceived the Soviet power  
not as a political system, but as 
“the mode of life of a state.”   
His characters were not burdened  
by choosing between  
right and wrong ideas –  
they felt that “ideas  











Gigantic Soviet symbols 
placed all around 
seemed to be a part of 
nature. People 
sometimes referred to 
them matter-of-factly as 




   His observations convince Dovlatov that “the Soviet power is no longer a form of 
government that can be changed. It is the mode of life of our state.”
313
  A critic 
explains that Dovlatov perceives the Soviet system as “the national form of the 
universal absurdity.” 
 
                    For him, it is “the zone of trouble from which one cannot escape because 
that is an indispensable condition of existence.”
314
  
                            Dovlatov described how people adapted to the system by becoming 
its functionaries. He tells the story of a talented young writer who “in addition to 
being talented, was far from stupid” and understood how to please his publishers: he 
had to demonstrate “an optimally modest amount of literary ability” – but not too 
much because “talent makes people suspicious.”  So this writer 
“adjusted his talent accordingly and published sixteen books in a row. But with each 
successive book, the young writer simplified his tasks. He produced them 
competently and quickly, and better than most […]  His infinitely compliant nature, 




                         Dovlatov himself becomes “a functionary” when he takes a temporary 
job with the editorial office of a literary magazine. This example brightly illustrates 
how “the system” is perpetuated by “greengrocers” themselves:  
 
“I, who had been a victim of the literary regime, was now transformed into one of its 
functionaries. “Functionary” is an all-inclusive word. Whoever you are and whatever 
your convictions, once you hold an official position, you become a man of functions. 
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It is impossible without a ruinous scandal to extricate yourself from the limitations of 
your position. Your function oppresses you. In deference to it your ideas become ever 
so slightly distorted. You no longer belong to yourself.  In the past, I, being a writer, 
had always had every reason to hate the officials of literature. Now it was I who was 
hated.  I led a double life. At my office, I strangled the living word. Then I put on my 
cap and went to [other publishing offices]. And they strangled me. I was both the 
predator and the prey. “
316
 
                         Dovlatov’s  “invisible book”
317
 symbolizes the doublethink of Soviet 
ideological controls in Brezhnev’s time. While the system continued to restrict 
writers’ freedom, it often did that “half-heartedly,” and despite partial bans and 
restrictions, such writers were turning into popular cult figures of their time. Most 
notably, the Party elite joined the ranks of their admirers but simultaneously enforced 
orders to restrict their visibility on ideological grounds.     
                           This is best exemplified by the story of two cult writers and 
performers, Vladimir Vysotsky and Mikhail Zhvanetsky. One was an actor and song 
writer; the other, a writer and performer of social satire. They became two pillars of 
Soviet “counter-culture.” Both were circulated in “audio samizdat” in millions of 
copies. But officially, they were frowned upon and marginally tolerated.   Their 
performances took place in private or semi-private settings and were recorded by  
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he has been paid the official honorarium, the publication is stopped altogether when 
the author is accused of ideological transgressions.  
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Exhibit 1.3.6: “Wolf Hunt” by Vladimir Vysotsky 
 
This is one of nearly 800 songs written by Vladimir Vysotsky that widely circulated in “audio-
samizdat” for many years until the poet’s death in 1980. As noted by contemporary critics, 
Vysotsky’s songs responded to the Soviet person’s down-heart desire to break out of the 
stagnant life in which genuine feelings and honesty were replaced by commonplace routine of 
doublethink and falseness. 
 
 “Wolf Hunt” is among his most famous “signature” works, written in 1968. Three years later, 
Vysotsky wrote an ironic untitled sequel to it in which he described a nomenklatura official (“an 
executive comrade”) getting interested in that song after hearing it in a “bad audio copy.” He 
summons the poet to his office to hear the song live, then says, “What wolves, to hell? This 
song is about me, and about all of us.” 





In my flight, sinews bursting, I hurtle, 
But as yesterday - so now today, 
They've cornered me! Driven me, encircled, 
Towards the huntsmen that wait for their prey! 
From the fir-trees the rifle-shots quicken - 
In the shadows the huntsmen lie low. 
As they fire, the wives somersault, stricken, 
Living targets brought down on the snow. 
 
They're hunting wolves! The hunt is on, pursuing 
The wily predators, the she-wolf and her brood. 
The beaters shout, the dogs bay, almost spewing. 
The flags on the snow are red, as red as the blood. 
 
In the fight heavy odds have opposed us, 
But the merciless huntsmen keep ranks. 
With the flags on their ropes they've enclosed us. 
They take aim and they fire at point blank. 
For a wolf cannot break with tradition. 
With milk sucked from the she-wolfs dugs 
The blind cubs learn the stern prohibition 
Never, never to cross the red flags! 
 
They're hunting wolves! The hunt is on, pursuing 
The wily predators, the she-wolf and her brood. 
The beaters shout, the dogs bay, almost spewing. 
The flags on the snow are red, as red as the blood. 
 
 
. We are swift and our jaws are rapacious. 
Why then, chief, like a tribe that's oppressed, 
Must we rush towards the weapons that face us 
And that precept be never transgressed? 
For a wolf cannot change the old story 
The end looms and my time's, almost done. 
Now the huntsman who's made me his quarry 
Gives a smile as he raises his gun. 
 
They're hunting wolves! The hunt is on, pursuing 
The wily predators, the she-wolf and her brood. 
The beaters shout, the dogs bay, almost spewing. 
The flags on the snow are red, as red as the blood. 
 
But revolt and the life-force are stronger 
Than the fear that the red flags instill 
From behind come dismayed cries of anger 
As I cheat them, with joy, of their kill. 
In my flight, sinews bursting I hurtle, 
But the outcome is different today! 
I was cornered! They trapped me encircled! 
But the huntsmen were foiled of their prey! 
 
They're hunting wolves! The hunt is on, pursuing 
The wily predators, the she-wolf and her brood. 
The beaters shout, the dogs bay, almost spewing. 





amateurs.  They were never allowed to perform on prime stages or prime TV. Nor did 
their texts get published in Soviet time.
318
 Yet, their recordings sounded in the homes 
of every family. What is notable, they were enjoyed in the homes of the Politburo 
members and KGB officers just as well.
319
             
                As noted by contemporary critics, Vysotsky’s songs responded to the 
Soviet person’s down-heart desire to break out of the stagnant life filled with 
commonplace routine of doublethink and falseness.  In the Soviet “cemetery of the 
spirit,” Vysotsky was “creating a reality that every Soviet person could try on -- in 
which human feelings were genuine and bared, rather than hidden under a thick shell 
of mimicry.”
 320
   
                          Mikhail Zhvanetsky waged his war against the culture of doublethink 
in a different way: he was revered “for saying out loud what everybody knew but 
would not say.”
321
 His humor is based on “compressing truth into a formula, and 
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shaping the formula into a witticism.” 
322
 As an example, here is a fragment from one 




“In the second half of the 20
th
 century, friendship mutated so much that admits 
betrayal, no longer needs rendezvous, letters or emotional discussions, and even 
allows only one befriender available. From there, it smoothly evolves into 
companionship. The term “companionship” denotes subclinical forms of the rampant 
19
th
 century friendship. […]  
Truth in the second half of the 20
th
 century tolerates some amount of lies and is 
named “authentic.” Courage, on the opposite, acquires hidden forms and is 
manifested in extreme conditions of TV broadcasting. 
The concept of honesty is now interpreted much broader – from some trickery and 
omission to full coverage of a big issue, but from one side only.  
Principled behavior is now tolerated easier. It allows to assert two viewpoints at the 
same time, which is why debates have become more interesting as debaters switch to 
each other’s viewpoints in the course of a debate, which makes it harder to observe, 
but adds intensity and brightness. 
The sweeping feeling that includes some ruthlessness and brutality is called kindness. 
The shape of a circle is taken by full trust combined with total control. […]  
With a microscope, one can easily see mutual assistance and solidarity, although in a 
very weak state.     
All in all, we can note with satisfaction that nowadays concepts and feelings have lost 
the repulsive clarity they used to have, so they easily and naturally flow into one 
another. Like different colors of the spectrum that form our present-day white color.”  
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Many of Zhvanetsky’s witty formulas became widely used idioms of everyday 
language.  They include, among others:  “Let us furiously argue about the taste of 
oysters – with those who actually ate them”; “Thinking is hard – this is why most 
people judge”; “Russia’s history is a permanent struggle of ignorance with injustice”; 
“Our freedom is what we do when nobody is watching”; “Intuition is our substitute 
for information”; etc. Zhvanetsky is credited for having described “all layers of 
Soviet life” without any veil – “like a car engine with the open hood, where we see 
every cog and belt and feel the smell of gasoline.” From today’s perspective, his 
works are perceived as a “historical testimony about late Soviet civilization” and “an 
encyclopedia of the Homo Sovieticus.” 
324
 That encyclopedia vividly demonstrates 
the grotesque scale of late Soviet “adaptive” culture of doublethink.  
 
Doublethink and Incapacitated Leadership:  
the Case of Mikhail Gorbachev 
 
 
                        Unlike the “inner party” described by George Orwell, the Soviet 
nomenklatura was susceptible to the culture of doublethink in much the same way as 
the masses. Their ideological indoctrination was deeper than anybody else’s: 
ideological frames were made their second self.  If one looks at the records of the 
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Politburo meetings under Gorbachev, it may appear that high-ranking CPSU officials 
were not able to express themselves outside those logocratic frames.
325
 
                         One special skill that career apparatchiks had to cultivate was the art 
of intrigue. A perfect illustration to it can be found in Mikhail Voslensky’s essay 
“One Day of Denis Ivanovich.”
326
 With good reason, such functionaries of the 
apparatus were called “cannibals in suits boiling in their own lies.”
327
  They showed 
sophisticated cunningness in building up clientelistic alliances inside the bureaucracy, 
were very good at “reading the mind” of their patron, and knew how to pursue their 
personal interest while promoting with impeccable accuracy the “party line” of the 
moment.  Gail Sheehy’s description of “thinking on two levels” 
328
 essentially 
presents the “nomenklatura edition” of the universal trait of doublethink.  She called 
such behavior “chameleonic.” 
                        It goes without saying that Mikhail Gorbachev had to master all those 
skills in the course of his career.  Despite his Soviet party “schooling,” Gorbachev 
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was able to remain a heartful and good-natured person with a “distinctively human 
face,” according to Anatoly Sobchak. But Sobchak also points out that Gorbachev 
had to exceed all other top functionaries in cunningness and intrigue -- because 
otherwise he would not have been able to get rid of so many old guard members of 
the Politburo and the Central Committee within a short time.
329
 
                        As noted by his former aid and subsequent biographer Andrei 
Grachev,  Gorbachev, with a flawless biography and the service record of “a 
Comsomol wonder boy,”  looked a promising new generation cadre of the Party 
leadership – and he behaved according to that image.  This meant “bringing new 
energy and innovation – as the life-weary party bosses expected – and simultaneously 
demonstrating his respectful loyalty to them.”  Grachev further remarks that 
Gorbachev -- like his many colleagues in the party apparatus -- was used to living in 
“the double world” divided between informal talks and official “façade” activities.  
That world seemed “immutable and unshakeable” to them.  Apparatchiks of that 
generation were able “to deliver eloquent praises” for Leonid Brezhnev’s  
“outstanding Leninist leadership” when they spoke in public;  but in private, they 
would be telling each other with  indignation that “everything was rotten through and 
things could not go on like that much longer.”
330
 
                           Gorbachev also learned the skill of evasive speaking that he called 
“the dialectical approach.” Even his university classmates recalled that “no one was 
ever quite sure what he stood for” because he usually wanted “to entertain a thesis 
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and its contradiction at the same time” and thus avoid committing himself to either 
side in a debate.
331
 
                   Those qualities were fully revealed in Gorbachev’s performance as the 
Soviet leader.  Anatoly Sobchak recalled  his work with Gorbachev in the Supreme 
Soviet as follows: 
“Gorbachev so often changed his views, and so often made alliances with most 
reactionary forces that sometimes we wondered: is all this not pharisaism and 
mimicry for the sake of short-term tactical gain?   Many [democratic opposition 
members] were persuading me that Gorbachev could not be trusted in anything, that 
this was a man with a double or even triple false bottom.  On the following day, his 





                      Andrzej Walicki notes that there was an “unresolved contradiction in all 
Gorbachev’s ideas.”  In Walicki’s view, Gorbachev as the leader of perestroika was 
split between “two persons.” One of them was “deeply aware that ‘everything was 
rotten through’ and that his country could not live that way’ any longer.” The other, 
however, was “profoundly committed to socialism,” and even though “unable to give 
it a precise definition,” considered socialism “the most significant thing in his life.”
333
  
Gorbachev was famously criticized for wanting to be the Pope and Luther at the same 
time.
334
 He was unable to choose between the evolutionary and revolutionary sides of 
perestroika; between its continuity and discontinuity; between market reforms and 
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subsidized prices, etc. For that reason, critics such as Mikhail Heller or Aleksandr 
Zinoviev profoundly distrusted Gorbachev’s initiatives. Heller argued that 
Gorbachev’s slogans were no more than a remake of Stalin’s industrialization mottos:  
they were consistently based on “concealed quotes” from Stalin. 
335
 Zinoviev claimed 
that Gorbachev’s promises to transform the Soviet system were like “the promise of 
an animal trainer to teach crocodiles to fly.” 
336
 Many were asking the same question:  
how can Gorbachev rely on the ruling party in carrying out such reforms that intend 
to reduce that party’s authority?
337
 
                        It was argued that the Soviet ruling class – including Gorbachev 
himself -- was fundamentally incompetent to provide leadership in conditions of 
competitive politics:  Soviet rulers did not know how to persuade and negotiate. Guy 
Sorman made that point quite emphatically: 
“Let us look at the personalities of Ligachev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and other leaders of 
their level. The selection criteria that brought them to the top prepared them to give 
orders but not to persuade. As long as the society had been obedient, they were able 
to govern. But now that there is a need to build a social consensus, the nomenklatura 
leaders reveal their incompetence. The soviet ruling class can only give commands or 
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                        The Russian historian Roy Medvedev later convincingly illustrated 
that point.
339
 All decisions of the Politburo traditionally had to be adopted by 
consensus and with little debate; so when a pressing and controversial issue revealed 
irreconcilable differences within the “collective leadership,”  Gorbachev could only 
stop the debate and postpone the unresolved issue, also  saying: “A situation like this 
did not take place at Politburo meetings in many decades.”
340
 
                        In Andrzej Walicki’s analysis, Gorbachev’s doublethink was neither 
hypocrisy, nor cunning tactics. It stemmed from his “incurably ideological Soviet 
patriotism”: Gorbachev “was equally sincere in his resolve to change the system 
radically, and in his desire to preserve continuity in Soviet history and identity.”  
Walicki notes that “Gorbachev’s fear of being seen as a renegade shows that he was 




                         Looking back, Gorbachev’s biographers point out that his dual 
mindset was perhaps the only factor capable of destroying the Soviet system from 
within. An ideal product of the system and its faithful supporter proved to be its most 
dangerous “enemy within” – when he attempted to reform, improve, and save that 
system.  That is only a seeming paradox: the ideocratic regime’s most vulnerable 
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point was ideological heresy,  “a rebellion of angels,”  and in order to succeed, it had 
to be led by a flawlessly genuine follower.
342
 
                         Thus, the regime built on lies collapsed when its leaders tried to come 
to grips with its vices and break out of the vicious circle of duplicity.  But it is notable 
that Gorbachev’s double-mindedness was still reflected in his post-Soviet interviews 




                          Although the “mental software of the Soviet man” mutated after the 
fall of the Soviet system, it arguably continued to operate in post-Soviet politics and 
societies. 
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Post-communist transition expected “a tectonic change” in mental adaptation 
mechanisms of “the Soviet man” and required the development of “elastic 
consciousness” – the ability to re-prioritize societal values and needs and accordingly 
adapt behavior.
344
  The actual way in which that change evolved is sometimes  
described as the transformation of “Homo Sovieticus” into “Homo Praevaricatus,” or 
“the cunning person.” 
345
  
                         Prevaricative behavior was cultivated by Soviet conditions of life, as 
discussed in the previous section. The Soviet system was breeding “cunning slaves 
and cunning masters” that were “cunning with each other and towards themselves.” 
346
  As noted by Yury Levada, cunning behavior is rooted in “normative polycentric 
relativism,” or blurred boundaries between right and wrong, between acceptable and 
non-acceptable behavior. It arises from “successive breakdowns of regulatory 
structures”:  in the Russian society, that was an incessant process that started in the 
19
th
 century and continued through Soviet times.
347
 
                                                          
344
 Yury Sayenko. Interview  in Zerkalo Nedeli, August 1, 2003 (in Russian). 
345
 Yury Levada. “Homo Praevaricatus: Russian Doublethink”. Contemporary 
Russian Politics: A Reader. Archie Brown (ed). Oxford University Press, 2001.  That 
term coined by Yury Levada was subsequently used by other scholars including 
Richard Rose.  
346
 Levada, ibid., p. 314.  
347
 Ibid., p. 313. 
115 
 
                        The post-Soviet situation produced a hideous mix of continuity and 
disruption in regulatory structures and norms. 
348
 It increased normative confusion 
and generated “visible normative pluralism” in absence of universally binding 
authorities. In Mikhail Zhvanetsky’s apt characterization, post-Soviet freedom was 
“like a traffic signal with all three lights on at the same time.” 
349
  Also very notably, 
the alienation between the rulers and the ruled became more expressed, and the 
“covert cunning” on both sides came out in the open – it became overt. 
350
   
                     Thus, adaptation based on the doublethink of conformism – the model of 
late Soviet period – was replaced by the doublethink of “playing with the rules” and 
constant search for “a multitude of loopholes” allowing to circumvent the rules or 
bend them in one’s favor for short-term gain.
351
  Such “elasticity of consciousness,” 
according to sociologists, was most readily demonstrated by “post-Soviet gangsters, 
corrupt administrators and shifty administrants.”
352
 With shadow economy estimated 
at over 60% of the total, most citizens felt that the country was being ruled by “the 
mafia and the state bureaucracy.” 
353
  The same survey revealed that 56% of 
Ukrainians believed it was wrong to pay taxes, 25% said that one should observe or 
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disregard the law “depending on the circumstances,” and at least 10% believed that it 
was best to ignore laws altogether. Similar findings were reported for Russia.
354
    
                  Yury Sayenko described that condition of mass consciousness as “an ugly 
form of adaptation” that resulted in “overwhelming depreciation of everything” – 
including ethical values, social norms, and institutions of the state.
355
  The resulting 
confusion and disorientation make the post-Soviet person’s behavior simultaneously 
cunning and confused. Cunningness is mixed up with infantile and irrational reactions 
to the world, and that remains the breeding ground for post-Soviet duplicity and 
doublethink.  
                   Confusion and duplicity dominate in the attidudes of Russians as well as 
Ukrainians to their own history and symbols.   As an example, Stalin’s denunciation 
for his atrocities is not questioned; but at the same time, his image continues to be 
used as a positive symbol of Russian and Soviet glory.
356
  Russians are content with 
combining former tsarist and former communist symbols in their state anthem, flag, 
and coat of arms.
357
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355
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356
 Protests broke out when Stalin’s images were featured in posters dedicated to 
Victory Day in Moscow in 2010; currently, some city buses in Moscow bear Stalin’s 
image in dedication to war memory theme. Volgograd city council recently approved 
the ordinance that ruled to name their city “Stalingrad” on commemorative holidays. 
A statue of Stalin was erected in Zaporizhia, Ukraine by the local Communist Party 
chapter, which also caused numerous protests until that statue got destroyed some 
weeks later by activists claimed to be linked with the an opponent nationalist party.  
357
 The Russian Federation adopted the flag and coat of arms that are based on pre-
1917 state symbols (the tricolor flag and the double-headed eagle), but gave up the 
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                  The “official” Russian Communist party – the CPRF – declares its 
ideological (!) unity with the Russian Orthodox Church and claims that the 
communist party and the church jointly serve “the tormented people.” 
358
 According 
to CPRF’s own estimate, at least one-third of communist voters in Russia are 
Orthodox churchgoers.
359
   
                     In another example of confused “mental software,” many Russians feel 
nostalgic for the lost “Soviet family of nations,” but at the same time they share 
xenophobic views in regard to former Soviet nations and demand to tighten 
immigration control in Russia. 
360
   
                     Like in Orwell’s dystopia,  Russian public opinion gets easily swayed at 
the pleasure of the government and suddenly turns against one or another neighboring 
country -- first, Ukraine, then Estonia, then Georgia – alternately labeling each of 
them as the  arch- enemy of the Russian state.
361
   
                                                                                                                                                                     
pre-1917 Russian anthem and reinstated the anthem that had been commissioned by 
Stalin, with new alterations in the text. 
358
 As emphasized in a recent CPRF newspaper article: “The CPRF, the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and the whole Russian society have one common ideology, one 
religion, one nation, and one Motherland – the Great Russia.”  Sergei Igumenov in 
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monument relocation in Tallinn. Georgia got to the top of that list in October 2008 
when the military conflict about South Ossetia broke out.  Victor Shederovich, a 
popular satirist, commented: “Two weeks of daily injections into viewers’ heads by 
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             In a similar way, many Russians readily succumbed to a hysteric campaign in 
the media that accompanied the ban on adoptions of Russian children to the U.S. -- 
they “were prepared to believe that ‘evil Americans’ would not only murder Russian 
orphans, but posthumously dismantle them into organs as well.”
362
   
                      That ease of steering the post-Soviet mind with propaganda inputs 
prompted the cult Russian writer Victor Pelevin to put forward the surreal idea of 
Homo Zapiens, or “the zapping man” – a person “remotely controlled” by television -
- in his popular novel, “Generation P.” 
363
Pelevin shows the devastating effect of 
applying refined techniques of advertising and spin to the inexperienced post-Soviet 
mind with its legacy of lengthy ”captivity.”  
                   A psychologist remarks that most voters in Ukraine demonstrate 
“infantile” behavior rather than traits of grown-up people. A grown-up person 
reasonably looks for solutions to a problem, tries to understand other viewpoints, 
cooperates and negotiates, can articulate and defend his rights and interests; a child, 
on the opposite, evades problems and avoids responsibility; childish behavior is 
capricious, demanding, and non-thinking; a child expects “to hear a beautiful fairy-
tale” and to have all problems resolved by the grown-ups. 
364
  That observation  
                                                                                                                                                                     
the TV news programs – and Estonia becomes the chief enemy of Russia. Then, all of 
a sudden, enemy number one is Georgia. Or Ukraine. Central TV can do this easily in 
two weeks’ time. And by the same token, this can be reversed. Tomorrow, we will be 
best friends again – if needed.” (Interview to Zerkalo Nedeli, April 25, 2008).  
362
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A house in a Russian village 
decorated with portraits of Marx,  
Lenin, and Putin, as well as  












An old Ukrainian woman shows up for an 
apparently important gathering dressed up, 
and holds an icon with Yanukovych photo 





almost verbatim coincides with Yury Levada’s remark about Russian voters: “ They 
can be easily lured – not even fooled because they kind of beg, ‘We want to be lured, 
please; paint us a beautiful picture, and we will be glad.”
365
 
                     Those observations are consistent with statistics of Russian film 
distribution industry (that includes Ukraine’s market as well). As testified by a major 
expert,  
“out of all kinds of Hollywood productions, the Russian viewer invariably chooses 
only fairy-tales. Likewise, all successful domestic films fall into that category as well. 
The highest indices of TV viewership belong to [Soviet films] that conserved the 
image of the world where one was not responsible for anything, did not control his 
fate, nor was threatened by the need to make choices. All the above is highly valued 
by today’s audience.  The Russian viewers accurately recognize -- and adamantly 
reject – any attempt to talk to them about serious things, even in a light manner. Any 




                     Distrust in formal institutions – a trait of the “cunning behavior” -- 
breeds corruption and renders democracy meaningless.  The majority of Russians 
believe that a bribe is inevitable when you deal with a government official. By the 
same token, Russians do not see elections as a form of political participation and 
representation. Rather, they feel that it is “a ritual of approval for those who already 
                                                          
365
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have the power; a kind of state ceremony.” 
367
  Such distrust appears to be 




                        Another often discussed manifestation of post-Soviet doublethink is 
self-censorship. Russian intellectuals of the older generation point out that young 
media professionals who grew up in post-Soviet times are not any freer than their 
parents. They demonstrate “a visible effect of self-censorship and self-suppression. 
They are scared of what is inside them -- they know very precisely what is not 
allowed.” 
369
  A Russian TV critic explains that in Soviet times people used to have 
“a delicate sense about what you can say and what you cannot.”  It was “a unique 
feeling, akin to ‘the party instinct’ – nobody was trained in it, but everybody had it.” 
He observes that young Russian TV entertainers “have a perfect command of that 
sense and camouflage it more skillfully than their Soviet predecessors. It is a great 
skill, and a philosophy of its kind.” 
370
 
                         Post-Soviet societies are also characterized as “a mecca of conspiracy 
theorists”  because there are millions whose minds are captivated with conspiracism, 
and political leaders themselves provide an ample supply of sensational conspiracy 
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  An important reason for such proliferation of conspiracy theories is 
that the character of politics in those countries is “competitive but non-
transparent”.
372
 But it is also true that conspiracy theories “appear to make sense out 
of a world that is otherwise confusing – and in an appealingly simple way.”
373
 
Conspiracy theories perfectly fit the post-Soviet atmosphere of institutional distrust, 
fuzzy norms, and universal prevarication combined with infantile irrationality. 
Common sense – “the best remedy against the paranoia of conspiracies”
374
—does not 
work well in that environment.   
                         The “ambivalent and ambiguous” post-Soviet mind appears inclined 
to sudden “twists and turns” of orientations.
375
 Therefore, maintains a popular 
Russian columnist, even as people vote for Putin or Medvedev, “their willingness and 
desire to support the authorities is combined in their souls with deep hatred of the 
authorities, and readiness to take up the peg and go destroy them.”
376
  The same point 
is made by Yury Levada who notes that in the post-Soviet doublethink, 
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“demonstrative excitement is always combined with covert distrust and dark envy.”
377
  
The post-Soviet mind is driven not only by external informational inputs, but also, 
significantly, “is whipped up from within, through mechanisms of self-delusion” that 
have “minimal connection to real experience or rational assessment.”
378
 It is “a mind 
in a state of mess” filled with “contradictory notions, beliefs, and myths” which guide 
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CHAPTER 4.  
DIMENSIONS OF POST-SOVIET DOUBLETHINK 
IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE 
 
 
                      Doublethink as the condition of post-Soviet mass consciousness finds 
various manifestations in the political behavior of individuals and groups. It is 
reflected in institutional features of post-Soviet politics and societies, especially in a 
complicated relationship between formal and informal components of the institutional 
system. The following section briefly sketches diverse manifestations and influences 
of doublethink in the politics of post-Soviet Ukraine.  
 
 
4.1. Controversies of Collective Identity and Memory 
 
                  In March 1991, over 70% of Ukrainian voters approved Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s proposal “to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal 
sovereign republics.” In the same referendum, nearly 82% of the voters endorsed the 
Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine earlier adopted by the legislature – which 
declared Ukraine’s independence in every aspect of government, from international 
relations and citizenship to the monetary system and taxes.
380
  In December 1991, 
92% of the voters supported Ukraine’s Act of Declaration of Independence which 
prompted the dissolution of the USSR within days. However, public opinion surveys 
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repeatedly conducted since1993 show that nearly 50% of Ukrainians would not have 
voted in favor of independence again.
381
 
                       Those numbers reflect, in part, the confusing character of the referenda 
questions.
382
 But more importantly, they show the “ambiguous and ambivalent” 
character of the post-Soviet Ukrainian identity.
383
  After Ukraine’s communist 
leadership under Leonid Kravchuk switched to “national communism” positions, the 
Ukrainian identity has been defined in terms of two conflicting narratives.  
                         One is anti-imperial, anti-Russian, and, by extension, anti-Soviet.  It 
treats contemporary Ukraine as “postcolonial” and “post-genocidal;” its greatest 
heroes are those who fought against the Russian and Soviet imperial oppression, from 
the great poet Taras Shevchenko to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) commander 
Roman Shukhevych. That narrative cannot be fully accepted by the Ukrainians who 
define themselves in terms of “dual identity” as “both Ukrainian and Russian” and 
who constitute, by various estimates, from 27 to 35% of the nation
384
 (in addition to 
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another 25-30% comprised by ethnic Russians or complete Russophones).
385
  
Opponents of that narrative argue that it is factually inaccurate because many of the 
agents of Soviet “colonial oppression and genocide” were ethnic Ukrainians 
themselves. They also argue against the hero status of freedom fighters like Roman 
Shukhevych labeling them as Nazi German collaborators.   
                          The flaws of that narrative, however, need to be understood in the 
context of its battling against the entrenched “Ukrainian Soviet” myth. This other 
narrative postulates “eternal brotherhood” of Russians and Ukrainians and 
emphasizes the achievements of socialist industrialization and modernization of 
Ukraine under the Soviet rule. Those who non-critically embrace this narrative are the 
most nostalgic for the Soviet times – but they demonstrate a “gap in historical 
memory” because those territories of Ukraine where the Soviet myth is most strongly 
entrenched are also those which suffered the most from the genocidal famine, or the 
Holodomor, in 1932-1933.
386
     Over two thousand Lenin statues can still be found in 
Ukraine’s cities, towns and villages (with the exception of the provinces that had not 
been Sovietized until 1939), alongside with Soviet and communist toponyms – names 
of streets, neighborhoods, public buildings, etc.  “Although the USSR died, it is 
metaphysically alive, like Lenin. We are still fixated  
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Exhibit 1.4.1: Ambiguities of Ukraine’s historical memory and identity. 
 
 
This collage taken form the Ukrainian intellectual periodical Zerkalo Nedeli reflects the 
Ukrainian mind’s confusion about its history, identity, and future path.  The elements featured 
in the collage include Russian, Polish, and Soviet symbols, figures of Lenin, Stalin, and 
Brezhnev (with Lenin showing direction into a cul-de-sac), and many clock faces apparently 












                         For nearly twenty years, Ukraine’s post-Soviet leaders were carrying 
out their “great project of amnesia:  a more or less conscious, but consistently and 
successfully implemented program of actions and steps with the goal to forever 
forget, not to research, not to review, and not to rethink the recent Soviet past.” 
388
  
Some attempts to change the situation during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency did 
not lead to “rethinking and rejecting the Soviet legacies,” and today’s Ukraine is still 
taken over by “methastases of Sovietness.”
389
 It remains “a ‘slack-baked state’ that 
was declared but still cannot decide how to treat its own recent past.” 
390
 
                          On the other hand, the “Soviet myth” of Ukraine’s history promotes 
amnesia in regard to events and heroes that do not fit in it, and replaces them with 
phony dates and names to celebrate. For instance, Ukrainians still fondly mark fake 
Soviet “anniversaries,”
391
 but are poorly informed that many of the heroes of the 
Russian history were of Ukrainian origin, or that Ukrainians constituted nearly 50% 
                                                          
387
 Pavlo Solodko. The Union Is Looking At You. Ukrainska Pravda, December 8, 
2010. 
388
 This phrase belongs to George G. Grabowicz, a scholar of Ukraine at Harvard 
University; it is quoted here from the article by Yury Shapoval in Zerkalo Nedeli 
dated December 16, 2000, in translation from Russian.  
389
 Yury Sobolev. The Soviet Legacy of Ukraine. Zerkalo Nedeli,  August 19, 2011 
(in Russian).  
390
 Yury Shapoval, ibid. 
391
 E.g. former Soviet Army Day became Fatherland Defenders’ Day. It is observed 
on February 23, based on a Soviet myth about a “battle victory” of the Red Army – 
which in reality never took place. More in: Svetlana Kabachinskaya. Inoculation of 
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                             The “Soviet” Ukrainian narrative is uncomfortable in dealing with 
any heroes – including freedom fighters, intellectuals, or human rights activists – who 
had been victims of the Soviet regime. 
393
 It is even more uncomfortable with 
recognizing as a hero anyone who had been an active opponent of the Soviet regime. 
Thus, the national legislature has never agreed to give official status of World War II 
veterans to former UPA combatants (although pertaining privileges were granted to 
them by several province legislatures). And by the same token, official tributes paid 
to Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and Symon Petliura (heads of the independent Ukrainian 
state who lost in the civil war to the Bolshevik Red Army in 1919-1920) are 
perceived as “hypocrisy and falseness” as long as more hearty reverence is paid to 
remaining symbols of Soviet totalitarianism.
394
  
                           Attempts to end the “conspiracy of amnesia” at the high official level 
were made by the end of Viktor Yushchenko presidency. He initiated national 
remembrance of the Holodomor and tributes to the warriors who fought against 
Bolsheviks for the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918-1919.  He also 
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conferred Hero of Ukraine titles on the controversial figures of UPA commander 
Roman Shukhevych and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists leader Stepan 
Bandera.  
                         Those acts, however, did not facilitate consensus and reconciliation. 
Instead, collective identity and historical memory gained an overblown role as themes 
for voter mobilization in the rivalry of political leaders and parties.  Neither 
Yushchenko, nor his rival and successor Viktor Yanukovych was able to get accepted 
as the leader of the whole country; each has been backed in one part of the country 
and rejected in the other. Themes of language (Ukrainian vs. Russian), World War II 
history, accession to NATO, and relations with Russia became “sacral idols” in this 
politics of “regional tribalism.”
395
  
                           While UPA veterans are honored as heroes in Western provinces of 
Ukraine, memorials dedicated to “victims of the UPA” have been built in eastern 
Ukraine and in the Crimea. When courts in Donetsk ruled to nullify President 
Yushchenko’s decree about awarding Hero of Ukraine titles to Bandera and 
Shukhevych, local governments in the Western cities of Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-
Frankivsk  immediately proclaimed the two historical personalities as their “honorary 
citizens.” A commentator suggested that such an exchange of clashing official 
statements could be easily imagined between Teheran and Washington; but within 
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                              Tribalist confrontations around themes of identity, history, and 
language in Ukraine appear increasingly ritualistic and irrational:  
“A resident of Ternopil or Donetsk can hardly be free in his or her choice of 
priorities: in fact, they are determined by the local environment. The sense of 
belonging to ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ makes a Ukrainian citizen accept a pre-packaged set of 
cultural, historical, and political fetishes that often have no logical connection. Those 
are not views – those are tenets of faith. Accordingly, the opposite viewpoint is 




                        But in the years that followed the Orange Revolution, this became the 
convenient tool of preference for Ukraine’s “top league” politicians in mobilizing 
their unsophisticated voters.  Thus, supporters of “patriotic” and “liberal” views 
became mistakenly identified with a single ethno-cultural environment, and that not 
only reduced their support, but also deepened political tension and cleavages. The 
logic of that path is further radicalization and departure from substantive debate on 
issues of the economy and law:  
“In this scenario, cultural consanguinity becomes the primary orientation marker for 
the citizens, whereas the ability to rebuff ‘the bad guys’ is valued as the greatest 
virtue. The winners become those who most diligently wave their red flags or their 
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                         A more sober view recognizes that such abuse of historical memory 
where “symbols dominate over reality” breeds confusion, volatile orientations, and 
duplicitous moral standards.  Some young Ukrainians note that concepts of “good” 
and “bad” in historical memory should not be conflated with citizens’ value systems: 
“Shukhevych or Bandera cannot be our symbols of liberal democratic Ukraine 
because they were neither liberals, nor democrats. By the same token, if the 
individual is more important than the state, We cannot consider Stalin ‘an effective 
manager.’ […] The Swedish people do not organize state commemoration for Charles 
XII, nor do the French have pompous festivities for Napoleon […] Those countries 






4.2. Doublethink and Social Values 
 
                      However, Ukraine’s post-communist transition inevitably ties together 
the questions of identity and values. “European identity and values” is a subject of 
“romanticized” debate, in which many Ukrainians do not yet realize that liberal 
European values are rational and pragmatic, rather than romantic. 
400
   
                     At the time of the Orange Revolution, many Ukrainians seemed to be 
driven by an irrational hope “to wake up in the Brave New World” the morning after 
they chanted revolutionary slogans in Kiev’s central square. That faith in “European 
integration” as a magic recipe was akin to the Soviet tradition of “faith in 
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   In the aftermath of those events, President Yushchenko’s  “European 
integration” motto acquired likeness to “a mystic and magic mantra” that substituted 
systemic reforms based on European standards of governance. 
402
  
                       In Ukraine’s “European integration” debate, discussion of ideological 
values became replaced with a “tribal” fight between ethno-cultural orientations.  As 
noted by Mikhail Dubiniansky, an insightful and widely quoted publicist, “in place of 
liberals and social democrats, we have competition between Lviv and Donetsk.” 
403
  
The sides in those political battles “easily reincarnate from ardent libertarians into 
convinced socialists, and from fervent democrats into ‘a strong hand’ advocates.” 
404
  
Dubiniansky points out that the Ukrainian society has avoided a clear analysis of its 
attitudes to the values of individual and economic freedoms. Voters prefer “an 
eclectic cocktail of mutually contradictive wishes spiced with abstract declarations 
about ‘justice’.”  That ambiguous and confused mindset continues the tradition of late 
Soviet doublethink when “one and the same person would demand social equality 
while exposing the luxuries of nomenklatura but also dream about free enterprise and 
capitalism -- like the fairy double-headed animal  pushmi-pullyu.” 
405
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                       Reflecting the voters’ conceptual confusion, political opposition 
demands from the government freedom for entrepreneurs along with more social 
spending in welfare and subsidies. Likewise, those who criticize President 
Yanukovych for encroachment on civil liberties, also criticize him for a “more 
liberal” language policy, notes Dubiniansky. He reasons:  
“One cannot sit in two chairs or travel by two roads at the same time. It is unrealistic 
to mix Keynesian economics and monetarism in one bottle while dreaming about a 
Roosevelt and a Reagan for Ukraine. It is silly to admire China’s economic 
breakthrough and feel nostalgic for the social security of Soviet times.  [Do we want] 
free market or government regulation? Personal freedoms or mandatory citizen 





                        Perception of the state is another controversial theme that reveals the 
double-mindedness of the Ukrainian society. According to Dubiniansky, the 
prevailing frame is an incongruous mix of paternalistic expectations and anti-
bureaucratic sentiment. The majority of citizens want the state to provide care and 
support in the forms of various funded programs. They also want the government to 
regulate the market and protect them from its adverse effects. At the same time, 
people revile “the bureaucrats” that “embezzle, steal, extort, and make problems for 
everyone.”  To resolve that problem, every new government wants to be given more 
powers, and “many Ukrainians are sincerely convinced that in order to defeat the 
dragon, they need a new dragon, only stronger and harsher.”
407
 
                     




 Mikhail Dubiniansky. The Discreet Charm of the Bureaucracy. Ukrainska Pravda, 
February 10, 2012.  
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Exhibit 1.4.2: “Clash of civilizations” in Ukraine’s parliament?  
Regular and vicious altercations in the Supreme Rada, according to some experts, reflect the 
“tribalist” character of political competition in which “ethno-cultural markers” replaced 
ideological positions.  Cultural features such as language acquire sacral symbolic meaning, 






















       It has been noted that post-Soviet people – including Ukrainians – show an 
apparent “personality split”: on the one hand, they feel “weary of being slaves”; on 
the other hand, they “hope for the advent of a wise master.” Voters’ sentiments 
inexplicably combine “hatred of the state as a tool of coercion and faith  
in the state as a remedy against troubles.”  Even before the Orange Revolution, some 
suggested that the electoral success of Viktor Yushchenko was based on that factor: 
he was able to project the image of “benevolent ruler” (for which some legislators 
ironically nicknamed him “the messiah”).
408
 
                           Ukrainians are aware of this duality, and many seem to think of it as 
their “unique curse”:  
“We are a unique nation – with European geography and an Asiatic sense of life. Our 
“European aspirations” are another lie and fantasy. We give bribes and curse 
corruption; we hate our politicians, but we get glued to our TVs to listen to their 
empty rhetoric in the weekly talk show, and, most remarkably, we believe them 
again. And the morning after, we hate them again. We live as if in a kingdom of 
crooked mirrors where democratic and foundational values acquire grotesque 
reflections devoid of meaning. We are lead actors in a modern theater of the absurd. 




                          The writer quoted above -- who is an entrepreneur and a local elected 
official -- notes that Ukraine’s biggest inconsistency with European standards is in the 
deep alienation between the individual and the state – because the individual is de-
facto still subservient to the state, despite declarations of the opposite. For that reason, 
some commentators have used the image of an hourglass “with a very small top part” 
                                                          
408
 Yulia Mostovaia and Sergei Rakhmanin. “Between Thunderbirds and Penguins.” 
Zerkalo Nedeli,” February 11, 2001 (in Russian).  
409
 Dmitry Spivak. “Ukraine as a Country of Paradoxes.” Ukrainska Pravda, 
November 1, 2011 (in Russian). 
138 
 
as a model of Ukraine’s society – to emphasize the alienation between the 
bureaucracy and oligarchs at the top and the rest of the society at the bottom. 
410
 Most 
Ukrainians agree that those upper and lower segments of the society “exist as if in 
parallel worlds” with very conventional links between them. Many would agree that 
Benjamin Disraeli’s famous characterization of the19
th
 century England is fully 
applicable to the Ukrainian society today:  “two nations, who are not governed by the 
same laws, between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, as if they were 
inhabitants of different planets.” 
411
   
                        Because of that, radical critics frequently refer to government as “the 
occupation regime.”
412
  Such labels are consistent with low digits of public trust to 
government leaders and their offices.
413
  But instead of organizing for political action 
against the perceived adversary, many Ukrainians prefer to wage their own “guerilla 
micro-wars” against “the system”: by operating in the shadow economy, by dodging 
the payment of “taxes and fees, as well as bribes and kickbacks,” by tampering with 
their utility meters, and even by forging various certificates or other documentation 
they are required to have. 
414
  The outcome looks like a war of “all against all” 
                                                          
410
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because not only “the government fools the people, and the people fool the 
government”  -- in addition, Ukrainians just as well “fool one another and fool 
themselves,” and lying is no longer considered amoral because it became “the norm 
of life: if you don’t lie, you cannot live.”
415
   
        
 
4.3. Divergence between Formal Laws and Informal Rules 
 
                      A Ukrainian philosopher famously said: “Corruption is what you 
personally do not take part in.”
416
  That sad joke implies the enormous scale of the 
phenomenon in Ukraine, wherefore some people suggest that the term itself – if it is 
understood as breaking of rules – becomes misleading. Corrupt behavior – bribery, 
kickbacks, extortion, stealing, and cronyism – is seen as the duplicitous norm and 
may arguably be called an established informal institution of post-Soviet societies.  
                       Its prevalence can be inferred from the rule formulated a long time ago 
by Saltykov-Shchedrin: “the severity of Russian laws is alleviated by the lack of 
obligation to fulfill them.”
417
  When the state is alienated from the people, and its 
laws and regulations are too hard to comply with, corruption becomes “the opiate of 
the masses” and “the heart of a heartless world,” explains Mikhail Dubiniansky; and 
the stronger the alienation, the more demand for the remedy that brings relief. This is 
                                                          
415
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why post-Soviet corruption “is not an alien tumor that the Ukrainian society would 
try to exfoliate; rather it is a service in mass demand;” in essence, it is “the buffer 
between Kafkaesque rules and the objective reality.”
418
   
                        Not surprisingly, many begin to feel that “it becomes non-competitive 
to live by the law.” Everyone wants to find some “niche for survival” in the shadow 
sector -- which may embrace, by some estimates, “up to 80% of everything that 
people do.”
419
 It is also estimated that up to 90% of Ukrainians receive at least a part 
of their income in tax-evading forms.
420
  
                        Vast shadow economy is based on an underlying “informal social 
contract.” It is a tacit understanding that the upper class is allowed “to capture the 
state,” while the lower class is allowed to make its living “in the shadow.” 
421
  A 
network of “parallel markets” described by Guy Sorman, as the epitome of Soviet 
“double thinking, double acting, and double morals”
422
 continues to operate in post-
Soviet Ukraine: people commonly bring cash as “gratitude” for services officially 
considered free -- for instance, to public school teachers and to public clinics 
physicians, because “everybody knows that their official salary is too low to survive.” 
423
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                       By the same token, cash “gratitude” becomes necessary when one 
needs to get a service from a government official – such as a registration, a passport, 
or anything else. According to one study, 69% of respondents admitted that they 
“gave cash or gifts” for getting served by authorized office holders.
424
 Many of them 
apparently would not even consider that a bribe.  
                       Even more striking than mass bribery by front-line officers is the 
permeating system of “chain corruption”:  according to reliable testimonies, bribes 
collected by lower level officers – such as traffic police or customs inspectors – are 
normally shared with their supervisors and go up the chain of command all the way to 
the top. 
425
   It is not uncommon to hear about extortion of “shadow payments” from 
lower-ranking officials by their supervisors
426
 which, in all appearance, comprise a 
corruption pyramid, similar in nature to the “cotton affair” pyramid of Soviet times.
427
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                           A young practicing lawyer sadly observes that “the society can no 
longer do without lies and falseness in any aspect of its life,” but he sees the crux of 
the problem in the court system corrupted by systemic lies. He maintains that  
“Only in exceptional cases can one find truth and rule of law in a court of justice. We 
are told lies that the rule of law and the equality of all before the court are the norm; 
and we pretend to believe it, as if we do not know how court impartiality is actually 
“financed,” and as if we do not know the standards of living of our judges – who 




                      Corruption in high places is the most visible and arguably the biggest in 
scope.  By various estimates, from 15 to 25% of government expenditures are 
“stolen” each year – as admitted by President Yanukovych and confirmed by 
independent journalistic investigations.
429
 However, striking facts of corrupt deals, 
despite previously absent publicity, do not result in effectual public outrage and do 
not lead to high-level resignations.
430
   Investigative journalists bitterly remark:  
“The government has done everything to make journalistic voyeurism not only 
enjoyable, but also easy to implement. At last, no one is hiding anywhere. Everything 
is in sight. What used to be shameful is now the subject of vanity. "Corrupt schemes" 
became simplified to the level of primary school. In order to conduct high-profile 




 President Yanukovych was quoted as saying that nearly $8 billion (about 15% of 
the government total expenditures) gets stolen each year. A tentative estimate 
calculated by journalists comprised close to $15 billion in 2011, or nearly 25% of all 
expenditures. Aleksei Shalaisky and Victor Tregubov. Top Seven Schemes Of 
Emptying Budget. Zerkalo Nedeli,December 29, 2011.  
430
 One of the best documented and most shocking scandals concerned the purchase 
of an oil-drilling platform by the government of Ukraine from a Norwegian 
corporation via a dummy company in Latvia, with a price cap of $150 million, in a 
falsified procurement tender (Zerkalo Nedeli, May 27, 2011, with follow-up stories). 
Its investigation, however, resulted only in a presidential “reprimand” to the Minister 
of Energy.  
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                      This short collection of facts and opinions sketches a paradoxical 
relationship between formal law and informal rules in today’s Ukrainian society. Law 
maintains its role as a tool of “blackmail”
432
 and is handy in the administration of 
“selective justice.”
433
  Like in the Soviet system, it sets “the interest of the state” 
against interests of the people, and complying with it remains as burdensome as it 
used to be for the “Soviet man” to meet the system’s ideological requirements.
434
  
Duplicitous attitude to law in post-Soviet societies continues the Soviet tradition of 
tacit understanding that “what matters is not law, but the rules of conduct.”
435
   It is 
perpetuated by the “mental software” of doublethink inherited from the Soviet past.                         
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PART TWO.  PSEUDO-MODERNITY 
AND POST-SOVIET INSTITUTIONS: 





CHAPTER 5.   
POLITICAL PARTIES  
IN OLD AND NEW DEMOCRACIES 
 
 
5.1. Democracy and Political Parties 
 
 
Political parties are deemed indispensable for democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset 
clearly conveyed this argument by underscoring institutionalized party competition as 
the central concept in his “minimalist definition of democracy.” 
436
 He reminds us 
that “political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable 
save in terms of parties.” 
437
  
                       In modern democracies, political parties commonly perform a number 
of functions. They recruit and nominate political candidates. Nomination of 
candidates is closely linked with voter mobilization and motivation, hence parties 
enhance mass participation in politics. Further, parties frame electoral choices in 
relation to policy issues and thus they facilitate policy debates and the formulation of 
policies. Also, parties aggregate diverse group interests into political coalitions. Last 
but not least, parties play a crucial role in social integration as they enable citizens to 
take part in the political process.
438
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                       A long time ago, Alexis de Tocqueville asserted that political parties 
can be of two kinds: “those that emphasize ideology and those that emphasize 
interests.” 
439
 However, he noted, behind the ideology one will likely find “private 
interest, which always plays the chief part in political passions, more studiously 
veiled under the pretext of the public good.”
440
 
                       Modern typologies of political parties are more elaborate and take into 
account their electoral strategies, social representation, principal objectives, and 
organizational capacities. Thus, scholars distinguish “organizationally thick” and 
“organizationally thin” parties; programmatic and pragmatic parties; etc. Gunther and 
Diamond propose to differentiate between five major types of parties in regard to 
their goals and structure: a) elite-based parties; b) mass-based parties; c) ethnicity-
based parties; d) electoralist parties; e) movement parties.
441
  
                      Elite-based parties emerged in old democracies when suffrage was 
significantly limited; with the expansion of the suffrage and socio-economic 
modernization, they largely lost electoral effectiveness. A later version of that type of 
parties is called clientelistic party: a confederation of notables organizing an 
exchange of personalistic favors as a principal tool for electoral mobilization of mass 
voters. “Political machines” in big North American cities and in rural areas of 
Southern Europe and Latin America at the turn of the 20
th
 century were prominent 
examples of that type of parties.  
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                      Mass-based parties are characterized by big numbers of dues-paying 
members who take part in party affairs not limited to elections only. Such parties 
emerged in Europe, predominantly with the political mobilization of the working 
class. Other variations of mass-based parties are pluralist nationalist parties or 
religious parties (that can be either denomination-based or fundamentalist).  
                    Ethnicity-based parties are typically less extensive and less organized 
than mass-based parties.   Parties of that type make no effort to aggregate interests 
beyond the ethnic group. But they sometimes form coalitions or alliances in the form 
of a “congress party.”  
                  Electoralist parties are organizationally thin outside the election time, but 
they work very actively to mobilize voters during elections and rely heavily on 
campaign professionals. Their frequent variety is known as the “catch-all party” – it is 
characterized by shallow organization, superficial and vague ideology, and a strong 
focus on elections. Another variety of electoralist parties is defined as 
“programmatic;” in contrast to “catch-all” parties, they have a more coherent 
ideological agenda and a narrower, more clearly defined social base.  A third type of  
 
electoralist parties, according to Gunther and Diamond, is the “personalistic” party 
which “only weakly performs the functions of parties.” 
442
 
                 Movement parties are organizations that “straddle the conceptual space 
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                     It is commonly noted that support for political parties in modern 
democracies has declined. They apparently fail to meet the citizens’ functional 
demands of political representation. Party politicians are increasingly perceived as 
self-serving, unresponsive, and unaccountable, with aggravating tensions between 
party leaders and followers. 
444
 Scandals concerning campaign funds reflect flaws in 
the system of party finance.  
                     Historically specific mass party may no longer be the norm in today’s 
democracies, and this indicates the decline of political parties as an institution. 
Scholars note “the ever more-pronounced separation of the representative and the 
institutional roles of the party.” 
445
 However, those trends can also be interpreted as 
“adaptation rather than degeneration.”  Although there are other kinds of actors that 
compete with parties in some of their functions, there are still no “real alternatives” to 
parties as the foundation of democracy. However, a question can be asked 
hypothetically: if parties ultimately fail to serve as the agent of political and 
institutional integration, what would be the fate of democracy? 
446
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5.2. Political Parties After Communism 
 
 
                   In the opinion of some scholars, the processes of democratization and 
party development in post-communist countries have more in common with party 
development in the 19
th
 century Europe than with similar processes in new 
democracies elsewhere in the world – because they had to be started “from scratch.” 
447
 
                 Institutionalized multi-party systems have emerged in those East European 
countries which had democratic experience prior to their communist regimes. After 
an initial “messy period” of transition, they developed a relative stability of voter 
political orientations and electoral cleavages. 
448
  This facilitated the 
institutionalization of a number of “programmatic” type parties (e.g. the Democratic 
Union in Poland, the Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party, the 
Czech Social Democratic Party, and others). Programmatic parties are based on a 
higher mode of linkage building than personalistic or clientelistic parties; they assume 




                       Stalled party development in post-Soviet countries (with the exception 
of the Baltic states) has been considered puzzling.  It was noted for instance that since 
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post-Soviet states typically have strong presidential systems, they would be expected 
to develop “two broad alliances or parties, as in the United States” – because a 
presidential system design is encouraging for such development. 
450
  But without a 
stable and ideologically coherent party system, the two most important post-Soviet 
states – Russia and Ukraine – remain “extremely shaky polities”  whose rulers 
“defend their claim to power as those in the postcolonial nations once did, in the 
language of leftist or egalitarian ideologies.”
451
   
                     Post-Soviet political parties are predominantly personalistic and 
“fabricated by small groups of party-builders,” with very weak linkage to citizens. 
Some maintain that newly formed post-Soviet parties “are similar to newly formed 
parties in the West, the parties that have arisen recently or are arising before our eyes” 
– so their post-Soviet development reflects the global trend towards  postmodern, 
non-ideological, and electoralist parties.
452
 
                     The claim about the “normalcy” of post-Soviet parties is seriously 
challenged by Andrew Wilson.
453
 He argues against a traditional approach to the 
study of post-Soviet politics which assumes that visible manifestations of conflict 
reflect genuine social cleavages. Wilson discusses political collisions in Russia, 
Ukraine, and Belarus as “theater designed to confuse and deceive the electorate rather 
                                                          
450
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than to represent real social actors.” 
454
  He emphasizes the role of “political 
technologists” (also known as “political marketers” and “consulting firms”) that are 
hidden behind parties and politicians while they organize the whole electoral process. 
                     According to critics, Wilson’s work “stands as a watershed in the study 
of post-Soviet politics and establishes a new research imperative to explore the 
limitations and scope of the virtual political space.” 
455
  They also note some 
questions that stem from Wilson’s work and need to be answered further. One of 
them is about the political interests behind the creators of virtuality: who are those 
actors and what ultimately drives them?  Likewise, his work calls for an examination 
of voting behavior – in order to “reintroduce the voter into the equation” of virtual 
politics.         
 
 





                   Post-Soviet political parties are a perfect example of a transplanted 
institution.  Under the Soviet system, political parties were banned from 1918; the 
“Communist Party of the Soviet Union” cannot be viewed as a political party in the 
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traditional sense of that word – it was the backbone of dictatorial state, an all-
permeating structure of governance and control.
456
   
               Democratization of the Soviet Union was driven by “the ambition to 
duplicate attractive Western patterns,” which produced the emergence of multiple 
political parties as a “pattern” deemed indispensable in a Western-style democracy.
457
 
But in the majority of former Soviet states, this institution is believed to have been 
artificially implanted rather than naturally emerged.  Their performance raises 
questions about the “traveling capacity of borrowed concepts.” When a concept is 
borrowed from established democracies to “democratizing” countries, how does a 
borrowed form correlate with its content?
458
  What becomes of the transferred 
institution in a foreign social and cultural context?  
                  A German diplomat stationed in Ukraine observed that some seemingly 
universal political concepts were actually creating communicative confusion between 
German and Ukrainian interlocutors – because the meanings of those terms were 
rooted in one’s “political tradition and mentality.”
459
  He named the word “party” 
among the most confusing in that problematic lexicon.   
                   In Western parliamentary tradition, a party is a “driving belt that picks up 
and unifies the opinion and will of the public, and then converts it into practical 
                                                          
456
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policies.” This understanding implies that parties gain their legitimacy from voters’ 
trust that is based in grassroots networks with broad involvement of volunteers.  From 
that perspective, “a party cannot be an artificially designed project created by public 
relations specialists… One cannot sell a party like a laundry detergent.”
460
 
                 However, post-Soviet parties are typically described as simulacra,
461
 
“virtual avatars” produced by “party designers,”
462
  “tadpoles” without bodies, 
“trademarks for electoral promotion”.
463
  They operate by using hired personnel (most 
recently, even for “mass protest” rallies), and consulting firms. Those parties are 
essentially like business ventures – they can be owned, sold and rebranded; likewise, 
legislators elected on a certain party ticket frequently switch their party identification.  
At the same time, all those parties barely reflect really existing social cleavages, with 
the exception of the parties that are ethnically-based. 
464
 
                 In his profound study of the party system in Russia
465
, Henry Hale 
observes that Russia’s parties can be considered both strong and weak at the same 
time.   Addressing this puzzle of “stalled party development,” he resorts to a “market 
explanation” model that views candidates as consumers of “electoral goods and 
services” supplied by parties (a public label, organizational support, reputation gain, 
etc.). Alternative providers of such service packages are “party substitutes” (e.g. 
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“regional political machines”), that often appear more competitive than parties in the 
“electoral market” due to “Russia’s patrimonial communist legacy” and the power of 
the executive branch “to regulate the market.”
466
            
                Looking from a different methodological standpoint, Anatoly Kulik arrives 
at similar conclusions. He emphasizes that Russian parties as well as the legislature 
(the Duma) have very little power, formal and informal, as compared to the executive 
branch (the Kremlin) which fully controls the regional authorities, radio and 
television, financial flows and the distribution of resources.  Therefore, he defines the 
raison d'être of political parties in post-Soviet Russia as survival via securing 
parliamentary status (which provides access to some administrative, financial, 
informational and other resources).  At the same time, for “the Kremlin” -- i.e. the 
ruling power – political parties are “simulacra of democracy” needed to legitimize the 
regime. 
467
    
                  All in all, party building in the post-Soviet space can be viewed as a 
process “between imitation and simulation.”  Those newly developing parties differ 
from traditional political parties of old democracies of the past, as well as from 
contemporary parties of liberal democracies today. The normative pattern they claim 
to represent “assumes the character of a myth.”
468
   While post-Soviet party politics is 
“underresearched and undertheorized,”
469
  it remains to be seen whether the 
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‘simulacra of democracy’ will develop into real mass-based parties, and whether 





CHAPTER 6.   
UKRAINE’S POLITICAL PARTIES: 
FROM A “PARTY OF POWER”  








                       The Soviet regime terminated political parties as an institution within 
the first few months of its rule. 
470
 As a result, the institution of political parties was 
totally discontinued for more than seventy years. The single political organization that 
remained, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (formerly the Russian 
Communist Party of the Bolsheviks) – the organization that actually ruled the country 
until August 1991 – can hardly be considered a typological variation of that 
institution.
471
   
                      The CPSU was the backbone of an ideocratic state; its function was to 
exercise power, and its structure fully reflected that function.  It was organized as a 
hierarchy of ruling bodies in each administrative unit of the country’s territory (town, 
city, county, etc.). The party office of the territory oversaw all activity within its 
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boundaries; accordingly, party offices comprised departments for overseeing industry, 
agriculture, schools, law enforcement agencies, etc. Offices of the state were no more 
than “external trimming” on the surface of the ruling structure of the CPSU.
472
  
                  Moreover, even the division of large cities and provinces into 
administrative districts was based on the jurisdiction of party offices rather than on 
the number of residents: as an example, the city of Leningrad (now St.Petersburg) 
was divided into 24 administrative districts where the number of residents varied 




                   CPSU offices, most importantly, controlled the selection, appointments 
and performance of the nomenklatura, i.e. of all officials and managers in positions of 
power within their territorial boundaries. The nomenklatura – the new ruling class of 
the Soviet system – was tightly organized around the CPSU offices. After the CPSU 
was disbanded in August 1991,
474
  the informal network of the nomenklatura 
remained in place. It became commonly referred to as “the party of power.” 
475
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 In the aftermath of the attempted by CPSU “hardliners,” President of Russia Boris 
Yeltsin issued a decree disbanding the CPSU in Russia; his act was followed in other 
republics of the USSR.  
475
 William Green Miller, a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and subsequently a 
researcher at the Kennan Institute, believed that the concept of the informal “party of 
power” was “of key importance” for understanding the course of post-Soviet politics 
(Kennan Institute lecture, January 9, 2006).  
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               The former nomenklatura was using its access to positions of power – in 
elected and administrative offices, as well as via informal crony connections – to 
pursue what Gaidar described as the natural course of history: from “collectively 
owning the state” to becoming private owners of formerly public assets. 
476
   Former 
apparatchiks were turning into business owners and elected officials “in one bottle,” 
as described by a Ukrainian commentator:  
“When that became ‘permissible,’ local bosses started to privatize what they could:  
market places, grocery stores, canteens and coffee shops. Later came public non-
residential buildings, even some nursery schools, libraries, and gyms. In the 
meantime, bosses in higher levels were privatizing big state assets.  Then the newly 
made entrepreneurs ‘of nomenklatura pedigree’ would run for elected offices of 
government and once again occupy the seats of executive authority. Such was the 
‘natural cycle’ of our ‘salt of the earth’ and their money in post-Soviet politics.” 
477
 
                           
                        Despite the fact that there already existed dozens of registered political 
parties,
478
   the majority in Ukraine’s Supreme Rada, as well as in subnational 
legislatures and local councils until late 1990s was comprised by formally non-
affiliated legislators who belonged to the “party of power.”  Collectively they were 
described as “the swamp” – an amorphous group with very vague notions about the 
desired social goals. “Those people were ready to do obediently what the superiors 
told them, but not out of conviction, only out of their private self-interest. […] The 
                                                          
476
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 The total number of registered parties in Ukraine comprised: in 1990 – 1; in 1991 
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Karmazina. Do Parties Perform As Agents of democracy? Zerkalo Nedeli,  January 
13, 2012).  
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main goal of this new upper class was to get instantly rich by privatizing what used to 
belong to the state and then re-sell it with profit. Thus political power merged with 
economic domination, and this shaped the order that was later called the ‘oligarchic 
clan system,’” recalled former U.S. Ambassador William Green Miller. 
479
 
                          Consecutive presidents of Ukraine, starting with Leonid Kravchuk, 
tried more than once to establish a strong pro-government party and thus to equip the 
amorphous “party of power” with a structured institutional frame.  The first of those 
attempts dates back to 1992 when President Kravchuk initiated the establishment of 
an inter-party association named the Congress of National Democratic Forces. 
However, its influence was limited, and it collapsed with the electoral defeat of the 
incumbent president in 1994 (which was a rare incidence in the post-Soviet space).  
                       Leonid Kuchma’s attempt in formal consolidation of the party of power 
was somewhat more effective. He won the presidential election as a vaguely defined 
“opposition” candidate (after resigning from the Prime Minister’s position a year 
before the election). Kuchma was the first to mobilize gifted intellectuals of non-
nomenklatura origin to lead his staff (such as Oleksandr Razumkov, Dmytri Vydrin 
and others) who created a less Soviet political style and attracted support from groups 
of liberal orientation.
480
  His message was about “change” and “reform,” and he was 
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Ukraine, the Union of Students of Ukraine, the New Wave association, and some 
others. Later, they merged into the presidential People’s Democratic Party joining 
with forces of pragmatic and ideologically amorphous orientation, but in less than 
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backed by a network of opposition candidates in local elections that were held 
simultaneously. That network was named the Inter-regional Bloc for Reforms. 
481
  
Later, the support base of the IBR was somewhat restructured to form a more 
comprehensive pro-presidential party under the name of People’s Democratic Party.    
                        The PDP was the first incarnation of the amorphous “party of power” 
in a structured political party in Ukraine. It emerged at the time of rising authoritarian 
“superpresidentialism” of Leonid Kuchma, where administrative pressure, 
“kompromat,” and other tools of informal domination became the shadow side of 
everyday politics. 
482
  PDP became arguably the first among Ukraine’s political 
parties to employ “the administrative resource” to build up its influence.
483
   With 5% 
of the popular vote in 1998 parliamentary elections, it earned 19 legislative seats; but 
what with its leader Valery Pustovoitenko being the Prime Minister of Ukraine, 
seventy other legislators were persuaded to switch their party ID and join the PDP 
faction. Thus, PDP was able to muster 20% of the total number of legislators (the 
faction comprised 89 seats in 1999). However, as soon as Pustovoitenko lost the 
Prime Minister position, the party lost most of its influence, and the faction 
membership shrank to 15.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
two years the liberal wing of the PDP split off and joined the forces supporting the 
political ascent of Viktor Yushchenko.  
481
 The name contained a message for unifying politically opposite regions of the 
country. At the same time, it was reminiscent of the famous reformist caucus in the 
last Soviet legislature – the Inter-regional Group, that was headed by Andrei 
Sakharov and Anatoly Sobchak.  
482
 Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale Univ. Press, 2000, 
Chapter 9.  
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 As pointed out by Karmazina, bid. 
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                         From William Green Miller’s viewpoint, the “party of power” 
remained monolithic and intact despite the changing names of the political parties 
which took turns at the legislature’s lead.  In a four-year period between two 
parliamentary elections – from 1998 to 2002 – the number of party or faction 
membership switches exceeded the total number of legislators in the Supreme Rada. 
Many of them moved several times from one group to another; ten of the legislators 
made four or even five such moves within four years. 
484
  In Andrew Wilson’s apt 
wording, it was a parade of “virtual politics, with a shifting kaleidoscope of clan 
groups, shadowy business, and old nomenklatura interests.”
485
  
                        While clans were gaining in economic assets and power, their 
competition for rent-seeking spoils increased. As the result, the grand architecture of 
Ukrainian politics evolved towards a system of competing “oligarchic” groups, with 
President Kuchma positioned above as the supreme arbiter and, some also would say, 
as the capo di tutti capi or the Godfather.
486
  Each group established control over a 
major political party as a tool of influence; thus several major parties evolved to 
become “political holdings” of business corporations.  
                        The most conspicuous among them by the end of President Kuchma’s 
administration was the United Social Democratic Party under the leadership of Viktor 
Medvedchuk. Its best electoral result was 6.27% of the vote in the parliamentary 
elections of 2002; but its shadow influence was disproportionately bigger while 
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Viktor Medvedchuk served as the Chief of Staff for President Kuchma.  Medvedchuk 
aggressively built up his network of influence under the party name. For instance, 
while his brother served as the chief of internal revenue administration in Lviv 
province, almost every local branch of the revenue administration was also a local 
USDP affiliation. Many elected officials were getting quiet recommendations to join 
USDP if they wanted to avoid a thorough audit of their business records.
487
  
                        Such methods of “party politics” – bureaucratic build-up, 
administrative pressure, hypocrisy and fraud – indicate a continuity of style inherited 
by post-Soviet “parties of power” from the Soviet communist nomenklatura. Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, a former Prime Minister of Russia, famously made that point by 
saying: “Whatever organization we try to create, it comes out like a CPSU.”   Over 
and over again, a post-Soviet “party of power” is exposed as “a group that pretends to 
be driven by common ideas, but is in fact united for priority access to the trough.” 
Understandably, such parties cannot rely on winning with the power of their ideas; 




                         Popular resentment against such methods -- and the political system 
they shaped -- became the driving force for the Orange Revolution. In that sense, it 
signified the post-Soviet “greengrocer’s redemption.”
489
  However, attempts to 
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continue to the tradition of the “the party of power” were made in the time of Viktor 
Yushchenko’s presidency as well. Shortly after his inauguration for the presidency, a 
“party of President Yushchenko supporters” was established by the “nomenklatura” 
of his government – the party convention brought together “the chiefs of all major 
government agencies, key ministers, governors, mayors, a vice prime minister, the 
head of the National Security Council, and the State Secretary of Ukraine.”
490
  Yet, 
although President Yushchenko “did not change the principles of the government 
bureaucracy,” he did change its atmosphere making it “more relaxed and benevolent.” 
Arguably, the government did not become less corrupt, but it did become even less 
orderly and more anarchic.
491
 Yushchenko’s party “Popular Union ‘Our Ukraine’” 
never became a true “party of power” and declined in significance even before the 
term of Yushchenko’s presidency expired.  
                           The latest project of “the party of power” in Ukraine’s politics is the 
Party of Regions in the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych.   This party, initially 
founded as a promoter of local governments autonomy, later evolved into the political 
holding of the “Donetsk clan” and then ousted or absorbed a number of its former 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Its applicability to the Orange Revolution metaphor is discussed in greater detail in: 
Peter Voitsekhovsky. In the Footsteps of 1989: Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a 
Carnival of Anti-politics. Vladimir Tismaneanu and Bogdan Iacob (eds.) The End 
And the Beginning: Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History, CEU Press, 
2012; pp. 543–558.   
490
 Information communique quoted from: URL:  
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491
 Anatoly Strelianyi, ibid.  The commentator also notes that, in absence of the rule 
of law -- as the Soviet style bureaucracy is trained to fulfill personal commands from 
a boss rather than impersonal rules and procedures – such slackness of authority 
resulted in chaos and anarchy of President Yushchenko’s administration.  
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competitors and rivals that used to represent other regional clans. Its political style 
fully repeats the same methods of pressure and fraud that were used by its 
predecessors, but in a more rigid and merciless fashion. Journalists have described it 
as “an asphalt roller,” “an elephant in a china shop,” and “an occupation force.” 
492
  
Under Yanukovych, the Party of  Regions became nearly as overwhelmingly present 
in power and as comprehensively controlling power as Vladimir Putin’s United 
Russia. It has also been likened to the CPSU (while the style of its leaders, especially 
Viktor Yanukovych himself, was likened to the style of Leonid Brezhnev). 
493
  
                           Leaders of the Party of Regions claim for themselves the reputation 
of “strong managers,” while critics emphasize their unlawful, corrupt, and 
authoritarian practices. 
494
 Analysts point out that pressure methods of the 
Yanukovych party in electoral campaigns of 2010 and 2012 made a stronger reliance 
on intimidation, by means of a  “merge between the party of power, the law 
enforcement, and criminal gangs.” In many instances, criminal gangs would 
physically threaten or attack the Party of Regions’ opponents, while law enforcement 
officers would take no action against them.
495
  
                    The “party of power” model appears increasingly outdated and 
compromised, although still entrenched in post-Soviet polities.  Putin’s United 
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Russia, famously nicknamed “the party of crooks and thieves,” had to resort to 
unconcealed fraud in the 2011 Duma elections. This caused the Putin regime to shift 
to more fundamentalist anti-Western ideological frames in order to reinforce its 
legitimacy. By the same token, Ukraine’s Party of Regions is believed “to have been 
infected with the virus of self-destruction” from the moment it became ‘the party of 
power” because all of them are “doomed to quickly fade and decay.”
496
  
                        In general terms, there is a fundamental difference between a post-
Soviet  “party of power” and a ruling party in developed democracies. The strength of 
a ruling party comes from winning in competitive elections, which means that its 
ideas and statements at a given time express the will of the majority of voters.  In 
contrast, a “party of power” is not a product of the society at large; it is formed by the 
ruling group only in order to make an appearance of being a legitimate ruler.  
                 Another notable distinction of a “party of power” is its typically dull and 
colorless composition: by default, it has to be an organization of obedient officials 
who become its functionaries.  
                 The life span of a specific “party of power” is limited to the duration of its 
leader’s rule.  At the same time, the core of a “party of power” easily changes party 
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                        Political science textbooks and reference sources describe Ukraine’s 
political parties in terms of the traditional ideological spectrum: parties are labeled, 
with variations, as “left,” “right,” or “centrist,” for example:  
“The political party spectrum of Ukraine has been completely filled, from the ultra-
right to the ultra-left. Upon departing from the single-party system, Ukraine arrived at 
a hypertrophied multi-party system. Its existing parties are traditionally divided, 
according to their political orientation, into the right wing – radical nationalist parties, 
the left wing – parties of socialist and communist orientation; centrist parties make up 
a broad spectrum  that includes national-democratic, national-statist, and liberal-




                        
                        For a while, political scientists were taking the ideological self-
identification of Ukrainian political parties at its face value. Andrew Wilson was one 
of the few exceptions when her wrote, in an ironic manner, about the “not particularly 
green Greens and the not particularly social democratic Social Democrats” in the 
Ukrainian parliament.
499
      
                        The Green Party became a prominent example of a party name turned 
into a misnomer. Founded in 1990 as a network of environmentalist clubs, the party 
was one of the first to trade its genuine identity for big wallet membership: in the 
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elections of 1998 it allowed a number of rich businessmen and bankers – previously 
not associated with green movement -- to run for the Supreme Rada at the top of its 
list of candidates. The party name earned them 5.4% of the total vote and 19 seats in 




                         Another notable example of the same kind was the United Social 
Democratic Party that got through the electoral threshold in 1998 and 2002, owing to 
targeted use of “administrative resource” (essentially, a version of machine 
politics).
501
 At that time, the party openly acted as a classic rent-seeking political 
entrepreneur profiting from protectionism and political influence in business. This 
made the leader of the Socialist Party (claiming to be “genuinely” socialist), 
Oleksandr Moroz famously say that “Ukraine’s social democrats are like guinea pigs 
– which are neither pigs, nor from Guinea.” 
502
  It may be argued that the 
                                                          
500 Politically, the Green Party faction was indistinguishable from other big business groups 
that made up the amorphous “party of power.”  The Green Party brand never became 
winning again:  in 2002 and 2006, the party could not pass the 3% threshold and received, 
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The party’s strong-arm tactic of inflating its membership was reflected in the fact the 
number of votes received by USDP in 2002 – at the peak of its influence -- was less than the 
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Medvedchuk group appropriated the existing party brand by means of a “raider 
takeover” at the party convention in 1998. 
503
  
                       The selling of positions on party candidate lists and “hostile takeovers” 
of previously existing party organizations are only some of the forms of “politics as 
business” that distort ideological identities of political parties in Ukraine. They are 
discussed in more detail in the following section. But the majority of Ukrainian 
parties – including the most influential ones – have intrinsically confusing and vague 
ideological orientations.   The “party system” they make is more like a “Potemkin 
village” of ideological veils.  
                      “Ukraine’s motley political space where you can see nominal radicals, 
nominal liberals, and nominal socialists is only an appearance of colors and names,” 
maintains a young political activist.
504
   Although an official program statement is 
required for a political party’s registration, the statements submitted these days are 
very short, vague, and meaningless, unlike the elaborate platforms that used to be 
developed by the first few registered parties in early 1990s.
505
 
                         As shown by the course of political competition of the 1990s, virtual 
populistic projects trumped over attempts to build ideologically-based political parties 
with mass constituencies in the post-Soviet space.
506
   One important reason of that 
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outcome was undoubtedly the confusion of ideological frames and values in the post-
Soviet mind – as shown by the case of the Ukrainian society.
507
  Observers note that 
in today’s Ukrainian politics, “right” and “left” ideological identifications are 
confused with “cultural markers” of Ukrainian vs. Soviet-Russian identity.
508
   
Nostalgia for the Soviet Union is mistakenly considered “left’ although it increasingly 
blends with fundamentalist Russian nationalism; so the declared “left” identity 
acquires a duplicitous “right” lining.  Similar doublethink is ingrained in the 
Ukrainian patriotic mind which shares anti-communist sentiments, but expects quasi-
socialist paternalistic policies from its government.  Such mindset of voters was an 




                          The second major reason for the duplicity and hollowness of party 
ideologies is the fact all political parties in Ukraine remain personalistic: each of them 
is fully subordinate to the party leader.  Invariably, the leader creates the party – 
instead of the party putting forward its leader. That is a model of “socialization turned 
upside down.”
510
  Although some of the parties boast of very high numbers of 
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 membership in that model becomes formal and insignificant. 
Grass-root members are only needed for legitimizing the leader. Their token financial 
contributions, if any at all, are unimportant for the party’s finances. Nor does the 
party normally count on their volunteer campaign work. Thus the political party, for 
all practical purposes, becomes embodied by its leader and the bureaucratic staff of 
the party office; and they seem to prefer it to be that way -- rather than to share the 
power with unpredictable “mass participants.”  That situation also invites 
personalistic leaders to abuse populist methods and “token” issues such as the 
Russian language in an easy drive for votes.  
                          It is not surprising, therefore, that in the aftermath of the Orange 
Revolution, when street rallies became an accepted form of party legitimation (and 
Soviet-style coercion was no longer usable for providing mass attendance of rallies), 
“rent-a-crowd” services became widely spread in Kiev as well as in other cities of 
Ukraine.
512
 The Party of Regions – which claims to have the widest constituency of 
members and supporters -- was the first to resort to conducting fake rallies where 
attendees were hired by the hour; their political opponents, especially Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s organization, were doing the same, perhaps on a smaller scale.
513
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                           The Communist Party of Ukraine, reinstalled in 1993, for a number 
of years was considered the only “real” party with an ideological platform and an 
organized network of followers. But over time its ideological sincerity has been 
thoroughly questioned because all through the years the Communist faction has 
mostly sided with “oligarchic” governments against “liberal” opposition.  Legislators 
and high officials from the CPU supported oligarchic privatization schemes and 
earned dividends for themselves.
514
  It looks obvious to many that CPU’s expensive 
campaign billboards with the slogan, “The country for millions, not for millionaires” 
are actually paid for by those millionaires themselves.
515
 
                          The key issues on their agenda have included “return to the USSR,” 
apologetics of Stalin, “defense” of the Russian language, protests against accession to 
NATO, etc. But they were very remote from being a genuine “left movement that 
would defend the working people’s interests;” in fact, issues of labor interests are 
seldom mentioned at all.
516
   A Ukrainian publicist points out that today’s Communist 
Party leaders reveal their doublethink when they “shout about the criminal power, but 
vote unanimously with that criminal power; when they lobby for the interests of their 
children’s businesses; when they wear luxury watches, drive luxury cars, and acquire 
expensive real estate without declaring their sources of income.” She adds that, just 
like in Soviet times, Ukrainian communist leaders “declare one thing, have something 
                                                          
514
 Larysa Denysenko. Ukrainska Pravda, November 1, 2012. 
515
 Oleksandr Demchenko. Ukrainska Pravda, November 23, 2012 
516
 Igor Losev, Ukrainska Pravda, November 12, 2010.  
172 
 
different in mind, then act differently to what they say, and lie about what they do. 
This is indecent, repulsive, and has nothing to do with left ideology.” 
517
 
                          One other distinctly ideological party in today’s Ukraine is the 
Svoboda (“Freedom”) Party -- positioned as the ultimate antithesis to the 
Communists. It stands out for energetic and tightly organized membership. Some feel 
that, despite its ideology of conservative nationalism, Svoboda is “the only political 
party of the European type” in Ukraine: its campaigns are carried out by volunteer 
enthusiasts rather than by indifferent pay-per-event personnel.
518
 In today’s Ukraine, 
that is perceived as a unique and impressive political style, which appears to be 
winning: Svoboda made a strong showing in the local elections of 2010 and in the 
parliamentary elections in 2012. Also, the party gradually expands the territory of its 
influence from West to East. Its radicalism is appealing to voters who want resolute 
action to address perceived social injustice.
519
   
                         But despite its strong anti-communist convictions, Svoboda appears 
paradoxically close to the communist tradition of extremist message framing and to 
the anti-liberal rhetoric of communists.  Like in Dovlatov’s narrative, “Soviet” and 
“anti-Soviet” identities become surprisingly alike.
520
 Also, Svoboda’s views on the 
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regulatory role of government fully coincide with the Communist Party positions.
521
  
Social populism – the promise to keep Ukraine’s inordinately big system of welfare 
support and subsidies -- becomes a common denominator for all major parties 
including Svoboda. For that reason, some argue that Ukraine does not have any truly 




                          Likewise, the two “heavy-weight” political parties – Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s “United Opposition Motherland” and Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of 
Regions – are both noted for “exploiting populist slogans in the same hypocritical 
fashion, like identical twins.” 
523
 Both are equally inconsistent in their right-left 
orientations. “Motherland” and its components (“Front of Change”, “Reforms and 
Order,” and others)  claim a “center-right” orientation; but the general mode of their 
statements and policies is described as “romantically colored leftist populism.” Like 
their political competitors, “Motherland” politicians promise “social justice” that has 
to be regulated and delivered by the government. 
524
 “Motherland” seems to 
intentionally evade clarity of position statements, and displays doublethink on 
important issues. For example, despite its declared support of civil society 
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development, this bloc voted down several bills that would make civic associations 
more independent from the government.
525
  
                         The Party of Regions has been just as confusing about its ideological 
orientation. Its programmatic statements combine “individual freedom, socially 
responsible state, and innovative society.” Its spokesmen also claimed that the party’s 
platform “is beyond the boundaries of right and left ideologies.”
526
  Experts 
characterize the party’s actual views as “a mix of corporatism with electoral 
populism.”  In that interpretation, post-Soviet corporatism is defined as “only 
seemingly amorphous; it is neither communist, nor liberal, neither socialist, nor 
nationalist; yet it is clearly identifiable -- as the ideology of benefits, subsidies, and all 
powers given to ‘our side’; essentially, it is the allocation of all resources of the 
country to members of ‘the corporation’.” 
527
   A philosopher described this position 
as “capitalism with Bolshevist fangs.” 
528
 
                       Some of Ukraine’s leading “political technologists”
529
 assert that there 
has come “the end of politics” for political parties – because the pragmatic approach 
of “doing politics as business” essentially made political ideas and platforms 
meaningless. “Today’s politics no longer depends on political views, platforms, or 
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                      Civil society activists make an opposite point.  On the one hand, they 
agree that “today’s parties with their shadow financing and business-style marketing 
are the creators and the victims of the era of cynicism [in Ukraine’s society].” On the 
other hand, they emphasize that “Ukraine will become ‘a normal country’ when the 
people realize that only politics – i.e. political parties – will be able to provide their 
economic and social interests.”
531
 Hence, the society’s goal should be to move toward 
developing “proper parties of the future.”  
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                        A recent scholarly study framed post-Soviet party politics in Russia as 
“electoral markets,“ in which the parties are “suppliers of products, such as 
reputation, organization, and financing,” and the candidates are consumers: they 
“decide to ‘buy’ party products agreeing to run for office on party labels” in the hope 
that those products will help them get elected.
532
   Observations of Ukraine’s party 
politics suggest that the concept of “market” can be applied here as well, but with 
some modifications.  
                        Consistently with the “market” concept, political parties are set up and 
handled in Ukraine like business entities. Law firms openly advertise services in legal 
creation of political parties. In addition to “preparing the complete package of 
registration documents and legal support of the registration procedure at the  Ministry 
of Justice,”  such services also include “collecting signatures from ten thousand 
citizens in two thirds of counties nationwide, as required,” and “developing the 
party’s official program and bylaws.”
533
   
                        Registered parties have been traded almost like private companies and 
commercial brands, based on the firm (although informal) understanding that they are 
“owned” by the party leader. In that fashion, Viktor Medvedchuk’s group 
“appropriated” the United Social Democratic Party in 1998 from its earlier 
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 former mayor of Kiev Oleksandr Omelchenko “purchased” the Unity 
(Yednist) Party in 2000, 
535
 and the Party of Regions brand was acquired by the 
Donetsk “clan” in 2001 after a series of transformations and transfers of its 
“ownership.”
536
  More recently, a new party of the major league, “People’s Self-
Defense” (Narodna Samooborona), emerged from the rebranding of an old “dwarf” 
party, “Forward, Ukraine!” – after its “purchase” by the “political entrepreneur” 
David Zhvania.
537
 Three years later, the same entrepreneur was reported allegedly 
purchasing another “dwarf” party, the “Christian Democratic Alliance.”   Notably, a 
well-informed expert on Ukraine’s party politics commented that the purchased entity 
“had been overcapitalized and would soon depreciate.”
538
 
                      Advertisements about “a party for sale” can even be found in on-line 
classifieds. In one instance, an investigative journalist contacted the buyer and was 
told that “the party is ready for running in local and parliamentary elections because it 
has been registered for two full years; the party also has registered provincial 
chapters; it can be quickly switched to a new leadership and re-registered under a new 
name.” The asking price was 180,000 USD. 
539
 
                       Those examples may help to understand how Ukraine got to have as 
many as 202 registered political parties in 2012, with most of them meeting every 
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criterion to be called “fake formations” of “virtual politics.” 
540
  In order to explain 
the practical value of investing in such virtual entities, experts use the term “satellite 
parties.”
541
  Satellite parties play several roles in the politics of pretense and imitation.  
                      First, they serve as decoys for the unsophisticated voter of “anti-
etsablishment” orientation. It is commonly believed that the incumbent’s advantage is 
stronger when there are two or three dozen “opposition” candidates rather than just 
two or three. Each “satellite” posing as an opponent draws away at least some votes 
from the viable opposition. Plus, in a kaleidoscope of names and labels it is more 
difficult to differentiate between genuine and “brandjacked” entities. For example, a 
sympathizer of the Green Movement would have to make a special effort in order to 
find out the difference between the Green Party of Ukraine, “The Ukrainian Party 
‘Green Planet’,” and “The Political Party ‘Greens’.” 
542
 Such technology has worked 
effectively since the 1990s, wherefore the vast majority of political parties – arguably, 
about 95% of the total – are “fakes and ghosts turned away from the people.” Instead 
of serving as tools of democratic linkage, those parties distort and block the 
expression of the public demand and thus act as “agents of de-democratization.”
543
 
                      Second, “satellite” parties enjoy equal rights with the few “real” 
contenders, and therefore the electoral law entitles them to seats on electoral 
commissions. That is a tradable resource of political influence. An expert points out 
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that the trend started back in the 1990s; but it grew to enormous scale by 2010, what 
with the number of “satellites” and the scale of trading on that resource. 
544
 
                      Third, with increased competition for influential roles in the “party of 
power,” it gives one more weight to have a “private” party under your name, even if a 
small one. Similarly, medieval knights were expected to join the king’s army with at 
least a small troop of lancers in their service. In modern-day Ukrainian politics, 
Serhiy Tihipko did precisely that with his “Strong Ukraine” party when he declared 
joining the Party of Regions in 2012.
545
 By the same token, David Zhvania joined the 
Party of Regions’ faction in the Rada upon becoming a leader of his own “satellite 
party”.  
                       “Market” relations between parties and political candidates truly 
became institutionalized – but they acquired the form of de-ideologized monetary 
transactions. Like the Green Party did in 1998,
546
 all major parties now commonly 
sell their candidate list positions for cash donations to the party treasuries.  Rich 
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business leaders who pay those huge sums (unofficially, the price for a guaranteed 
seat in a Supreme Rada faction may amount to several million US dollars), obtain a 
somewhat different set of “products” than those listed by Henry Hale. The status of a 
Supreme Rada member provides highly valued immunity from criminal prosecution, 
and even more importantly, influence for lobbying their business interests with the 
government.  Thus, nominations of legislative candidates became the most important 
“party business,” and every party leader conducts it single-handedly and 
confidentially, behind closed doors.
547
   
                        Another aspect of “political business” is purchase of legislators’ re-
affiliation with another political party. The payment can be tit-for-tat (such as 
resolution of specific problems for the legislator, or appointments of the legislator’s 
relatives or buddies to important jobs), as well as payment of a monetary reward. In 
some instances, monetary or tit-for-tat rewards are promised, but do not 
materialize.
548
         
                        Scandals caused by such dealings erupted in the Supreme Rada many 
times.  In 2007, a scandal caused by massive re-affiliation of legislators resulted in a 
dissolution of the parliament elected in 2006.   More recently, a scandal erupted in 
2012 when a legislator published an audio recording of a conversation with a 
colleague from another faction in which he was offered a half-million dollars for 
switching to the other side; the talk mentioned payments to other legislators as well.  
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Interestingly, the Prosecutor General refused to investigate that incident claiming that 
it was no more than an ethical violation. 
549
 
                     Arguably, the best kept secret of Ukraine’s political parties is their 
funding. Party budgets, like most of their inner work, are non-transparent, secretive, 
shadowed.  Party leaders obviously prefer to be funded by few wealthy “customers” 
rather than to build up broad networks of financial support.  Formal requirements of 
financial reporting are fulfilled inconsistently and reveal only “white book” 
transactions, but do not disclose operations with “black box cash.”
550
   
                      Those issues are not typically brought up for outspoken discussions. 
But, according to an independent political observer, “everybody understands that the 
main instrument of political funding in Ukraine is the buying and selling of political 
influences.  One of its forms is the buying and selling of political parties and 
legislators in the Supreme Rada… The whole building of the country’s politics rests 
on corruption.” 
551
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POST-ORWELLIAN MACHINE POLITICS:  
SIMULATED SUPPLY AND DELUDED DEMAND 
 




            Henry Hale’s model of supply and demand relations between political parties 
and candidates leaves the voter out of the picture. A more comprehensive model to 
describe the political process was proposed by Richard Rose et al.
552
 That model is 
based on the view that “elites propose, masses dispose”; while it is the elites who 
propose new institutions and policies, it matters just as much what the people think 
about those choices.  The supply and demand model also describes the 
institutionalization of political parties as “persisting commitments” to parties by 
political elites (supply) and by voters (demand). 
553
 In conditions of “stable” supply, 
the elites maintain the same parties at one election after another. If, instead, volatile 
“flash” parties emerge with every new election, voters cannot hold politicians 
accountable by reaffirming or withdrawing their support of a particular party.   
                          Such supply-and-demand model implies several possible outcomes of 
post-communist transition. Its explanatory power is compared in Exhibit 4.1 with two 
other actor-centric explanations of post-communist regime change.   Stable 
democracy is the outcome when a democratic demand is met with reformist 
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democratic supply.   By the same token, both the elites and the masses may repudiate 
democracy in favor of a non-democratic alternative. Finally, a lack of democratic 
supply may be met with a lowered public demand: the people are frustrated with the 
politicians, but prefer that the state would leave them alone. This results in a “very 
imperfect” democracy which the people may tolerate as a “lesser evil” as compared to 
undemocratic alternatives. 
                           In comparison, it appears that the ‘supply and demand’ model 
explains post-Soviet regime change better than the two elite-centered models. The 
elite-centered models cannot explain, for instance, a notable path divergence between 
Ukraine and Belarus which occurred at the bifurcation point of two presidential 
elections in 1994. However, the supply-and-demand model plausibly explains the 
advent of President Lukashenka’s dictatorship in Belarus in contrast to the emergence 




                     Electoral politics in Ukraine perfectly fits into the category of a “low 
level equilibrium” of Richard Rose’s model where poor supply matches low demand.  
As discussed further, the legacy of doublethink helps to understand the causes of that 
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                       In twenty plus years of post-Soviet history, electoral proposition in 
Ukraine has been characterized as prevaricate and rich in myth. In presidential 
elections, candidates typically framed their messages with exaggerated antagonism 
and in fateful “make or break” terms. Thus, each candidate would make an effort to 
mobilize the voters, first and foremost, not so much in favor of oneself, but against 
the opponent, in order to prevent “the bad side” from winning. In other words, the 
suggested logic for the voter would be to look not “for the greater good,” but “for the 
lesser evil.”  
                      The juxtaposition of the “good” and the “evil” was invariably related to 
pro-Russian and anti-Russian (or “patriotic”) sentiments. Remarkably, successful 
candidates were able to identify, alternately, first with one side, then with the other. 
Thus, Leonid Kravchuk won the presidential election in 1991 as “the lesser evil” for 
62% of voters, when juxtaposed against the “nationalist” Vyacheslav Chornovil.  
Four years later, Kravchuk carried the “nationalist” vote against Leonid Kuchma who 
was perceived as “the agent of Russia.”  But in 1999, Leonid Kuchma, likewise, 
became “the lesser evil” for the patriots in the runoff against the Communist Party 
candidate Petro Symonenko.  
                       In reality, the contrast between such candidates proves to be less 
significant.
555
  Even Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych who appeared to 
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clash on irreconcilable differences during the Orange Revolution in 2004, became 
political allies again in less than two years’ time.
556
 
                      Philosopher Dmitry Vydrin speaks about electoral campaigns in 
Ukraine as “a struggle between imitations within one and the same cynical corporate 
political consciousness.” 
557
  It appears that the imitations had at least some realistic 
component for a number of years: even though competing political camps assumed 
partly “imagined” labels, they tried to appeal to specific social groups, and they had 
to debate about political choices.  A campaign manager recalls that “every candidate 
tried to create unique proposition with a unique label. People were voting for 
identifiable things: leftist values, national-democratic principles, young talent, 
conservative wisdom, etc.”
558
  Candidates tried to talk in terms of “casual ideologies” 
addressing people’s day-to-day lives.
559
 
                         In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the trend changed. 
Political competition virtualized. Campaign promises became vaguer and avoided 
specific “deliverables.” Direct advertising on billboards and TV became the leading 
form of communication with voters.
560
  Taking voters into account was simulated by 
establishing telephone “hotlines” where voters were encouraged to call with their  
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Rent-a-crowd rally participants can 
be easily recognized by their 
melancholic looks and lack of 
enthusiasm. 
 
Source: Korrespondent.net, 2007.  
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Top: campaign banners from Yulia Tymoshenko in 2009 were a perfect example of appeal 
based on emotion rather than reason. While she was the Prime Minister of Ukraine -- and her 
government was criticized  both by President Viktor Yushchenko and the opposition leader 
Viktor Yanukovych --  the banners, produced in Tymoshenko party colors, carried multiply 
repeated message, with no names: “They promise – SHE WORKS; they obstruct – SHE 
WORKS; they hamper – SHE WORKS.” 
Bottom:  A Yanukovych billboard for 2010 presidential election campaign exemplifies the 
virtual and message-less style of post-Orange campaigns. The poster slogan reads: “Ukraine 
is for the people.”  Other buzz slogans of that campaign were “to make life better” and “stability 







  Efforts to win voters’ minds or hearts were, to a large 
degree, replaced by efforts to cynically buy their vote.
562
    
                        As the result, Ukraine developed “a caricature of the democratic 
election model.” The country’s leading expert in election monitoring believes that its 
new “oligarchic-virtual campaign style” is common in post-Soviet polities, as well as 
in resource-rich African countries.  This campaign style is based on “big money” with 
a “business plan that calculates spending forecast per vote,” after which “everything 
is purchased” including “huge amounts of advertising, brand personalities for 
promotional campaign, ‘zakazukha’ (secretly paid promotional coverage disguised as 
news), bonuses for electoral commission members and fees for hired rally crowds.” 
563
 
                          Rent-a-crowd services became openly advertised in classifieds, and 
both the government parties and the opposition were buying services from the same 
providers.
564
 It seemed easier and cheaper for both opposing political camps to hire a 
crowd of “supporters” waving their banners than to build up networks of genuine 
grass-root supporters; but even more importantly, such Potemkinist technology 
allowed party leaders to fake accountability to their electorate.   
                                                          
561
 Yuri Butusov, ibid.   
562
 Artem Bidenko, ibid. Forms of voter bribing are discussed further in section 4.3. 
563
 Igor Popov. Korrespondent, October 19, 2012. 
564
 “Companies supply rally participants both for the opposition and the coalition.” 
BBC Ukrainian Service, April 23, 2007. 
190 
 
                         That situation reflects that fact that oligarchic clans continue to “own” 
Ukrainian politics and parties. A prominent publicist maintains that “out of the 450  
legislators in the Rada, the few wealthy families who own everything in Ukraine are 
represented by 450 of them.”   Thus, none of them is truly “left-wing” or “right-
wing,” they only use “either left or right rhetoric” which makes no difference for the 
power bosses as long as their interests are maintained. 
565
   
                           The same point is made by analysts who emphasize that “today’s 
opposition parties [who oppose President Yanukovych] are fake because they do not 
have a genuine social base. “If you ask an opposition politician who they see as their 
voter, the answer will be vague and uncertain, ‘Our voters are the whole Ukrainian 
nation.’ That explains why there is a big gap between what the opposition does and 
what the society expects them to do.” 
566
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7.3. “Please Fool Us Again”: Paradoxes of Voting Behavior 
 
 
                          The majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the situation in their 
country; yet they continue to support those politicians who should be held 




                          Ukrainian survey data from different years confirm Yuri Levada’s 
observation that the post-Soviet voter “begs to be fooled” and expects to hear “nice 
fairy tales” from political leaders.
568
  On the eve of elections in 2007, 68% of 
respondents said they did not believe in the fulfillment of promises from the 
candidates they would vote for. Only 13% said they “hoped” the promises would be 
kept.
569
  Journalists summarized those results in the statement: “We know they will 
deceive is, but we still vote for them.”  
                         In 2012, 77% of respondents felt they had made the right choice in the 
previous parliamentary elections. But at the same time, the majority also said that the 
Supreme Rada was performing poorly, and that voters had little impact on the quality 
of the elected officials’ performance. 61% felt negative about the fact that many 
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                          A prominent sociologist explains those paradoxes of the voters’ 
consciousness as “peculiarities of their political culture” – namely, confused and 
contradictive notions, or “a mixed salad in their heads.”
571
 A blogger remarks that 
generational change alone did not result in a new quality of the social consciousness – 
“the Soviet mind continues to be reproduced, even though Leninist doctrines are no 
longer imposed on the people.” 
572
  
                         A political essayist calls this condition “social infantility.” He notes 
that “the people do not want to take the responsibility for their fate into their own 
hands; they want someone else to come and do it.” 
573
 The society remains “waiting 
for Peron”
574
 who may come under any name, be it “The Great White Mother” or 
“The Great Boxer.”
575
 Such deluded demand creates perpetuating supply of political 
populism.  
                          Paternalistic expectations, however, are not to be equated with 
authoritarian sentiment.  “What people want is not a dictator – they want the advent 
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           Exhibit 4.3.a: Leaders as icons 
 
Presidential candidate Yanukovych greeted by a fan, 2004. 
Hand-written poster says: 
“Yanukovych –  
you are our God,  
and we believe in You! 
194 
 
Leaders as icons (continued).  
            
 
A fan with a portrait of Yulia Tymoshenko  
dressed in a Ukrainian folk costume (left),  









A woman  
from the 
countryside 
listening to  
Viktor Yushchenko  
at an Orange 
Revolution rally 
(photo by  
Konstantin  




                      Iconization of political leaders started with the Orange Revolution, and 
continued in its aftermath (see Exhibit 4.3.a).   It is obviously connected with the 
divisive politics of the two big party camps; their divide appears to be so deep that it  
was even compared with the eve of the Civil War in Spain.
577
 Each camp “creates its 
own reality” and deludes its half of Ukraine to accept it as the only authentic vision. 
This perpetuates voter behavior driven by infantile emotion that comes ahead of 
rationality and reason.  
                         Political leaders on both sides replace policy debates with “primitive 
clichés that can fit into billboards and banners.” The public has been trained to 
perceive politics in terms of “clichés, bogeys, and political buffoonery on Friday 
night TV.” Voters are urged “not to delve into complex questions and vote with their 
hearts – only not with brains. Civic choice has been consistently pushed out of the 
sphere of reason into the sphere of passion.”
578
  
                          Sociologists note that voters tend to become less demanding of their 
representatives, as well as more prone to selling their votes.
579
 This clearly reflects 
the overall crisis of moral standards (see Chapter 1, section 1.4). In the words of 
Vitaly Klitschko, a promising post-Orange political leader, “what is considered a 
crime in Europe, is a norm in Ukraine. Lies became a habit and the norm of life for 
the upper class of the country.”
580
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                         Elections of 2010 and 2012 showed a surge of the new phenomenon 
of “electoral pyramids” when voters, especially in rural areas, were paid modest 
amounts of cash – but en masse – for “promoting a candidate.” There could be several 
hundred of paid “promoters” in every village. Many were saying to TV reporters that 
they saw nothing wrong with such cash bonuses or food gifts from a candidate. 
581
  
Such was the latest episode in the political behavior of Homo Praevaricatus.  
                          In big urban communities, however, voter bribing apparently became 
less successful. Its biggest accomplishment is believed to be the political machine of 
Leonid Chernovetsky who twice won mayoral elections in Kiev (in 2006 and 2008) 
owing to decisive support from networks of pensioners that had regularly received 
food supplies from his charity fund.  But similar attempts made by his former deputy 
in 2012 were defeated – the “machine” candidate lost to a more ideologically 
wholesome candidate from the Klitschko party.    
 
  
                                                          
581
 Tetiana Nikolaenko. Ukrainska Pravda, September 21, 2012.  
197 
 




A still from video clip “Voting Blindfolded” by Internews Ukraine released in September 2012.      
The clip shows scenes of voter bribing and intimidation, where all witnesses voluntarily 
blindfold themselves to ignore violations of law and morality.  In this episode, a campaign 
operator distributes proverbial “buckwheat packages” as bribes to voters. 









                    The culture of doublethink and fakeness breeds moral resentment and 
outrage. Those attitudes played a big role in the collapse of communist regimes. In 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, they expressed the spirit of the 
revolutions of 1989 which signified a “rebirth” of societies re-enchanted with 
modernity.
582
  The same attitudes were present in the public protests in Moscow in 
August 1991 which defeated the attempted anti-Gorbachev coup.  
                       In Ukraine, the most powerful outbreak of moral resentment against 
political duplicity and fakeness became known as the Orange Revolution of 2004. It 
was Ukraine’s attempt to break with the Soviet past. It is somewhat inaccurately 
categorized as an “electoral revolution” with implied contrast to the revolutions of 
1989: in Kiev, Tbilisi and Belgrade, an election was a catalyst for mass mobilization, 
whereas in Prague and Berlin, mass mobilization and protests came first, and then 
free elections followed.  ‘Electoral revolutions’ are viewed as only distant relatives of 
the revolutions of 1989 because: (a) they are thought to be about electoral fraud rather 
than regime change; (b) their post-communist environment is believed to be less 
oppressive than the totalitarian communist system; (c) they are thought to be based on 
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                          In fact, all three assumptions are inaccurate. Indeed, the presidential 
election of 2004 became the spark that ignited the events of the revolution.  But many 
observers were asking in those days  – is this conflict really about an election?  A 
foreign journalist’s comment conveys this point:  
 
“You begin to feel that there is something you don’t understand in their affairs, that 
you don’t know their undercurrents. Both sides are convinced that they are choosing 
not the president, but the fate of their country for decades ahead […]  Otherwise, it is 
difficult to explain their sitting on the streets under snow, and the declarations, first 




                         The assumption that protesters got mobilized by indignation of 
falsified vote count (election fraud) is not fully accurate: it implies that there had been 
an electoral race of equally placed contenders.  Formally, indeed, there were two 
main contenders: Viktor Yushchenko, running as an independent candidate, and 
Viktor Yanukovych as a candidate from the Party of Regions. In reality, however,  
Yushchenko’s opponent was not Yanukovych or his party; it was the machine of the 
state, with its arsenal of intimidation techniques and hurdle-making, commonly and 
euphemistically referred to as “the administrative  resource”.  A strategist of 
Yushchenko’s campaign office was explaining to a foreign journalist:  
We were confronted with the fact that we had to wage a war with the machine of the 
state. Nobody was ever able to win against the state. […] This was the political 
essence of the situation. The whole machine of the state opposed us, with all its 
components. Not just some public organizations or parties. No matter whose name 
was there – Yanukovych or anyone else [of those around president Kuchma] – 
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particular names were secondary. So Yushchenko was saying this many times: the 




                           Thus Yushchenko’s campaign was re-enacting Vaclav Havel’s 
famous definition of the struggle the led to the revolutions of 1989: “citizens against 
the state.”  Two years earlier, Yushchenko ran for parliament as the leader of the 
electoral bloc “Our Ukraine” which united ten parties of various calibers. So, his 
choice to run as a “self-nominated” candidate was a political message in itself.   
                         But how different was the state ruled by president Kuchma from the 
states ruled by communist regimes?  It was no longer totalitarian; yet, Havel himself 
referred to the Orange revolution as ‘the second act of squaring with the totalitarian 
regime.”
586
  Young people growing in post-communist Ukraine were reading Orwell, 
thinking about their country, and it was making them want a revolution.
587
     
Kuchma’s regime inherited many features of the late Soviet system.  
                          One of them was covert repressiveness. Under Stalin, opponents of 
the regime had been openly arrested and executed. Under Brezhnev, they were 
frequently placed in psychiatric asylums or sent to forced exile.  Under Kuchma, 
repression was even more covert, but no less formidable, as shown by the tragic case 
of Georgiy Gongadze – a vocal critic of Kuchma who got kidnapped and secretly 
murdered by a group of police officers acting on orders that originated from the 
president’s office.  
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                           A perfect example of the duplicity of Kuchma’s regime were the 
temnyky – confidential instructions circulated among editors of the leading media 
outlets telling them how to cover current events, and which events to ignore. Those 
memos were formulated in impersonal non-ordering statements and sent to editorial 
fax machines, unsigned. Their form epitomized the Soviet double-mindedness; they 
were intended for the professionals of ‘reading between the lines.’  The phrase ‘In the 
opinion of analysts’ meant “you must write this as your point of view”; ‘the event is 
important and topical’  meant “give it favorable coverage”; ‘there is no comment on 
this event’ stood for “don’t even mention that it took place.”
588
   This was truly 
Orwellian centrally controlled self-censorship. Journalists and editors complied, 
fearing intimidations or even fearing for their safety.  
                            Just like in Soviet times, factory and office employees were forced 
to attend political rallies to express support for the regime. This was described as 
follows:   
Compulsory rallies take place not only during the working hours, but even after a 
working day. Those who avoid attending them are subjected to various pressures.  In 
Soviet times, collective admiration and fear of the authority were cultivated in 
accordance with the party and government resolutions. Today, Ukraine’s president 
Leonid Kuchma and his entourage act with the same methods. And the ordinary 
people have not changed much, either. They grumble in discontent, but sheepishly 
allow to be pulled by the rope to a butcher. The administrative resource skillfully uses 




Kuchma’s Ukraine was a society of Havelian ‘greengrocers’ – ordinary people with 
habitual compliance to the regime and its rules of the game. Since the Soviet times, 
the rules of the game continued to emphasize duplicity, doublethink, and 
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subconsciously accepted disparity between official law and informal “norms of 
behavior.”  One new feature was an increased scope of bribery and other corrupt 
practices. Honest journalists spoke in despair about a ‘suffocating’ political 




                        The call to ‘live with the truth’ was gaining strength in Ukraine years 
before the Orange revolution. A predecessor of the famous Pora was the student 
movement “Za Pravdu!” (For Truth!). It was launched in January 2001, in the midst 
of the loud ‘tape scandal’ (a.k.a. the Kuchmagate)  -- when recordings of Kuchma’s 
conversations allegedly made by his bodyguard became public and implicated the 
president in ordering the murder of Georgiy Gongadze, among his other dark 
business. The students demanded truth to be told in the Gongadze affair; but their 
motto had a wider meaning as well – a demand of truth as the moral standard for 
Ukraine’s politics and society.  
                         Three years later, this theme was powerfully developed in Pora 
campaign materials. The ideas and practices of Pora campaign in the spring and 
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Exhibit 7. 4.a: “The MATRIX” theme in Pora 2004 campaign materials  
 











IT’S TIME  to live a real 
life. Stop fooling 
yourself. Everything 
must be real: beer and 
coffee, joy and sorrow, 
the words you are 
saying, your friends and 
your Motherland.    
Today’s Ukraine is a 
“Matrix” where all is 
unreal: authority, laws, 
independence, 
presidents, elections, 
wages, knowledge and 
grades, rights and 
liberties, even life itself.  
It’s time to learn to live. 
It’s time to choose.” 
 
IT’S TIME  to live a real 
life. Stop fooling 
yourself. Everything 
must be real: beer and 
coffee, joy and sorrow, 
the words you are 
saying, your friends and 
your Motherland.    
Today’s Ukraine is a 
“Matrix” where all is 
unreal: authority, laws, 
independence, 
presidents, elections, 
wages, knowledge and 
grades, rights and 
liberties, even life itself.  
It’s time to learn to live. 






 and of the efforts to educate ‘the greengrocers’ that were made by 
KOR, Charter 77, and other civil society organizations that had prepared the 
revolutions of 1989.   
Likewise, Pora saw its mission in motivating the society towards a revolution and 
tried “to actualize the public demand for change.”
592
  But they did not intend to lead 
crowds in a revolution nor make a ‘revolution plan’ for the election day. In fact,  Pora 
never campaigned for Yushchenko as their candidate.  They produced and  
disseminated a series of flyers exposing ‘Kuchmizm’ as a system synonymous with 
‘unemployment, criminality, poverty, corruption, and hopelessness.’
593
   They also 
carried out many street performances and interactive events, much in the style of the 
Orange Alternative in Poland.  
                       One of the flyers produced by Pora employs the theme of then 
fashionable blockbuster “The Matrix”:  the image of two pills on open palms, offering 
the choice of either ‘the old life’ of simulated reality or a path to the truth – which 
starts with the pill that bears Pora logo. The opposite page of the flyer looks like a 
computer screen with the text: “File #1. Today’s Ukraine is the MATRIX where 
everything is fake: power, laws, independence, presidents, elections, wages, learning, 
grades, rights and liberties, even life itself. Stop fooling yourself.  It’s time to live a 
real life.  It’s time to choose.”  
                       While the public attitudes to the election and the agenda of change 
were shaped by a multitude of factors, the messages of Pora definitely helped to 
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frame them for those who came out on the streets. Neither Pora, nor Yushchenko 
campaign headquarters expected the massive turnout on the first day of the protests 
on Kiev’s  central square.  There are indications that both of the competing sides were 
“genuinely surprised by the scale, persistence, and devotion of the crowds” there.
594
  
The total number of people who came out on the streets to take part in rallies and       
protests is estimated at nearly 5.5 million – which was roughly 15% of the country’s 
adult population.
595
    
           This was a moment of redemption for Ukraine’s ‘greengrocer society’, as 
reflected in the name given to the Orange revolution by Aleksander Kwasniewski 
(who closely observed it as well as mediated the round table talks in Kiev). He called 
it “the revolution of dignity.”
596
   Yushchenko voters were not driven by a single 
coherent ideology
597
. What united them was the rejection of the Kuchmist system and 
a hope to have its wrongs corrected. This was eloquently emphasized by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski: 
The Orange revolution was a revolution of hope, of genuine hope, and, in many 
respects, also abstract hope […]  It was in a sense a moment in which a transcendent 
shared sense of national identity defined in democratic content became a common 
property of the Ukrainian people. It was a mood, it was a faith, it was an aspiration, it 
was a desire and it was also very much a determination. […] In many respects 
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                        The Orange Revolution dealt a strong blow to the post-Soviet culture 
of submissive fear. It would not have been possible without genuine grass-root action, 
which became epitomized by the “orange ribbon initiative” – when citizens not even 
affiliated with Yushchenko campaign organizations came up with the idea to wear 
orange as a sign of their civic solidarity.
599
   The orange ribbon initiative became the 
turning point in mass mobilization for the revolution. To begin wearing an orange 
ribbon (or sweater, or scarf) instantly became a statement of civic dignity: “I do not 
fear! I am a free person!”   Andriy  Bondar, a Ukrainian writer, recalls those days as 
‘an orange epidemic’ explaining that it created  an instant sense of solidarity and 
hearty trust among strangers – and that was a unique and new feeling for many 
Ukrainians.
600
  In Bondar’s view, “the anthropology of the Orange Revolution” 
remains its biggest accomplishment.  Bondar also emphasizes that the experience of 
great emotional uplifting in the Orange revolution made as much impact on the minds 
of Ukrainians as the Prague Spring on Czechs or the 1981 Solidarity campaign on 
Poles. 
                       Yet, the Orange Revolution carnival also played a function of medieval 
European carnivals by being a “safety valve”– because the revolution of a carnival is  
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Exhibit 7.4.b:  “Anthropology of the Orange Revolution.” 
In the words of a prominent writer, “the anthropology” of the Orange Revolution was its biggest 
accomplishment. The rallies brought an instant sense of solidarity and trust – a unique and 
new feeling for many Ukrainians. Hand-made motto says: “We are the people.” (Photos by 











phony, enacted, and only perpetuates the status quo.
601
   The carnival of the Orange 
Revolution was very optimistic; but it did not result in any significant institutional 
changes for the country, unlike this was in Poland, Chechoslovakia, or Hungary.  
                         One critical aspect that made the Orange revolution different from the 
revolutions of 1989 was the role of critical intellectuals. In 2004,  Ukraine had no 
political leaders of great intellectual and moral authority that had come from outside 
the old system, similar to Walesa, Michnik, or Havel.    Viktor Yushchenko became 
the iconic spiritual leader in 2004 because he was intuitively perceived as one that 
differed from all others in the government; he was the only one that seemed honest, 
moral, hearty, and unselfish. Two years earlier, Yulia Mostovaia spoke of 
Yushchenko as ‘the Ukrainian Havel,” also adding that the two leaders were as much 
different as their respective societies.
602
 
                          However, Yushchenko’s rule also became the biggest disappointment 
for his inspired supporters; so many hopes were defeated.  The grass-root movement 
that brought him to power remained separated from “the party of power” – which was 
formally established by the government bureaucracy under the name of “People’s 
Union ‘Our Ukraine.’”
603
 Enthusiasm and hope were replaced by growing frustration 
and cynicism. By the end of his rule, Yushchenko’s approval rate was less than 10%, 
and he gained only 5.4% of the vote when attempting to run for a second presidential 
term in January 2010.  
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                          Looking back, former enthusiasts of the Orange Revolution see its 
main accomplishment in the “exacerbation of political and social ills” – which is 
positive because “exacerbation is a step to recovery.” As a young blogger explains,   
“Now we have seen how ugly the system is. We realize that it is wrong. Freedom of 
speech has given us the opportunity to speak openly. The more open information goes 




                        But a part of post-Orange disenchantment was due to the realization 
that the freedom to speak openly did not make political debates more substantive. In 
fact, the opposite took place – party contestation became more dispirited and 
virtualized.
605
 This feeling resulted in the growth of “against all” attitude. Some 
opinion leaders voiced out “the manifesto of ordinary voters: we don’t believe in 
politicians and refuse to go to their rallies!”
606
   Others blamed the mindset of the 
voters maintaining that it was still “Orwellian”:  
“Our voters’ attitudes surpass Orwell’s imagination! We independently mastered the 
skill of doublethink, and we practice it every minute. How does it happen that those 
who are the most vehemently criticized and hated become the leaders in an electoral 
race? The result is predetermined, no matter who gets to be the winner. We have to 
choose between the two evils – because we choose inside a circle that can only 
contain evil. Apparently, we want to go on living that way. We fear to confess, but we 
do not really want change; we are quite content with the existing system – old, rotten, 
perverse, but so habitual.” 
607
  
                        Post-Orange politics is now compared to “the world of simulacra in 
which even a small genuine act becomes a ray of light in the dark.”  Those genuine 
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but weak and low-numbered activist groups become conspicuous because the society 
still has a demand for “normal politics, normal civic organizations, and for parties 
that look like real parties.” 
608
  That fac*tor is commonly named as the reason why a 
radical party like Svoboda was able to earn considerable support among moderate 
mainstream voters: it earned their sympathy just because it “looks and acts like a real 
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CHAPTER 8   
DOUBLETHINK AND                                                           
POST-SOVIIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
 
 





                          The collapse of communist regimes did not result in a complete 
turnover of the political class. In the countries of East Central Europe, “essential 
continuity of elites” was deemed to be a factor that facilitated the progress of 
democracy – because the established elites did not perceive it as a threat. However, 
researchers note a distinction between “moderate” and “high” degrees of elite 
continuity, and assume that there was a certain “threshold” beyond which elite 
continuity was inhibiting democratic progress.
610
 
                            Continuity of political elites in post-Soviet polities falls into the 
”high degree” category. A study made in 2003 – over a decade after the fall of Soviet 
communism – showed that former nomenklatura members occupied 73% of the most 
influential positions in the offices of national government and comprised 80% of 
province governors in Ukraine.
611
  Without exception, all heads of state, from Leonid 
Kravchuk to Viktor Yanukovych, were shaped by their nomenklatura past; the same 
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                            Experts anticipated that massive generational change in the political 
elites would modernize the quality of Ukraine’s politics. That generational change has 
evolved slower than expected; but most importantly, it did not bring expected 
improvements. It is commonly held that “the quality of Ukraine’s elites deteriorates 
with each new election.”
613
 Younger generation office holders are better educated but 
they “do not demonstrate a different way of thinking.” Rent-seeking behavior rose to 
a higher scale; young executive leaders “no longer take bribes in enveloped cash, but 
use offshore bank accounts instead.”
614
  Cultural continuity in leadership continues to 
show how right was Robert C, Tucker when he emphasized a long time ago that “the 
end of the Soviet Union as a state formation […] did not mean the end of the long-




                      A fundamental premise of that culture, as discussed earlier in Chapter 1, 
is a pre-modern understanding of power. “Our voter firmly knows that ‘the power’ 
cannot be elected; it is not produced by public trust,” observes a Ukrainian publicist. 
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Such implied “ascriptive status” of power holders creates low democratic demand; 
many voters feel that it is best to support those who have the power so that they 
would “do something for the people.”
616
 In shortage of democratic demand, 
successful leaders continue to be guided by “Soviet managerial culture” which can be 
defined for the modern-day environment as a set of four principles.
617
 The first of 
them is the understanding of power as property (consistently with Yegor Gaidar’s 
analysis).
618
  Power gives informal control of property which trumps formal 
ownership rights. The second tenet of “Soviet” managerial thinking is the belief that 
administrative controls work better than economic incentives. Third, it does not rely 
on formal law, but believes in informal incentives and threats instead. Fourth, it 
favors monopoly over competition.  
                      This “code of leadership” helps to understand why the emergent post-
Soviet order took on the character of “so-called nomenklatura capitalism.”
619
 A 
Russian thinker remarks that “their capitalism comes out to be as Stalinist as their 
socialism was – because it is so primitive, blunt, and inhuman.”
620
  
                       Nomenklatura capitalism is based on access to political leadership as a 
tool to distribute the “resources of the state” (such as energy consumption quotas, 
price subsidies, all kinds of licenses and permits, tax benefits, government contracts, 
etc.). In Ukraine under President Kuchma, the system of nomenklatura capitalists – 
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a.k.a. the oligarchs – emerged with the president as the political patron and arbiter for 
the competing clans. Their competition eventually created a peculiar form of political 
pluralism where those with disadvantaged access to “the resources” emerged as the 
political opposition. Under Viktor Yushchenko, the system of presidential arbitration 
was shaken; Yushchenko “was either unable or unwilling” to function as the resource 
distribution arbiter.
621
 Clan rivalry acquired more open forms of party competition 
and parliamentary lobbyism, but its externally democratic forms did not change the 
underlying essence of the struggle. Instead of setting up a transparent system of rules 
with “an even playing field” and debating about competing ideas in the pursuit of the 




                          Such duplicity of political form and meaning generates the post-
Soviet phenomenon of “virtual politics” and “façade democracy.” Deceit becomes the 
underlying principle of governance, notes Andrei Kolesnikov, one of the brightest 
Russian political commentators.
623
 The system makes hurdles for the development of 
genuine mass-based parties and produces fake entities with that name. Instead of 
genuine grass root movements, the system creates fake organizations that imitate 
public enthusiasm in support of government.
624
  Instead of truly open governance, it 
creates “public councils” that imitate accountability.  
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                         The value system of the post-Soviet political elites is interpreted as a 
“symbiosis” of two sets of principles: those of the old nomenklatura with its 
privileged class mentality and those of the new adventurous business leaders with 
their neglect for the law. Blended together, they accounted for the triumph of 
corporate interest and corruption. Their notions also became the model for the 
disoriented society at large promoting duplicity as the social norm. The leaders would 
commonly declare high moral standards but were seen violating those standards for 
blunt personal gain. This demoralized many young people who were getting 
convinced that success is incompatible with moral scruple.
625
  
                         Due to the shortage of public demand, political leadership in Ukraine 
is now perceived as “artificial and fake.”
626
  Name recognition and approval rates of 
today’s “leaders” are pumped up by the television. Therefore, observes an expert, 
“one can get the impression that Ukraine’s political leaders are appointed: the 
oligarchic make casting auditions and then choose those for whom the right image 
would be molded: a liberal, a democrat, a Russia sympathizer, etc.”
627
  As an 
example, regular invitations to Friday night talk shows have boosted popularity 
rankings from single to double digits for Arseniy Yatseniuk and for Sergiy Tigipko in 
2009 and 2010. The Svoboda party leader, Oleh Tyahnybok, was reportedly advised 
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to throw a pack of yogurt at his opponent in a live TV debate – which, he was told, 
would instantly raise his approval rate by 5% or more.
628
   
                        The fakeness of such leadership is also visible in the efforts of the new 
ruling class to collect various external signs of merit recognition – in the form of state 
decorations, honorary titles, high academic degrees, published books, and 
membership in select clubs or associations. However, this trait is often ridiculed 
because honorary titles inherited from the Soviet tradition have become meaningless, 
academic degrees are known to be traded, publications are commonly plagiarized, 
and select clubs turn out to be phony.  Scandals on those subjects abound in the 




                         Another way for the ruling class self-assertion is their demonstrative 
luxury. Elected officials and even law enforcement officers do not hesitate to 
demonstrate consumption that often exceeds their declared income (see more in 
Chapters 3 and 4).  Their lust for luxury watches and limos, as well as palaces and 
yachts makes a stark contrast with the living standards of their voters, and has been an 
embarrassment to their counterparts in European capitals. This lifestyle can be 
reminiscent of the U.S. “robber barons” of late 19
th
 century – and some of the 
Ukrainian oligarchs proudly insist on such a parallel in their favor; they appear 
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genuinely convinced that Ukraine’s Party of Regions is moving along the path earlier 
travelled by the party of Abraham Lincoln.
630
 
                          But unlike the U.S. industrial tycoons, post-Soviet oligarchs acquired 
their assets from the state in shady privatization deals. They are driven by pre-modern 
mercantilist ideas, both in their economic activities and in their personal lifestyles.
631
  
                          The style of the post-Soviet ruling class is described first and 
foremost as “glamour”—in the sense of “striking deliberateness” of varnished 
luxury.
632
 A celebrated Russian satirist notes that post-Soviet “glamour” is grounded 
in doublethink – because it includes a degree of self-irony that keeps uttered words 
distanced from acts. The members of the vogue circle “imitate self-irony and 
advanced mindsets: it’s like we all understand everything about ourselves and about 
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8.2. Virtuosi of Doublethink: Selected Examples 
 
 
                    The important role of doublethink in shaping the political culture of 
Ukraine’s post-Soviet leadership can be examined in greater detail at the level of 
individual leaders. This section presents an analysis of political culture traits 
pertaining to three consecutive presidents of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid 
Kuchma, and Viktor Yushchenko.  
 
Kravchuk and  Kuchma: the architects of the “blackmail state”  
                    Kuchma’s predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, was Ukraine’s first president 
and held that office for only two and a half years. A career functionary of the 
Communist Party, he headed the conversion of the mainstream party bureaucrats to 
“national communism” before the collapse of the Soviet Union – which meant an 
abrupt switch of ideological allies and adversaries in a truly Orwellian fashion. 
Kravchuk’s skill of political flexibility is reflected in the famous joke: while it is 
raining, President Kravchuk refuses to take an umbrella saying he can “just zigzag in 
between the raindrops.”
634
   Looking back, Ukraine’s leading publicist remarks that 
there has been little difference between “Kravchuk’s time of prevarication, Kuchma’s 
time of lies, and Yushchenko’s time of hypocrisy.”
635
  But it was Kuchma who truly 
designed Ukraine’s post-Soviet power system that was only modified but not replaced 
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in the aftermath of his rule – when presidency was taken over, consecutively, by each 
of his two hand-picked successors, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych.  
                       Kuchma’s leadership style was shaped by his experience as an 
industrial manager and a communist party bureaucrat. In that capacity, he was fully 
trained by the nomenklatura school of bureaucratic intrigue described by Mikhail 
Voslensky.
636
 As a Soviet industry manager, he strongly believed in overwhelming 
authoritarian control of every component of the system subordinated to him. A 
scholar who used to be a young analyst in Kuchma’s presidential staff recalls how he 
was surprised to see that the president’s order were “never fulfilled accurately and 
timely.” Eventually, he realized that what mattered for Leonid Kuchma was to see 
obedience, but he did not expect much in terms of its quality.
637
   
                         At the time of the Soviet system collapse, Kuchma was among the 
most influential “red directors” in Ukraine.
638
  Dmitry Vydrin testifies that in those 
days many of the “red directors” were absorbed in reading Mario Puzo’s “Godfather” 
– they read it like a handbook, with colored pencil marks. He remembers seeing one 
sentence especially highlighted: “Strength is the absence of restrictions.” In Vydrin’s 
view, that became the underlying principle for the whole epoch of the Kuchma 
presidency.  Kuchma “continuously fought against any restrictions for his power: if 
the restriction came from a law, then the law had to be circumvented; if the restriction 
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came from the public opinion, it had to be ignored and falsified; moral restrictions did 
not matter at all.”
639
    
                     Kuchma’s nomenklatura experience and power instincts helped him to 
easily change his declared political goals. While he was running for presidency in 
1994, his “winning proposition” was to support the Russian language in Ukraine and 
make the country officially bilingual. But he immediately dropped that rhetoric after 
he became the president. He even converted to speaking clumsy Ukrainian in public 
(while continuing to speak Russian in private – as demonstrated by the Melnychenko 
tapes).
640
  Five years later, Kuchma successfully assumed the opposite electoral 
image – that of the defender of the Ukrainian identity against “the Russian threat.”  At 
the same time, Kuchma, as well as Kravchuk before him and Yushchenko for several 
years after him, was presiding over “the great project of amnesia” refusing to rethink 
the Soviet past and to “de-Sovietize” the collective mind.
641
  In 1995, Kuchma 
energetically proclaimed “market reforms,” “investment support,” and “innovation” – 
but in reality, he promoted crony capitalism based on clans of the “offshore 
aristocracy” where no investor could do business without establishing clientelist 
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connections in the government. 
642
   In foreign policy, Kuchma maintained a 
balancing act between “special relations” with Russia and amorphous “friendliness” 
with the West – what his advisors described as a “multi-vector policy” but what 
essentially became “a study in ambiguity.”   
                        Kuchma was also characterized as a master of venturous political 
schemes.  Until 2002, he argued that a “parliamentary model” of government was not 
fit for Ukraine; then in 2003 he made a roundabout turn and proposed it as the 
country’s best choice – in the expectation that he would assume the Prime Minister 
position after the end of his presidential term. 
643
  That was, apparently, Kuchma’s 
plan A for staying in power. His plan B, as confirmed by various sources, was even 
more cunning. Kuchma facilitated the rise of Viktor Yushchenko to the role of the 
opposition leader who maintained significant personal loyalty to him. He also 
handpicked Viktor Yanukovych as his official “successor” for the 2004 presidential 
elections – the candidate whom many perceived as “the bigger evil” than other 
figures in the “party of power.”
644
  It is commonly believed that Kuchma  anticipated 
a clash between Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters and intended to use the 
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644
 Yanukovych was antagonizing many voters outside his own region, Donbass, by 
his past criminal record as well his low-educated style. There is evidence that in 2004 
some Russophonic voters supported Yushchenko because they were against 
Yanukovych; but they would have voted for another Kuchmist candidate – for 
instance, Sergei Tigipko.  
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post-electoral conflict as the reason to nullify the elections – so that he would stay in 
power.  But he did not anticipate that the public protest would so strong, and that it 
would be targeted against himself personally as much as against the candidacy of 
Viktor Yanukovych. 
 
Viktor Yushchenko: the Hamlet of Ukrainian politics?  
 
                       Viktor Yushchenko’s political orbit has many parallels with the fate of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Like Gorbachev, he rose to power as a career bureaucrat; he was 
favored and handpicked by the country’s top leader (in Gorbachev’s case, this was 
Andropov, in Yushchenko’s case, Kuchma) to be the “reformist young hope” of the 
system.   Like Gorbachev, Yushchenko gained unprecedented credit of people’s trust 
for projecting the image of a “bureaucrat with a human face.” He likewise quickly fell 
out of favor with the masses when their admiration was followed by frustration and 
disenchantment.  When Gorbachev ran for presidency of Russia in 1996, he gained 
0.54% of the vote. Yushchenko and his party gained 1.5% in the parliamentary 
elections of 2012.   
                         Both Gorbachev and Yushchenko epitomized doublethink in their 
wavering and inconsistent messages and deeds. Gorbachev was criticized for 
attempting to be “the Pope and Luther” at the same time.
645
 Yushchenko pledged to 
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 See section 1.3.b in Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion.  
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dismantle “the criminal system” of corrupt power and restore justice and 
accountability in governance.  But instead, he had “one kind of hypocrisy replaced 
with another”
646
 and allowed a surge of corruption to unprecedented levels.
647
   
                      
                           Yushchenko’s political personality used to be described as 
enigmatic: he was called “the Hamlet of Ukrainian politics,”
648
 “a Ukrainian 
Havel,”
649
 and “Plato’s ideal philosopher king.”
650
  In one of the most elaborate 
studies available, Yushchenko was characterized as “completely weaved out of 
irreconcilable contradictions – which, however is not a sign of inconsistence, but 
simply a reflection of his specific type of thinking.”
651
  This type of thinking was akin 
to characters in Chekhov’s plays – beautiful dreamers who “evade action;” likewise, 
Yushchenko’s political behavior was based on “evading action” and “charismatic 
understatement.” The author of that analysis noted that this was a peculiar type of 
leadership based on “sacral and esoteric faith.” In his opinion, there was much in 
common between the public perception of Yushchenko and Putin: both were 
enigmatic “presidents of hope,” with each voter reading that hope in his or her 
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particular way. Moreover, Yushchenko could be seen as a “piggy bank of other 
people’s hopes and illusions.” 
652
 
                     Those qualities facilitated Yushchenko’s victory despite tremendous 
pressure from the administrative machine of the “blackmail state.” At the same time, 
they made his image easy to ruin after he achieved the electoral victory. 
Yushchenko’s former supporters eventually criticized him for inappropriately 
messianic tone implying that “the little Ukrainians” were not “initiated” into his 
special wisdom.
653
 More importantly, many accused him of “breaking the promises” 
to do away with clan politics, cronyism, and corruption.  Officials whom he had 
accused of election fraud in 2004 received state awards after he became the president. 
Despite Yushchenko’s calls to unite the nation, his presidency left it more polarized 
than before; he was rejected by the majority of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, which 
also played in favor of his political opponent Yanukovych.   Looking back, it is fair to 
say that Yushchenko’s attempts to reform the Kuchmist system collapsed for the 
same reasons as Gorbachev’s perestroika: his cultural roots in “the Soviet ruling 
class” made him unfit for an “open system” of politics where, in addition to declaring 
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 This point was discussed by Guy Sorman as a major shortcoming of Mikhail 
Gorbachev and his team (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.b).  
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
                       Post-Soviet societies are plagued by anti-modern cultural legacies 
inherited from Soviet and pre-Soviet past.  Their core syndrome can be described as 
doublethink – a mechanism of mental adaption that accepts mutually exclusive 
concepts without perceiving a conflict between them.  This results in blurred 
boundaries between truth and falseness, between right and wrong, between acceptable 
and non-acceptable behavior.   
                     Doublethink was the condition of life under the Soviet system.    It is 
perpetuated in post-Soviet societies in patterns of prevarication and equivocation that 
characterize the thinking and behavior of both the elites and the masses. Doublethink 
is also manifested in incongruous values and duplicitous rules that prevail in society.   
                    This core syndrome penetrates the political life and significantly impacts 
the character of modern democratic institutions. In part, doublethink enhances the 
imitative and simulative character of post-Soviet political parties. They operate in a 
topsy-turvy world of imitated supply and deluded demand and perform like “post-
Orwellian” machines of virtual politics.  
                     What does this tell us about the future of political parties in Ukraine and 
Russia?  Ukraine’s situation clearly shows a stalemate for further advances of 
personalistic parties such as those in the former Orange coalition.  They have lost 
much credibility with their voters.   All available information indicates that there is 
demand for genuine representation and linkage, both in Ukraine and in Russia.    
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                      But European-style programmatic parties of liberal or social-democratic 
orientation are yet to come.  One problem appears to be the shortage of competent 
and trustworthy party leadership. Another problem is all parties’ complete 
dependence on non-transparent funding from rich sponsors.  
                      For now, the only positive dynamics is in the trend towards a mass-
based party of nationalist type (Svoboda). It is sometimes mistakenly interpreted as a 
sign of electoral demand for authoritarian supply.  But this demand can be better 
understood in the light of contrast between Svoboda’s style of “genuine activism” and 
other parties’ imitative technologies.  
                      Grass-root civil society groups also show examples of genuine civic 
activism, but they obviously cannot serve as an adequate alternative to political 
parties as vehicles of political representation and mobilization. 
                      Changes in electoral law alone cannot deliver a change in political 
culture.  In 2006, Orange coalition parties insisted on the transition to party-list 
proportional election system. This was believed to be a tool for strengthening party 
institutionalization. Instead, that change of electoral law resulted in significant growth 
of virtual politics because party bosses obtained tremendous influence and did not 
want to be accountable either to their own factions or to the voters at large.  In 2012, 
the electoral law was changed back to half proportional, half majoritarian 
representation. As anticipated, this resulted in a greater number of local clientelistic 
machines, predominantly in some rural districts. But those instances received 
visibility in the media, and similar attempts in many urban districts, especially in the 
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capital city of Kiev, were not successful – machines of gifts, favors, and 
administrative pressure were unable to win plurality vote. 
                    Emancipation from doublethink will logically occur with embracing the 
values of modernity.  The educated urban class will clearly lead in this process. It will 
take more time to be completed, but the changing character of civil society discourse 
in the aftermath of Viktor Yanukovych electoral victory of 2010 makes some 
indication of that.  
                    The economic and political power of “the oligarchs” – or big business  
clans – remains a major  factor. For this reason, it is deemed useful to examine their 
political role in greater detail as a next step of this project. This next step of research 
would draw a comparison between the political role of business tycoons in modern 
Ukraine and Russia and the “political bosses” of the Gilded Age in the US.  The 
question to ask would be: how can the U.S. experience of transition from Gilded Age 
to Progressive Era inform the post-Soviet project of political modernization?  It 
appears that important structural similarities can be found; but such a comparison 
would also emphasize that post-Soviet societies face their specific challenge of 
realignment with the path of modernity by emancipating from the bondage of 




APPENDIX 1.  







This study uses 1990 World Values Survey data to measure the degree of 
entrenchment of "Leninist" value legacies in post-communist societies at the starting 
time of transition.  It checks the hypothesis that countries with less entrenched 
"Leninist" value legacies get better scores in transformation progress indices 
compiled by acknowledged monitoring organizations. Four different indices are used 
for comparison and verification purposes (those of the Freedom House, the World 
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Heritage 
Foundation). The data sample includes 21 postcommunist countries of Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.  Relevant questions and responses were selected in the survey, 
then response frequencies for each country aggregated into group means for 
“consolidated democracies” and “transitional societies.” Group means were compared 
by using t-test for equality of independent means. Variables showing the most 
significant differences between the two groups were used in building linear regression 
models. The obtained results confirm that  the countries where postcommunist 
transition has been more successful had a lower level of entrenched paternalistic 
expectations and egalitarian distributional expectations at the starting time of 
transition.  Linear regression models with those two variables explain up to 75% of 










Table 1. Comparison of independent variables’ means                                                                              









Reliance on  government 43.6% 57.3% .018 
Reliance on  oneself 32.1% 22.1% .033 
Positive sense of control over  one’s life 48.0% 39.0% .006 
Lack of control over one’s life 16.6% 28.0% .000 
Desire of greater income incentives 67.8% 47.8% .002 
Desire of greater  income equality 18.3% 26.6% .093 
Approval of  competition 76.6% 68.3% .038 
Disapproval of  competition 9.0% 11.1% .260 
Desire for more local participation 19.0% 11.2% .008 
*) Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
**) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, 











Table 4. Comparison of independent variables’ means                                                                              



































“no free choice” 
perception 
.103 (.565)*** .089(.530)*** .192(.557)*** -.142(-.809)*** 
Desire of more 
incentives 
-.045 (-.120) ** -.043(-.49)** -.088(-.496)*** - 
Adjusted R-square .686 .652 .695 .635 
 







“no freedom of 
choice” perception 
6.368 (.622)*** 5.565(.593)*** 11.93(.618)*** -7.93(-.806)*** 
Desire of more 
incentives 
-5.337(-.457)*** -5.008(-.468)** -10.34(-.469)*** - 




Fig. 1. Freedom House consolidated ranking (“democracy” score + “economic 







Fig. 2. Freedom House consolidated ranking (“democracy” score + “economic 





APPENDIX 2.  A Timeline of Ukraine’s Political History, 1990 – 2012.  
 
March 1990 
First democratic elections to the Supreme Rada and local 
legislatures. 
July 1990. Supreme Rada adopts the Declaration of Sovereignty. 
August 24, 1991 Supreme Rada adopts the Independence Declaration Act. 
December 1, 1991 Independence Declaration Act is approved by popular 
referendum. Leonid Kravchuk is elected as the President of 
Ukraine.  
October 1992 Leonid Kuchma is appointed as the Prime Minister of Ukraine. 
September 1993  Leonid Kuchma resigns from the prime Minister position.  
March 1994 Elections to the Supreme Rada and local councils 
July 1994  Leonid Kuchma wins presidential elections. 
July 1995 After a stand-off with the President, the Supreme Rada adopts 
“Constitutional Treaty” as a provisional constitution of the state. 
June 1996. Supreme Rada adopts the new Constitution of Ukraine that 
strengthens the powers of the President.  
March 1998 Elections to the Supreme Rada and local councils 
October 1999 Presidential elections. Leonid Kuchma wins his second term. 
November  2000 “Tapegate” scandal in the Supreme Rada implicating Leonid 
Kuchma in ordering the assassination of the journalist Georgiy 
Gongadze and other crimes. 
December 2000 – 
March 2001 
Civil protests on Kiev streets demanding Kuchma’s resignation. 
March 2002 Elections to the Supreme Rada and local councils 
October – 
December 2004 
Presidential elections followed by mass protests against fraud 
turning into the “Orange Revolution.”  
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January 2005 Victor Yushchenko is inaugurated as the new President.  
September 2005 Public scandal inside the Yushchenko team results in the 
resignation of the cabinet headed by Yulia Tymoshenko. Orange 
coalition split.  
March 2006.  Elections to the Supreme Rada and local councils 
July 2006 After lengthy negotiations, Viktor Yanukovych is appointed as 
the Prime Minister of Ukraine 
April 2007 President Yushchenko disbands the Supreme Rada and calls 
early elections 
September 2007 Early elections to the Supreme Rada.  
November 2007 Yulia Tymoshenko is appointed as the Prime Minister. 
January – 
February 2010 
Presidential elections won by Victor Yanukovych.  
March 2010 Yulia Tymoshenko Cabinet is forced to resign by the vote of no 
confidence in the rada.  
June 2011  Yulia Tymoshenko is put on trial on accusation of economic loss 
inflicted while she served as the Prime Minister and then 
sentenced to 7-year imprisonment. 











APPENDIX 3.   
TEN MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE 
(BACKGROUND INFORMATION) 
 
Rukh (“People’s Movement of Ukraine”).  
Was founded in 1989 as a civic political movement before alternative political parties 
were allowed in the Soviet Union. The organization takes its roots in Ukrainian 
dissidents, most notable of them — Vyacheslav Chornovil. Eventually was converted 
into a political party of “national-democratic” orientation. Rukh had sizable registered 
membership in Western provinces.  In 1991, Chornovil won 23% of the national vote 
in presidential elections. In the course of the 1990s, the party gradually lost some of 
its influence and was finally ruined by consecutive splits in 1998 and 1999. Chornovil 
was killed presumably in a road accident, under suspicious circumstances, in 1999, 
months before presidential elections. Rukh’s ideas and key activists later served in 
Viktor Yushchenko’s campaign of 2004 and in his party “Our Ukraine.” 
Socialist Party.  
Was founded in October 1991 by members of the banned Communist Party. Its leader 
Oleksandr Moroz was the speaker of the Supreme Rada from 1994 to 1999 and 
competed with Leonid Kuchma for presidency. The party generally stood on the 
positions of national communism, in contrast to the re-established Communist Party 
which more consistently oriented towards “Soviet” legacies. The party had a sizable 
(15-30 members) faction in the Rada in every election until 2007 when it failed to 
pass through the electoral threshold.  
Communist Party. 
Claims to be the successor of the Communist Party of Ukraine from Soviet times, 
although it was discontinued from 1991 to 1993. The party won 24% of the vote in 
the parliamentary elections of 1998, 20% in 2002, 3.6% in 2006, and 11% in 2012.  
People’s Democratic Party. 
Was founded in 1996 by a merge of several small parties of liberal and “centrist” 
orientation. Quickly rose in prominence as a “party of power” project. Later split into 
pro-Kuchma and anti-Kuchma groups, with the latter forming their own party, 




Social Democratic Party (United).  
Was founded in 1991, became conspicuous after it was headed by Viktor 
Medvedchuk, who later became President Kuchma’s Chief of Staff. Was represented 
in the parliament in 1998 with 4% of the vote and in 2002 with 6.5%.  
Reforms and Order.  
Was registered in 1997 as a aprty of liberal orientation. In 2002, became the backbone 
of Viktor Yuschenko’s bloc “Our Ukraine” in the Supreme Rada. In 2006 formed a 
bloc with Yulia Tymoshenko’s party “Motherland.” 
 
“Motherland”. 
Was founded in 1999 as Yulia Tymoshenko’s personalistic party. Later modified 
names to Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, and then “United Opposition – Motherland.” 
Gained 7% in the parliamentary elections in 2002, 22% in 2006, 30% in 2007, and 
25% in 2012. Its ideological orientation is amorphous; is generally considered to be 
an example of a “catch-all” populistic party.  
Party of Regions. 
Was founded as the Party of Regional Revival – a project initiated by several 
municipal government leaders. Later merged with several other organizations and 
turned into the political holding of the Donbass economic clan. Was headed by Viktor 
Yanukovych since 2003. Is the richest and the most powerful political party in 
Ukraine, claims to have 1.5 million registered members – although it resorts to 
“crowds for hire” when holding mass rallies.  
Our Ukraine.  
Initially this was the title of Viktor Yushchenko’s inter-party bloc in the Supreme 
Rada. In 2005, after Yushchenko’s victory in the presidential elections, the party was 
established by government bureaucrats as his personalistic party. The party’s 
influence deteriorated as Yushchenko lost popular support. It earned 1.1% of the vote 







APPENDIX 4.   
 
Contestation and successful framing: presidential elections in Ukraine. 
 
Year                     Winner Winning proposition 
1991 Leonid Kravchuk Independent statehood, well-being, spiritual 
revival 
1994 Leonid Kuchma To end economic crisis and make a more balanced  
language policy 
1999 Leonid Kuchma To prevent “communist comeback” 
2004 Viktor Yushchenko Honest and open governance, “gagsters go to 
prison.” 















APPENDIX 5.  Election outcomes and factional cleavages in the Supreme Rada. 
1990 
Communists –                          239 
“People’s Rada” –                   125 
Non-affiliated –                         78 
1994 
Communists –                                                 89 
Socialists and Rural Party –                            33 
Rukh –                                                             20 
Other “national-democratic” or nationalist –   35 
“centrist” –                                                        9 
Non-affiliated –                                             168 
1998 
Communists –                            121 
Socialists and Rural Party –        34 
Rukh –                                        46 
Greens –                                      19 
People’s Democratic Party –       28 
Hromada and other “centrist” –   53 
Non-affiliated –                          111 
2002 
     Our Ukraine bloc (Yushchenko)   –             111 
     Yulia Tymoshenko bloc –                             22 
     Communists –                                                66 
     Socialists –                                                     24 
     For United Ukraine (party of power bloc) – 101 
Non-affiliated –                                               92 
2006 
Party of Regions –                                186 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc –                    129 
Our Ukraine -                                          81 
Socialists –                                              33 
Communists –                                         21 
2007 
Party of Regions –                       211 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc –          116 
Our Ukraine -                                76 
Communists –                                25 
People’s Party –                             22 
2012 
Party of Regions –                                  187 
Motherland –                                          102 
Klitschko’s “Democratic Alliance” –      40 
Svoboda (“Freedom”) –                           38 
Communists –                                           32 
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